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Draft CPSU Platform Shortcomings Examined

90UN1738A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 15, Apr 90 p 6

[Interview with I. Tarapov, rector and professor, Kharkov State University, by Anatoliy Kleva, correspondent: "Events Beyond a Local Scale"]

[Text] I. Tarapov, rector and professor at the Kharkov State University, offers his thoughts here below on the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress.

[Correspondent] Ivan Yevgenyevich, I suppose you agree that the essence and the significance of the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress lie in the analysis and the assessment of the present-day status of our society and party, as well as in the characterization of our crucial period, which, by the way, it seems that many people do not understand....

[Tarapov] The positive quality of this document consists, above all, in the fact that it has worked out a political type of program formula—humane democratic socialism.

[Correspondent] It's this term that has caused many persons to be puzzled....

[Tarapov] What this means is socialism without totalitarianism, without an over-simplified class approach, without an authoritative-bureaucratic system, a socialism constructed on general-human values, on the scientific conclusions drawn from the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, the socialist idea has not died or perished. It could not die, for it is the historical law of mankind's development.

Therefore, I'm more inclined to a calm and sober assessment of the present-day period as a crucial transition from one form of governing our society to another form: from a totalitarian system to a democratic system. Here it's time to state a number of proposals for altering or amending the draft platform. In its basic part, this draft relates more to the present—it contains too little of the past and nothing of the future.

[Correspondent] I agree with you: herein lies its static quality and its insufficiently scientific quality. There are no theoretical or practical conclusions drawn from the errors which have already been committed during the course of perestroika. There are no forecasts or scientific predictions of the future, based on analyses of the past and present.

[Tarapov] Yes, the questions asked by our allies and our political opponents alike, no matter how difficult they may be, must be answered unambiguously and specifically. Thus, if the party proposes for a certain period of time to combine the planning and departmental centralized principles of economic management with a market economy, then what are the real methods of struggle against the might and absolute rule of the bureaucracy?

On the other hand, how does the party of humane socialism intend, under these same conditions, to struggle against the emerging stratum of plutocracy, against the deformation of the human personality amid the circumstances prevailing under the power of money? Because, you know, even now the tolerant attitude toward the morality of the newly emerged nouveaux riches is leading to a situation whereby access to education and to the best health-care institutions is becoming dependent upon money-bags. How can we fail to recall here the following words of the great scientist A. Einstein: "I am convinced that there is only one way to put an end to all this evil, and that is specifically by creating a socialist economy with an educational system keyed to social goals." Unfortunately, what one hears more frequently in our country nowadays are biting, scathing, and irresponsible phrases defaming socialism. In my opinion, we must approach the revision of certain positions in Marxism-Leninism with the same "Mont Blanc of facts," which the founders of this doctrine had at their disposal. And the role to be played by scientific research on these problems should be more decisively underscored in the Draft Platform.

Furthermore, if we live under the conditions of democracy and socialism, how are we to maintain and raise the level of discipline and the measure of social responsibility which would ensure democracy and the performance of its most important functions—the functions of governing the society? If this is also to be done with help from the power of money, then what will be left again of socialism?

The problems of socialist democracy are new ones—in both a theoretical and a practical sense. And if we, while allowing a market and competition, also allow the all-encompassing power of money, then we risk obtaining a pseudo-democracy: what would emerge victorious in the elections—the ideas of the parties or the sale of the financial support for them?

[Correspondent] On the other hand, will the socialist democracy be able to neutralize the power of the bureaucracy in order to guarantee the rights of the individual?

[Tarapov] Here too there has been a failure: the Draft Platform lacks any indication of fundamental ways for the party to solve the nationality problem under the conditions of its lack of a solution in general in the world of the 20th century, as well as its unprecedented exacerbation in our country. The ideological stances taken by the party with regard to the merging and disappearing of nations—stances such as the following: "Workers have no fatherland" have turned out to be groundless and without justification. On the contrary, nationalistic feelings in our time have become a serious force for social development. They often operate along lines which are opposed to scientific unification, to state and political alliances created in order to solve problems confronting all mankind—environmental protection, the fight against AIDS, epidemics.... In our country the exacerbation of the nationality problem threatens to break out

into a civil war and the break-down of the state. None of the ways described in the Draft with regard to solving the nationality problem will bring about any effective results.

[Correspondent] You mean that to create a party based on the profoundly internationalist ideas of socialism, the idea of social justice for all persons, regardless of race or nationality—to create such a party as a confederation of national parties is profoundly erroneous?

[Tarapov] Precisely. All the more so in a situation whereby these “national” parties, which are supposedly communist parties of the republics, have never been national parties either in their essence or their form. Only nowadays are they being made such, i.e., national parties. In fact, at one time the CPSU Charter permitted an impreciseness, even a vagueness, with regard to such concepts as the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, etc. What was written on a party card was: “Communist Party of the Soviet Union”; yet the name of the building right next door to us here is “Gorkom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine”; and we conduct a Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, etc. Strictly speaking, what we have is the Ukrainian Republic-Level Organization of the CPSU and its Conference, rather than a Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Against the background of the present-day exacerbation of the nationality problem in our country, the “national” parties have been compelled, in one way or another, to make certain concessions to the policy of “internationalism” so as to garner the votes of a certain, specific part of the population. In this connection, the example of the Communist Party of Lithuania has already shown us how easy it is to “turn up” in the “wagon train” of such organizations as Sajudis.

And so, a part of renovated socialism must be built on national principles and ideas which relate to all nationalities in equal measure....

[Tarapov] Their nationality platform must be genuinely international in nature. Otherwise, we would be professing “national socialism and humanism,” which is just as meaningless as national mathematics, if, of course, we recognize for social theories the same scientific quality and objectivity as we do for the theories of the national sciences.

Under present-day conditions, the pulling asunder or disintegration of the present CPSU into separate national “huts” would mean only one thing: the split-up of the CPSU by national criteria.

[Correspondent] Here we have approached the social and economic foundation for a renovated party. To say that this is the “party of the working class, of all laboring people” is unsophisticated at the very least.

[Tarapov] We must precisely and carefully determine whose interests and what strata of society the CPSU is

protecting. The only clear thing is that the CPSU should protect the interests of the inter-republican and inter-ethnic strata of the population, those which have been united by the idea of affirming humane, democratic socialism in the country. This party should be the vanguard of a society wherein the economic laws and principles of a multi-structural society prevails with various forms of property ownership. Its social foundation should comprise the stratum of politically conscientious and well-educated specialists, professionals in their own fields of activity. They are the fundamental moving force of contemporary social progress, based on the achievements of science, education, and culture. Their work is organically linked with creativity in all spheres of human activity. It is only this stratum which can share power with the bureaucracy, leaving the bureaucratic apparatus, to the extent necessary, as an element in the system of administering an industrial society. On the other hand, it is only this stratum which can skillfully rebuff political adventurism and demagoguery, the “meeting-type” method of solving state and public problems. This stratum includes scientists, the technical intelligentsia, and those employed in the fields of culture and education, as well as workers and peasants who are true masters of their occupations. Such a stratum matured in the depths of the totalitarian state with its “barracks-type” socialism; it suffered most of all from that socialism’s structure and its bureaucracy, which was intolerant of creativity. And it was this stratum which destroyed the system which we call “administrative-command.”

[Correspondent] There has been much discussion about the party’s need to free itself from economic-management functions which are “not inherently its own business,” and that it should concentrate on the political forms of activity, rather than substituting for economic managers and the like. Wouldn’t this mean for a vanguard party merely a loss of its own “qualification” by removing itself from the fundamental issues of social development?

[Tarapov] That’s a difficult question, and I’m not going to undertake an all-encompassing answer. But, by way of trying to approach a solution, I’d like to propose a path whose outlines took shape in Kharkov’s Dzerzhinskiy Rayon party organization.

Elected officials who have been “freed up,” i.e., relieved, of their regular duties during their period of party work lose their basic skills and, after a certain length of time, are transformed into those “party bureaucrats” and “apparatchiks,” who we nowadays so willingly and gladly abuse in all ways. At the very same time, let’s say, for example, the administrative and party staff members at VUZ’s have already been exercising their “elective” functions for a long time. They hold more than one position, while delivering lectures and conducting classes under various conditions of salaries or fees. And why shouldn’t we make it possible or even mandatory for party staff members and officials to hold more than one job in that basic occupation or profession? Or even

perform party-assigned tasks on the basis of public principles? After all, you know, the contents of party work have now been radically changed, and branch sections have been done away with. And here the party, in the person of its leading officials, will always be in the thick of economic and state matters, as well as social issues.

[Correspondent] Haven't you formed an impression that the Draft Platform suffers from a load of old-style thinking and stereotypes?

[Tarapov] Unfortunately, the Draft has not become an example of restructuring that style of thinking when it places "everything in first place" for human beings except education, science, culture, and the striving for knowledge.

It's time to state definitively and unambiguously, and, above all, in the most important documents, rather than just paying lip service to the times and to the stubborn insistence of certain strata of the intelligentsia, that the present-day cultural level of human beings, their level of education, along with their store of knowledge and skills, comprise that factor upon which the success of all the changes and transformations in human society depend fully.

[Correspondent] Why is it so important now to devote particular, top-priority attention in the Draft Platform to issues of education, science, and culture?

[Tarapov] No matter how strange this may seem, the revolutionary period of perestroika has created a definite danger for society's scientific and cultural potential. It is precisely during this time of rapidly changing events that future problems of education and culture are being moved to the background, inasmuch as, in order to win popularity, the authorities have to grant the masses "goodies" today rather than tomorrow. Only when wisdom and culture are combined with power, when the concerns of the present day are solved simultaneously with the problems of the future—it is only then that society will progress.

Speaking about the overall impression gained from the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee, I would not find fault with it for an excessive quality of making declarative announcements. In the final analysis, in such a document as this, it is permissible if we take into account the fact that many amendments were introduced into it during the course of the Plenum. To be sure, the mechanism for achieving a number of paramount goals should have been designated.

[Correspondent] Still, let me ask you again: what would you like to see very much in this document?

[Tarapov] I'd like to see it inspire in all communists a confidence in their own strength and in the correctness of the political course chosen by them. We communists have, unfortunately, found ourselves in a sort of inferiority complex. The fact of the matter is that nowadays

glasnost frequently does not convey the entire truth but only that portion of it which enjoys great demand "in the market." But this portion of the truth—which was banned for a long time—represents a negative assessment of the role played by the party in developing the country and the society. It's clear that all this is already creating a distortion of reality, a lack of respect for the truth, and an incorrect formulation of public opinion. We must bear in mind an entire series of indisputable facts and not be ashamed to elucidate them. Here are some axioms. Prior to 1917 only one out of every four persons in this country was literate, and it was the party which was the inspiration and organizer of the cultural revolution. For many years the peoples of tsarist Russia, who were living under medieval conditions, found their own national culture and literacy as a result of the party's policy. The party, the state, and our people played a universally acknowledged role in annihilating fascism in the world. The party was the organizer in raising the country up from the ruins caused by the Civil War and in restoring the economy during the period of the Great Patriotic War.

One could argue about the "price" of all these accomplishments. And one could speak about the possibility of other ways by which these goals could have been attained. But we must not forget, in this connection, that it was specifically the party which found within itself the strength and courage, even at the price of losing its own influence among the people, of acknowledging the unseemliness and sometimes even the criminality of the personal, individual actions committed by some prominent and "not-so-prominent" party members, as well as by many of its "leaders."

In conclusion, let me note once again that perestroika in such an enormous country as ours, with its tangle of extremely complex political, ethnic, and economic problems, is not an event on merely a regional scale. And we must agree with the conclusion regarding the lengthiness of this process—the process of making the transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

Emergence of Alternative Platforms in CPSU Examined

90UN1783A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 6 May 90 pp 1-2

[Article by I. Antonovich, prorector of the Academy of Social Sciences, under CPSU Central Committee, under rubric "At an Ideological Crossroads": "The Magic of Words and the Logic of Life: Who Needs Alternative Platforms in the CPSU and Why"]

[Text] Where did everything begin? It began with a discussion of intellectual diversity as a form of the self-renewal of ideology during the perestroika period. And that discussion ended somewhat unexpectedly—by the appearance of a number of documents that represent alternatives not so much of speculative pluralism as of political.

The two platforms—the Democratic Platform and the Marxist Platform—that arose on the threshold of the 28th Congress as official alternatives to the draft of the Central Committee's Platform represent, in my view, well thought-out attempts to break up the party's positions on ideological theory into parts that conflict with, oppose, and discredit one another. Their goal is to establish, in place of the CPSU, a multiparty system with a general abstract program of democratic reforms. Of course, if one were to be more accurate, the only platform that could be called alternative is the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU," because the Democratic Platform is not such. Because an alternative presupposes a possible different version: either the present program, or ideas that are proposed to replace it. The authors of the Democratic Platform are consciously striving for the complete replacement of the currently existing CPSU by a new democratic formation—with new rules, with new social goals, and a new method of functioning. Consequently, this is not an alternative, but the position of unambiguous opposition.

The initial theoretical positions of both platforms are largely identical. They view the current situation in society as a blind alley. They attempt to substantiate the impossibility of its further development of the socioeconomic, political, and moral base that has developed, proposing their own versions not only of developmental programs, but also of the future political organizations and social institutions. It is typical that in neither place is a single word about economic reform or the chief task of perestroika—the increase in public productivity in the material sphere and emancipation in the spiritual sphere.

The basic goal of the platforms is to create new parties. True, by different methods. The Democratic Platform is a list of political evaluations, without, so to speak, any abundance of proof, a list that is obviously intended for mass perception, for our emotional rebuff to the crisis in which our society finds itself today. The Marxist Program, on the contrary, proposes the theoretical analysis of the state of society. It clearly reveals the intention to develop a system of societal reforms that is intended more for the party functionaries than for mass perception.

One can also discern easily the differences in the specific goals that have been set. The authors of the Democratic Platform would even seem to be happy about the crisis in society and in the CPSU, a crisis that they identify as "final and irreversible," and they express the impatient desire to organize a new movement that would completely replace the party. The Marxist Platform reveals genuine concern for the state of affairs and a noticeable attempt to formulate a program for bringing our country out of its crisis, for reforming the part on principles of the classic theoretical premises of Marxism. Incidentally, it makes sense to take a more attentive look at the peculiarities of the platforms that have been mentioned.

It is easy to note that the Democratic Platform is based on an analysis of yesterday and that its creators offer their negative evaluation of past events as the justification for a fundamentally new policy. But we should notice that much of what is offered by them as discoveries has already been implemented in the legislative practice of the soviets and in the party and state decrees. This reveals even more the chief goals of the "Democrats"—the taking of power by forming a faction opposing the CPSU, with the purpose of destroying its political structure and mass-political organization. The specific deadline for the decision has been mentioned—the 28th CPSU Congress.

I do not want, however, to reject entirely the positions of the Democratic Platform. It does contain—and who can argue that it doesn't?—a number of completely reasonable features. They include the concern about the slow rates of radical changes in all spheres of social life and the desire to promote the overcoming of crisis phenomena in the party and the country; the appeal to the fundamental re-examination of the dogmatic views that developed during the period of Stalinism; and, finally, the admission that we have taken only the first steps along the path of revolutionary reforms, and a strenuous, long job lies in waiting ahead of us. The proposed fundamental changes in the CPSU Rules are also, to a large extent, reasonable—for example, the direct, alternative election of secretaries of the primary organizations and party commissions on the basis of platforms with a secret vote; the possibility of creating horizontal structures (associations based on specific-target, functional, occupational, and other interests). However, the means and methods that are proposed cannot be accepted, since these "innovations" are intended for only one purpose—not to reform, but to destroy the existing organizational structure of the CPSU. Moreover, a large number of theoretical principles that are known to be untrue are expressed.

For example, the assertion is made that the initial "point" of the crisis in the party and the country is the crisis of communist ideology. And yet it is generally known that the evolution of ideology only reflects the socioeconomic and sociopolitical processes in society. Ideology suffers from all the same diseases that society suffers from.

Another conclusion that is unproven is the Democratic Platform's conclusion about the increasingly intensified ideological-political demarcation within the party. I can predict the question: hasn't the sociological research conducted, in particular, by the Academy of Social Sciences, under CPSU Central Committee, established the considerable variety of opinions among Communists, and the serious concern felt by practically all the party members with regard to the state of affairs in the CPSU? Yes, that is so. But nevertheless there exists a tendency not so much toward ideological-political demarcation, as to a search for real concepts that are capable of bringing us out of the crisis.

I am convinced that the "forced cultivation" of the topic of the ideological-political demarcation is specially intended to create among Communists the impression that there is universal disorder and upheaval in the party itself. And yet research that we ourselves have carried out attests to the fact that neither platform—neither the Democratic Platform nor the Marxist Platform—has any movement formed behind it yet. Without a doubt the interest in them within the party is tremendous, and many of their principles are being perceived with approval, but at the present time one cannot say that they have already been formulated into mass movements. According to our computations, the number of supporters of the Democratic Platform is approximately 10,000-20,000, and of the Marxist Platform, 3000-4000. The platform authors themselves, who have not been stingy with their interviews, have difficulty in given exact figures.

It is possible to agree completely with the Democratic Platform's thesis concerning the completely nonconformity of the party's neo-Stalinist, antidemocratic model to the present-day processes of social development. But it by no means follows from this that in its present-day state it cannot bring perestroika to its logical conclusion. Of course, the party deserves criticism because the process of democratic reforms has been slowed down within it. However, one cannot ignore the obvious: by coming forward with a constitutional initiative, the CPSU thus made a decisive break with the old political model of the single-party state, and removed from itself the mission of a party that is "responsible for everything and everyone." The CPSU is currently traveling along the very difficult path of reforms, and it is the duty of Communists not to complicate that process, but to make it easier.

But let us be consistent. The stubborn extension of the negative evaluations of our party's actions in the past to its present-day activities, an extension that is so typical of the authors of the Democratic Platform, instills in the mass awareness of Communists a sense of guilt, or it completely paralyzes their willpower and their capability of performing work to carry out reforms. In my opinion, it is completely unjust, for example, to evaluate the CPSU as increasingly lagging behind the positive social processes and as having become the basic inhibitor of perestroika. This carping attitude toward the party, which is demonstrated not by just anyone, but by its members, is extremely dangerous. Because how will people judge us? They will say that if the Communists themselves are disappointed in the CPSU and do not see in it any possibility for its democratic self-renewal, then... it's as good as lost.

A sample of abstract-theoretical, but at the same time abusive, criticism is provided by the creators of the Democratic Platform in their approach to the principle of democratic centralism. Failing to say a single word about what they have in mind by democratic centralism, they only enumerate that it fails to guarantee "the genuine pluralism of ideas," "the protection of the rights

of the minority," and the participation of the party masses in the decision-making, bans horizontal ties, dictates "iron executive discipline that precludes any creativity or participation at the bottom" etc.

It is time to open up the CPSU Rules and to read to the platform authors the appropriate section. There it is stated—true, in just as abstract terms—that everything that was previously enumerated with the particle "not" is indeed authorized for Communists. And it becomes crystal clear that the "Democrats'" tasks are not so much to analyze what democratic centralism actually is and how it should be developed under the present-day conditions, as it is to compromise that principle by sharp, total criticism.

Another section of the Democratic Platform that suffers from abstractness is the basic section pertaining to the fundamental reform of the CPSU. What is contained in it? Essentially speaking, nothing except an appeal to reform. It also contains stipulations concerning the need to observe the gradual sequence of the reforms and to avoid haste that contains the threat of chaos and anarchy. But as for how all of this is to be achieved, once again there is not a single word.

Instead of specific recommendations the Democratic Platform has only one *idée fixe*: the CPSU must renounce its vanguard role in society, and must become a party of the general democratic type. The latter principle, I feel, is completely unacceptable for a party that arose and developed as a political mass organization expressing and defending the interests of the working class and the entire working nation. This kind of party cannot narrow the volume of its activity to a role prepared for it by those who are thirsting to occupy the "vacancies" in the soviets. Otherwise I'm afraid it would become an "Order of the Knights of the Sword," a kind of parliamentary Mafia that serves the interests of the especially active politicians, that is engaged in distributing the jobs, influences, and awards, and that is bogged down in interminable intrigues.

It would seem that the tongue-twister and the streamlined effect of the formulations in this section of the Democratic Platform are by no means accidental. The authors obviously wanted to stifle the "basic motive" in the CPSU reform being proposed by them. The subject, we repeat, is the replacement of the CPSU as the vanguard mass-political organization striving for the consolidation of all the progressive social forces around the goals and tasks of perestroika, around the cause of socialism, changing it into a party of a parliamentary game—one of many, and equal among all other equals. Just notice how persistently—time after time!—it is emphasized that in the future the CPSU must operate only within a system of many other parties. Thus it is being pushed toward the acceleration of the formation of a multiparty system, into the voluntary occupying of its "niche" in that system.

I shall state it directly: This "consistency" in orientation toward discontinuing our party's political role is extremely dangerous for its future. The danger is increased even more by the demand for the complete autonomy of the parliamentary factions in the CPSU from top to bottom (sic!), and the independence of the soviets upon its basic agencies. If the CPSU were to find itself in such a situation, it could easily lose both the experience in organizing and in discipline, and a numerical size that considerably surpasses the other parties.

In essence, our party has been offered an alternative that was employed by the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] on the eve of the election and that actually destroyed it. In Poland, I might remind the reader, the PZPR parliamentary club was created not on the basis of an election to the Diet, where it lost the majority, but prior to the election. Having scarcely been formed, that club became an autonomous structure, where the deputies undertook to compute the possibility of their own personal victory and to divide the seats and the official functions in the Diet that they have not yet won. This, of course, contributed to the disuniting of the party's leading nucleus on the eve of the election and became one of the powerful factors that predetermined the party's defeat.

I think that the federalist principle of constructing the CPSU, as declared in the Democratic Platform, is also unacceptable. It is obvious that the new conditions of uniting the republics in the USSR objectively place on the agenda the necessity of the existence in society of a single consolidating political force that is capable of rising above national differences and contradictions. Either the CPSU will become the only part that is concerned about the unity of the Union as a high-priority political valuable, or it will split apart according to the federative principle into separate autonomous national organisms, which is something that Lenin fought against for his entire life.

In general, the leaders of the Democratic Platform actively preach a line aimed at all kinds of demarcation: between the minority and the majority; between the radicals and the conservatives; between the parliamentary and nonparliamentary factions; by various ideological currents; by political goals; etc. This splintering does not presage anything good, since practice attests uncontrovertibly that all the political parties in the world achieve victory only when they act in unity.

In my view, the appearance of the Democratic Platform is a test carried out on the party—a test of its strength and its ability to preserve itself in the midst of changes. For the first time in many decades, the CPSU is facing a well thought-out, well planned attempt to splinter it from within. Therefore I am convinced that the demarcation with the leaders of the Democratic Platform on the eve of the 28th Congress is an urgent task. Because if the congress has "discussion" forced on it, the party will prove to be doomed to an exhausting factional struggle,

and the delegates to the partywide forum will be prevented from resolving the basic tasks of the socioeconomic and political transformation of society, and of eliminating the country's crisis state.

Let us return now to the Marxist Platform in the CPSU. Unlike the Democratic Platform, it is more of an ideological-theoretical nature than sociopolitical. Moreover, in my opinion, it can completely become the basis for normal creative discussion both on the eve of the congress, and during it.

First, let us consider what there is in this platform that evokes interest. Take, for example, the thesis: in view of the relatively low level of development of capitalism in Russia and the subsequent socially catastrophic situations (the civil war, collectivization, etc.), the attempt to construct an integrated, developed socialist society led us to contradictory results, and this is precisely what necessitated perestroika. The criticism of the so-called bourgeois-liberal trend that orients itself toward capitalism is also convincing. I think that the document emphasized in a completely substantiated manner the fact that this tendency is capable of creating prosperity in our country in the foreseeable future only for a handful of cooperative members, bosses in the "shady" economy, and the "upper crust" of the persons in the free professions. One's attention is attracted by the orientation taken by the document authors toward a democratic movement that is Marxist in its ideology and that guarantees a socialist choice, with such a party being one that corresponds to the fundamental interests of society. Therefore the conclusion seems to be logical: the path to socialism is the path for bringing the party out its crisis. And how can one fail to share the striving of the proponents of the Marxist Platform for genuine sovereignty of the people, which guarantees to every individual the opportunity to be involved directly in the deciding of social problems?

In my opinion, one cannot support here the idea that one of the conditions for bringing the CPSU out of the crisis is its transformation from a support of the state-economic agencies into a political organization on a Marxist ideological basis, an organization that comes forward in favor of a socialist choice and a communist prospect. This, in general, is the formulation of the basic position in the draft of the Central Committee's draft. And certainly no one will object to the party's orientation toward work in labor collectives, at people's place of residency, and in mass organizations, or against appealing for the democratization of life within the party, for freeing the CPSU of functions that are not within its purview, and for getting rid of those who discredit it by their selfish actions, will they?

Nevertheless, I feel that we cannot accept this platform either in full volume. And this is the first "but." For some reason its authors avoid even mentioning Lenin's name, and they remain silent about his participation in the October Revolution and in general about Leninism as the theory and practice of socialist construction in our

country. And yet there is concealed behind this "reticence" a political danger that is probably greater than the factional strivings of the Democratic Platform. Because if one ignores Leninism as a part of the Marxist ideological heritage, then it is as though the real socialism of the twentieth century will prove to be accidental. Then the only thing remaining to restore the historic succession is to take aim at the social democracy of the modern capitalist countries, the leaders of which, incidentally, also (although only verbally) recognize Marx and deny Lenin.

One can understand the protest lodged by the authors of the Marxist Platform against the many years of implanting, with the brand of Marxism, vulgarizing and dogmatic concepts. But I suggest that it is impossible to agree with them that the only way out of the situation is to return to classic Marxism. That is insufficient. Limiting ourselves only to it at the present time would mean changing it once again into dogma.

A section that is somewhat intentional and, I would say, arbitrary in the document being considered is the section where mention is made of the placement of the sociopolitical forces. The authors in an extremely carefree manner apply to their opponents the labels of "the bourgeois-liberal trend," "the social-democratic current," "the conservative-bureaucratic current," etc. Although today there are today simply no reliably discernible currents of that sort. Without a doubt, there are currently in the country a rather large number of actively operating individuals who are not averse to founding parties and public movements. They give themselves both traditional and whimsical names, each in his own style, in the attempt to attract people's attention to themselves. But the ranks of their supporters (and I mean specifically their supporters, rather than simply the curious) are not growing especially fast. Of course, this should not dampen the Communists' ardor. Nevertheless we shall make a common-sense judgment: the development of a multiparty system takes time, and the CPSU, as the ruling party, ought scarcely to accelerate that process or artificially encourage it.

Like the Democratic Platform, the Marxist Platform contains strikingly pale, or even primitive, formulations that are devoted to national movements as a whole, and an assertion only of their nonhomogeneity. True, it is extremely remarkable that the authors of the Marxist Platform saw in them the increasing role of the "lumpen" elements that are inclined to seek the roots of their problems wherever they can, but not in their own home.

But what causes the bewilderment? Neither of the platforms takes into consideration the mortal danger to the

existence of the union on the part of chauvinistic movements, and neither one attempts to make a distinction between the legal demands of nations for their national-cultural renewal and the activities of extremist groups of inciters who, in order to further their own power-loving goals, go as far as massive armed terror and bloodshed.

The Marxist Platform contains a number of curious ideas concerning the ways to bring present-day socialism out of its crisis. For example, the following assertion is interesting: the political system of socialism cannot be reduced to a multiparty system, parliamentary democracy, or even a system of soviets, but presupposes genuine sovereignty of the people, which guarantees to every individual the opportunity to participate directly in the decision of social problems. But what then? Alas, confusion. For example, something that in my opinion is hasty and poorly thought-out is the attempt to "substantiate" the actual dual power by creating under the soviet system mass-political and public organizations operating on principles of self-government. No one knows how the authors of the Marxist Platform imagine the functioning of the nationwide public movements and organizations—of workers, trade unions, consumers, ecologists—as the democratic foundation of the Supreme Soviet. Because, actually, all this will be converted very quickly into the *diktat* of free associations under the country's chief legislative agency.

Another thesis that is just as dubious is the one to the effect that the Soviet Union, as a socialist state, can be only only a voluntary union of free and sovereign states on principles of internationalism. Because that would be already a union of states, rather than a single state. The historic fates of all the known confederations are dismal: sooner or later, they broke down into groups of competing, frequently hostile, states, the relations among which were aggravated even more than those among states that were not officially members of that confederation.

Putting it succinctly, the ideological-theoretical depth of a number of the conclusions in the Marxist Platform are peaceably similar to the political infantilism and naivete of specific proposals. Therefore one cannot consider it to be an "independent" platform for renewing the CPSU. At the same time one can take from it a rather large number of ideas and formulations that, I repeat, would be beneficial to discuss at the congress. This is a platform not of demarcation, and especially not an attempt at confrontation, but is simply a different "reading" of the goals and tasks that the party faces.

I feel that it would be desirable to have a discussion of the different platforms at the primary party organizations themselves. It is important for the Communists, before the 28th Congress, to make a precise and unambiguous determination of their positions.

RSFSR Congress Procedure, Sovereignty Seen
 90UN1875A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
 in Russian No 20, 16 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Statement by USSR People's Deputy Gennadiy Burbulis, and interview with RSFSR People's Deputy Sergey Krasavchenko, deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Ye. Domnysheva; first paragraph is LITERATURNAYA GAZETA introduction: "What Russia Should Be"]

[Text] The First RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies opens today. It is a significant event which will be decisive for our country to a great degree. A great deal will be discussed during these days and positions will have to be taken on a great many issues. While those elected by the numerous peoples of the Russian Federation are gathering in the Kremlin, we asked two people's deputies to share with us their thoughts on the congress.

USSR People's Deputy Gennadiy Burbulis

I consider it most difficult, but absolutely necessary, to refrain from having groups and personalities come to terms at the congress—we must structure our work around proposed programs. And if the Congress sets out on this path—which Union congresses have been entirely unable to do—then we will get a natural, "unpressured" answer to the question of who specifically is capable of implementing the chosen best program in the best way. And then we will see an easing of that tense expectation which today prevails in the republic and the country as well—whom will the congress choose as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet? Yeltsin or someone else?

Unity is necessary for another exceedingly important reason as well. Deputy activity over the period of a year has convinced us that the work of our highest organ of authority depends to a great extent on such a delicate property as voter confidence. Poland held out so long on trust, if you will, in her crisis situation... There is one way to firmly secure this delicate material—to prove through the course of the Congress itself that Russia's deputies are united not around certain people's ambitions, but around the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the residents of the republic.

I realize in this regard, of course, that the Russian deputies are required—as we were required—to begin functioning in a structure of low efficiency. As the highest organ of authority, called upon to make responsible decisions, the Congress justifies itself poorly. But insofar as politics is the art of what is possible, today we must do everything possible to see to it that the Congress fulfills its intended function all the same. But many underwater reefs lie in its path.

One of the most dangerous of these is the fact that most deputies are arriving at the Congress unprepared. From

this springs the possibility that the Congress may be manipulated. Yes, I know there was preparatory work, committees met, endeavors were made by regional and group conferences. But none of this can replace broad pre-Congress debate—in groups, factions, and schools of thought, where positions are developed and argumentation sharpened. The Congress itself is the place where program comparison, constructive criticism, search for compromise, and development of final solutions should be taking place. If the Russian deputies recognize their status to its full extent—a deputy being a state political functionary, the soviets and the Congress being organs to exercise state political leadership—and if they are able to defend this status through the law and regulations, this will be a tremendous victory in itself! It is therefore extremely important for the deputies—and the voters too, by the way—not to consider matters of procedure and regulations as secondary issues. How many times we burned ourselves on this at our congresses, until we learned (and not everyone learned it) that it is precisely matters of regulations which contain built-in opportunities for being manipulated. And some additional advice—our experience shows that groups of deputies, and factions perhaps as well, deserve a great deal of attention and respect. They will be at the Congress regardless; they already exist. I would like to see them treated like normal subdivisions within any social structure.

One gets the impression that we all contributed to this Congress through excruciating congresses in the country yielding little in the way of results, through our wordy sessions of the Supreme Soviet—where decent laws are adopted but not applied, through participation in the work of the local soviets—in order to attempt in fact to unite plans with execution; and that we contributed, finally, with all the efforts of our thoughts and feelings, hoping that what we fail to accomplish on the union level might turn out to be possible on the Russia level. And the other republics would be inspired by the example of Russia.

Interview with RSFSR People's Deputy Sergey Krasavchenko, deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Ye. Domnysheva

[Domnysheva] Sergey Nikolayevich, today the question of sovereignty of the Russian Federation has a special status. It is a huge territory with a multitude of ethnic formations. I would think sovereignty will be one of the "hottest" issues at the Congress.

[Krasavchenko] No doubt about it—insofar as this is one of the key problems which must be decided for the Russian Federation to be able to more quickly extricate itself from the deep economic and social crisis it finds itself in along with other republics. Genuine sovereignty for Russia means independence in making political and economic decisions, in drawing up and implementing legislation, and a great deal more. Many republics have already taken the first steps in the acquisition of their

sovereignty. I will not address the complex form of sovereignty proposed by the Baltic republics, but we also have the example of Georgia. They justly raise the question of the priority of republic laws over Union laws. This means that resolutions of the Union Government become effective in the RSFSR if they do not go against the laws of Russia.

Today, unfortunately, it is as if all the republic parliaments are subordinate to the will of the Union parliament. I will cite just one example. The apparatus of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet worded our proposals on introducing amendments to the RSFSR Constitution in this manner: "...amendments to the RSFSR Constitution with the aim of bringing it into conformance with the USSR Constitution." (!)

The position of a non-sovereign republic with respect to a higher Union organ is more than clear. Almost all Russian resolutions are adopted only in the development of USSR resolutions.

[Domnysheva] The idea of introducing presidential rule took solid root in the country beginning in 1990. Following election of the Union president, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan set out along this same path. We cannot exclude the possibility that the issue of electing a president will come up at the Russian Congress as well. When, where, and how, in your view, should presidential elections be conducted?

[Krasavchenko] A great number of delegates, including myself, are convinced that it is too early today to raise the question of an RSFSR president. First of all, the president should be elected by all the people, by direct and secret balloting, and not at the Congress. Russia has endured a long time—it has the strength to endure a bit longer until general elections. Today we must elect a chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. He will function in such capacity one or two years, over which time legislation and terms will be readied for a new Union treaty. There will be a demarcation between the powers of RSFSR and USSR president. If we select a president today at the Congress, the situation might change in connection with a new Union treaty—and suddenly we have an elected president who cannot conform to the new tasks?! It is my conviction that we should elect someone president based on specific authorities and specific tasks. Today in this transition period, when everything is not yet defined regarding the republic, it is too early to be talking about a presidency.

[Domnysheva] Russia, as we know, is not one of those republics which are showing prosperity against the Union background. What can you say about the economy of the Russian Federation, and is there a program for emerging from the crisis?

[Krasavchenko] As an economist, it is not easy for me to answer this question in brief terms. Along with all the problems every republic faces, the extrication of Russia from deep crisis is further complicated by two aspects. First of all, Russia occupies a position significantly lower

than most republics according to many economic and social indices. I will not cite the statistics—they are universally known. As they say—we do not have roads, nor hospitals, nor housing... and where these do exist, they are considerably worse than others'. Secondly, the scale of the economy is such that it introduces special complications. The larger and heavier the train is, the more difficult it is to position it on new economic tracks, the more complicated it is to overcome the inertia of crisis. But on the other hand, Russia's rich resources have been utilized in such unthinking, senseless, and careless fashion that simply putting all of this in proper order would yield a colossal return. New forms of economic management, a normally functioning open market for our republics and for foreign countries, and the establishment of market ties advantageous to Russia—this is our salvation. A group of economists under the leadership of Deputy M. Bocharov has concluded that were we just to shift to world prices, Russia, which presently has a deficit in trade with other republics, would move to the profit side.

New Volgograd Obkom First Secretary

90UN1297A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in
Russian 18 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent in Volgograd I. Mordvintsev: "Why Are We Being Tardy? Notes from the Volgograd Oblast Party Conference"]

[Text] The idea stated in the headline of these notes was voiced by the youngest delegate to the conference V. Vengerov, first secretary of the Zhirmovskiy rayon party committee [raykom]: "We can argue a lot about the nature of rallies that have seethed here in recent days. However, here is something that we definitely have to agree with: An overhaul of our party house is long overdue, but we are being tardy with it."

Vladimir Aleksandrovich recalled a situation that was until recently quite characteristic of the oblast party organization. The unfit methods of the former leaders of the oblast and their violations of the principle of social justice caused the communists and all workers to sharply criticize them. In late January, the first secretary and the obkom [oblast party committee] bureau had to resign. A temporary obkom bureau was charged with preparing and holding an extraordinary party conference on a volunteer basis (the delegates expressed their gratitude to the bureau for the work done). Naturally, the bureau could not assume responsibility for everything that had happened. The fact that both Chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee A. Orlov and Chairman of the City Executive Committee Yu. Starovatykh were defeated in the elections to the soviets held on 4 March also exacerbated the situation.

I noticed this: In front of the House of Political Education where the conference was held (incidentally, it was broadcast on the radio and TV) the delegates were

greeted by pickets who handed them detailed "compromising materials" concerning those who, in the opinion of the picketers, were expected to be elected to the leadership of the obkom. There were no customary greetings telegrams from neighbors. Apparently, they had become so fed up with ostentation that when one of the members of the presidium proposed sending a greetings message to the newly elected president of the Soviet Union, the audience did not support him.

And yet... the delegates, even though they were elected by direct vote right in the primary party organizations, did not depart too far from the framework of customary patterns. Here is an altogether paradoxical detail. At the obkom plenum which preceded the conference it was resolved not to read the summary report but to hand out printed copies of it ahead of time, and to begin the discussion right away. This was done. However, some of delegates demanded: "Read it!" Supposedly, some people had not managed to familiarize themselves with it. So, they still had to spend more than an hour doing that. Toward the end, during the discussion of a resolution on the summary report, they began to make statements in the old style—"amendments": "they forgot about our city...", "there is no mention of construction workers... power industry workers... tractor operators...."

In the lobby, they observed in this regard: How would the authors of such statements be regarded at the rallies? They would definitely not be able to hold on to the podium for long. But here you are welcome to beat the air to your heart's content. Incidentally, a survey of representative groups of citizens of Volgograd conducted the day before by two local newspapers indicated that the authority of local party organizations based on, so to say, "incontestable" power has been considerably undermined (it is no accident that only 45 percent of those polled attached any hope for an improvement in their lives to perestroika in the CPSU). At the same time, not too much power based on authority has been gained.

About 30 political and politicized organizations have already emerged in Volgograd. For now they appear to be small, but they are growing. Given this situation, is it appropriate to allocate lines in the resolution, or to stay calm?

As was noted at the conference, the ingloriously retired obkom bureau that manipulated the command-bureaucratic levers liberally displayed its lack of understanding of the situation and its isolation from the bulk of communists. The pretense of heavy activity was kept up in the process. Resolutions following resolutions which were simply no good were adopted. Still, almost all members of the bureau attempted to impose on the lower echelons something "of their own," frequently unrealistic and far-fetched: This is how their "personal contributions" were measured! Conferences and meetings with endless discussions were in full bloom, as in the

years of stagnation. However, collective discussions were ultimately replaced by the peremptory monologues of the chairman.

The national economy of the oblast suffered catastrophically from such leadership: benefits that were not obtained, and sometimes direct losses, went into tens and even hundreds of millions of rubles. However, distortions in the cadre policy led to the greatest losses. For years, preference in all kinds of nominations was given to spineless candidates who always remembered "to seek advice" and raised their voices only in favor of the stronger side, if at all. As time went by, the rest joined the ranks of the indifferent, and those who disagreed with this "system" were considered extremists.

How can one demand that the obkom members and all communists become political fighters after such "training?" Still, it was said with concern at the conference that there is no other way: Since the appearance of other political forces in the public arena lies ahead, it is necessary ahead of time to ensure readiness to engage both in dialogue and tough competition with them. It was stated straightforwardly that serious changes in the elected organs are urgently needed, primarily by way of nominating energetic people who are deeply devoted to the ideas of perestroika, and who are innovators with bold thinking. Such people are now emerging, mostly from among the young who, fortunately, have avoided the rollers of the previous system. However, how are the bold thinkers to make use of their... courage? Widely ranging opinions came to the fore on almost every issue in this field.

Let us say that, on the one hand, they traditionally recalled the need to comply with the principle of social justice at the conference. And yet, on the other hand... there were statements to the effect that it is undesirable to brandish this principle excessively. Isn't everyone entitled to his own opinion? This may be so. However, it is high time to think about working out a unified line, as clear cut as possible, for solving the mounting problems which the oblast party organization is facing.

Unfortunately, at the conference old approaches often clearly prevailed over thoughtful and bold analysis. For example, a noticeable decline in labor discipline was noted: In the past three years, the loss of work time in industry and construction increased by a factor of 1.5. What are the conclusions? The report stated: "The party organizations have not found efficient methods for influencing the collectives toward creating in them an atmosphere of high requirements and organization. They frequently fail to come up with a principled evaluation of cases of slovenliness and irresponsibility." Is that all there is to it? But speakers in the discussion added little to this statement. There were worn-out words, "evaluations" we are tired of, and smooth reports on one's own activities...

These cliches for all occasions are something else indeed! They relieve one of the necessity of considering why,

having abandoned the discipline of fear, we still cannot arrive at the discipline of interests and, finally, why, while verbally advocating pluralism of opinion, we actually give a hostile reception to an opinion that does not coincide with "our own?" I believe that the traditional condemnation of the press's "undisguised craving" for sensations and "juicy facts" was issued from the podium for a reason. So, would it have been better had the "secrets" that have facilitated the departure of many false authorities from leadership positions in the oblast never been revealed?

Indeed, there was no dearth of criticism at the conference. However, it is a pity that this criticism frequently lacked constructive elements and was not focused on searching for new ways to work. Ultimately, even this suggestion was made: Supposedly, enough overthrows and revelations have been made; let us concentrate on thinking about how we are to organize the rest of our work. Alas, this desperate appeal notwithstanding, there followed no perceptible influx of new ideas or "applications" for new approaches to the problems concerning the communists of Volgograd. In this sense, the exchange of opinions that occurred concerning the need for a profound revision of the structure of party organs was almost the only application. Yu. Shirokov, brigade leader of drivers from the Uryupinskiy Passenger Motor Vehicle Transportation Enterprise, was the most categorical in this matter.

He stated: "We should set forth in the CPSU Statute that meetings in the primary party organizations should be held when needed. The party apparatus should be halved. Let the apparatus 'live off' economically accountable activities for the most part—give lectures, do sociological research, rent rooms—rather than exist on our party dues... What is the situation at present? Cars for the gorkom are repaired at the expense of enterprises. If gasoline is needed it is paid for by a collective farm. Enough of that!"

V. Yermakov, first secretary of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Obkom, made a suggestion: "We need to set up a commission to work out a tactic for transferring power to the soviets."

Finally, the decision was made to confirm a new structure for the oblast party organs on the basis of the suggestions made. This will be done at the next "round" of the conference. It will convene again in early June in order to sum up the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress that will be held in the districts.

The first secretary of the CPSU obkom was elected. "The grassroots," the party organizations, directly nominated 28 contenders for this position. After some of the candidates withdrew, the names of A. Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Gorkom; I. Rybkin, first secretary of the Sovetskiy Rayon CPSU Committee of Volgograd; and V. Kochetov, department chief at the CPSU Obkom, were placed on the ballot for secret voting. All of them are experienced party functionaries. A. Anipkin is

one of the few "apparatchiks" who have participated in virtually all citywide rallies and defended the party line at them. I. Rybkin has advantages in his young age, his negation of all dogmas, and his ability to attract the attention of all kinds of audiences. V. Kochetov, who worked successfully as a plant director and in various party positions, has learned a lot in his lifetime. All of them were given the floor to outline briefly the avenues for overcoming the critical situation.

A. Anipkin was elected first secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Obkom by a secret vote.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee G. Usmanov took part in the conference proceedings.

Leningrad Oblast Soviet Presidium Meets

90UN1820A Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 6

[Report from the press center of the Leningrad Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies: "The Presidium Resolves"]

[Text] The session of the first elected presidium of the oblast soviet of people's deputies was distinguished by the businesslike functioning of its participants and constructiveness of its decisions.

Each of 16 issues on the agenda could rightly claim to be termed "main." This is entirely true, for example, with respect to the decision on primary tasks of soviets of people's deputies in the oblast in connection with enactment of the USSR Law "On General Principles of Local Government and Local Economy in the USSR." A necessary organizational step in the establishment of our own oblast newspaper was the decision to form a temporary commission for organizing the Leningrad Oblast Soviet press organ.

Far from falling out of the overall framework of primary concerns of the presidium was the seemingly mundane question of recategorizing the workers' settlement of Nikolskoye in Leningrad Oblast to that of a rayon-subordinate city. The people's deputies justified their request to the Presidium of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet based on the numerous supportive statements of settlement residents, on whose territory intensive development of industrial production has been taking place along with a corresponding increase in population. The status of city will permit a more active resolution of social problems in the growing settlement.

A draft resolution was examined on the proposals and observations expressed by oblast soviet people's deputies at the first session of the new convocation. This extensive listing of "painful" issues for oblast residents has become the guide to action for various subdivisions of the oblast executive committee.

The list of plans of the first order to be accomplished by the oblast soviet presidium includes the examination of

issues related to intensifying accountability for abuses in commercial activity and profiteering. Supervision of progress being attained in agricultural projects on oblast territory has been established. Preparations for the second session of the new body of oblast people's deputies are being accelerated. Among the most important issues is enactment of the USSR Law on the Land.

With regard to impressions gathered from the session of the oblast soviet presidium, we note first of all its businesslike tone consistent throughout the course of its four hours of work, the precise, well-reasoned judgments rendered—not always in agreement but leading in the final analysis to selection of the optimal decision, and the manifest interest of presidium members in seeking the shortest paths for traversing their charted course. It was emphasized at the session that the people of Leningrad are expecting specific decisions and concrete results from their deputies. Well—it seems the body of oblast soviet deputies made no selection error in forming its presidium.

Moldavian CP Plenum Resolution On Restructuring, Party Activity

90US0733A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1

[Resolution of the 18th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia from 1 March 1990: "On The Political Aspects of Perestroika in the Republic and the Activity of the Communist Party of Moldavia In New Conditions"]

[Text] 1. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, having heard and discussed the report of the Moldavian CP Central Committee Bureau, (First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee of Moldavia comrade P.K. Luchinskiy delivered the report) "On the Political Aspects of Perestroika in the Republic and the Activity of the Communist Party of Moldavia in New Conditions," notes that along with positive socialist transformations Moldavia, as all the union republics, has experienced in full the negative impact of the administrative-command system, the distortions in national policy which had an effect on the fate of the people and on political, economic, national and spiritual development. But the fact remains indisputable that the socialist period has given Moldavia the opportunity to renew its own sense of statehood and to create a modern economy which is a strong foundation for the achievement in the future of true sovereignty within the framework of a renovated USSR federation.

At the same time the serious ordeals that the people of Moldavia experienced, repressions, famine, the mass deportations of the 30's, 40's and 50's, left behind in the minds of generations recollections of violations of socialist principles. The monopolism of the central agencies and the voluntarism of the local leadership in the subsequent periods of the republic's development were

the cause of serious distortions in the economy, the spiritual sphere, in personnel policy and elicited a wave of emigration and finally exacerbated social and national problems. The national culture and language, the uniqueness of the way of life of the national groups populating the republic came under the threat of extinction. There were blunders and political mistakes in the activity of the Communist Party of Moldavia which caused both the development of the Moldavian people and the authority of the Party to suffer losses. During policy formulation and also in practical activity during the period of the Central Committee leadership of I.I. Bodyul and S.K. Grossu, subjective approaches predominated, as did a striving to do everything on a gigantic scale which led to a disruption of the organic link between traditional branches of the republic's economy and a move towards an imbalance of the productive forces especially in the agrarian sector. A real concern about the social-economic development was replaced by plans for unrealistic tasks, the encouragement of fraudulent accounting and deceit. An atmosphere of permissiveness, degeneration on the part of the leadership and violations of the norms of socialist justice and party etiquette developed. An adherence to the command methods of leadership found its expression in the replacement of economic organs and public organizations by the party apparatus which gave birth to an arrogant attitude toward the proposals and opinions of people.

The time which has passed since the beginning of perestroika has not become a turning point for the republic in realizing a course towards renewal. This chance has not been taken advantage of by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia. Passivity and the constantly changing positions of the Central Committee Bureau have led to a deepening of economic, social and especially national problems. The republic has entered a very real social-political crisis with an even stronger national opposition. Mistakes and miscalculations gave rise to doubts on the part of the population regarding the ability of the former Central Committee leadership to manage the course of perestroika in the republic and prompted a search for other public-political movements and organizations.

In conditions of growing political activity of the masses a certain confusion on the part of some party committee and organization leaders can be seen as well as a slowness or even a tendency to avoid decisions involving crucial problems. A tendency towards a reduction in the number of new members joining the party has been noticed as well as an aging of the republic's party organization. The number of communists who have left the ranks of the CPSU is growing.

2. The Central Committee Plenum supports the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress which reflects key problems of perestroika of the party and society, opens broad opportunities for an objective analysis and a deep understanding of the historical process and experience of the CPSU and

the choice of political guidelines in new conditions, and expresses the assurance that after broad and thorough discussion, it will be added to and enriched by the opinion of communists and nonparty members.

The Plenum confirms that for the Communist Party of Moldavia, which has begun the process of renewal, adherence to the choice of socialism remains firm. While pursuing this choice, it soberly recognizes the danger of both an idealization of the past, an unwillingness to learn the whole and sober truth about tragic aspects of our history as well as an attempt to overemphasize everything truly significant and valuable in the historical legacy of Moldavia or represent it in a distorted form. The continuity of the glorious traditions of the Moldavian people should not be disrupted, just as its history should not contain half-truths, subjectivism and situational judgements.

While remaining on the ideological foundation of creative Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party of Moldavia renounces any form of ideological dogmatism, supports the freedom of conviction and rejects any suppression of dissidence. It is against manifestations of the propaganda of violence, nationalism and chauvinism, atheistic and religious intolerance and other inhumane views and will conduct an active struggle for the absolute respect of the rights of citizens of any nationality who live on the territory of the Moldavian SSR on the basis of the constitution and the laws of the Moldavian SSR.

3. The Central Committee Plenum emphasizes that the principle basis for further development of the Communist Party of Moldavia is its adherence to the CPSU Program and Rules, raising the status of the republic Communist Party, assuring its complete independence in the elaboration of its own program documents as well as in dealing with organizational, personnel, publication and financial issues, carrying out the political line in the sphere of state construction, social-economic and cultural development, the political consolidation of the citizens, the combination of national and international interests, making contacts with other parties and public organizations. It is considered expedient to elaborate a program of renewal of the Communist Party of Moldavia which will consider the specific characteristics of the national question, the history, traditions and culture of the Moldavian people and whose implementation will promote the advancement of its vanguard position in public life.

A proposal concerning the reexamination of article 6 of the constitution (fundamental law) of the republic will be brought before the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet as a legislative initiative. A rejection of the legal support of its position does not signify a retreat by the Communist Party from the struggle for political leadership in society.

Party gorkoms and raykoms should consolidate universally the practice of making political decisions through communists working in the soviets and management

organs for the purpose of strengthening party influence on finding solutions to the crucial problems of economic and social-political development. Their efforts should be concentrated on assimilating new party functions and overcoming the administrative-command style of work which evolved over a period of many years through an improvement in the political methods of leadership and a strengthening of collaboration and mutual relations with the labor unions, komsomol, veterans', women's and other public organizations.

4. Taking into account that the democratization process has been accompanied by an intensification of political activity of the public movements which have appeared in the republic, the Communist Party of Moldavia supports the development of a dialogue, discussions and collaboration with those who stand for socialism and who are promoting the realization of the tasks of perestroika. At the same time the Central Committee Plenum is against the creation and the activities of organizations which preach dissension among nationalities and pursue extremist, anticonstitutional goals. A strict adherence to the law must become the standard of activity of all state organs, public organizations and independent groupings, of the behavior of officials regardless of rank and of all citizens. We do not accept but condemn unsanctioned marches, lawlessness, ultimatums, antimilitary demonstrations, political strikes, threats, demands for a return to a policy of administration and a "tightening of the screws." The only path for reaching a consensus is a persistent search for organizational and political compromises, wise mutual concessions in the interest of the cause and of progress. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia voices its desire for a convocation of a "round table" meeting of all public-political forces of the republic.

5. The Central Committee Plenum believes that a mandatory condition for the preservation and further consolidation of the vanguard role of the Communist Party of Moldavia is the democratization of its internal life, the basis of which must become the power of the party masses. The activity of the Central Committee, party gorkoms and raykoms, the concentration of their attention towards the organizational strengthening of primary party organizations along production and territorial principles, their independent decisions on questions of acceptance into the party and resignation from the CPSU, the definition of its structure, directions and methods of work, frequency and procedure in conducting meetings, political acts and mutual relations with Soviet and public organizations and the utilization of party dues should be subordinated to this. During the period of preparation for election meetings, conferences, the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia and the 28th CPSU Congress, active work is to be conducted for the unification of the party ranks and the democratization of the practice of electing delegates and staffing supervisory party organs. Effective measures are to be taken to increase the responsibility of communists for adherence to the standards of the CPSU rules, to

decisively rid our ranks of time-servers, careerists, opportunists and from those who discredit the rank of party member with their moral unscrupulousness and disdain of party principles.

6. The Central Committee Plenum strongly condemns violations of party principles committed in the past and distortions of personnel policy in the republic and entrusts the Central Committee Bureau, and commissions on organizational-party and personnel work to elaborate, taking into account the proposals of the Central Committee members and other communists, a scientifically based mechanism to realize this policy which will exclude any dependence on the will of the party leader who assures necessary influence on the training of personnel and the staffing of a reserve as well as the direct participation of the party masses and nonparty members in the electoral process and the organization of the higher party organs.

In conditions of the democratization of party life the style of personnel work should be completely renovated and made to answer new requirements. With this goal in mind it is necessary that the party committees deal with personnel issues in a timely manner on all levels, assure the replenishment of supervisory staff with new faces, with people who are capable of creatively putting into practice the goals and tasks of perestroika, and strive towards a situation in which the makeup of the staff personnel truly reflects the national structure of the republic's population. The practice of staffing the party apparatus on a competitive basis and through recommendations of candidates by the primary party organizations and labor collectives is to be expanded. The formation of its staff in part with members of the electoral organs is to be considered expedient. Establish that the types and amount of financial support to the electoral party organs and its apparatus be determined by decision of a congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia and a Central Committee plenum under corresponding control with mandatory sharing of that information with the communists.

The Plenum obligates party committees and primary party organizations to develop democratic principles of personnel selection. To actively support the nomination to responsible posts of organizers from among communists, nonparty members, the youth and women who have demonstrated their abilities. To resist decisively any attempts, on the part of any individual, to push individuals into a supervisory position based on personal loyalty and friendly relations. To put an end to the still current practice of deciding questions regarding the promotion of supervisory personnel in private, of suppressing questions about the advisability and true reasons behind their transfer. To expand the practice of accountability of CPSU members elected by the leaders of labor collectives and people's deputies to the membership of the ruling organs of public organizations. At the same time to resist any attempts to defame honest and principled leaders and to belittle their role.

The Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party of Moldavia believes that it is necessary to elaborate in the republic a long-term state program regarding personnel training and to reexamine the existing procedure in this matter, keeping in mind the transfer to the republic of the right to make final decisions on questions of selection and appointment of personnel to union-republic ministries, departments and enterprises.

7. A renewal of the activity of the Communist Party of Moldavia is inseparably linked with the further regulation of its potential in the ideological and spiritual spheres, the confirmation of new approaches in ideological-political work, based on a deep analysis of the objective processes of social-political development, a critical rethinking of the expanding circle of crucial problems in the public life of the republic.

In carrying out the tasks of the restructuring of ideological activity, the Central Committee Bureau, the Central Committee ideological commission, party gorkoms and raykoms are to take practical steps to overcome the abstract-instructive character of ideological and political education. Ideological work must have a firm basis in today's reality, must anticipate the potential development of events and must acquire to even a greater degree an innovative character. It must promote an increase in public activity of the working class, peasants and the intelligentsia, taken into greater consideration their social, professional, national and other characteristics and interests.

The new social-political situation in the republic requires a scientific approach to the elaboration of programs of practical measures in the ideological sphere. The ideological commission and the corresponding Central Committee departments of the Communist Party of Moldavia are to accelerate progress towards completion of the draft of a new concept of ideological work in the conditions of the republic and to direct it towards a definition of the crucial problems in the political, social and spiritual life of society.

The Central Committee Bureau of the Communist Party of Moldavia, the party gorkoms and raykoms are to achieve an improvement in the material-technical base of ideological-educational work, to drastically renew the personnel of the ideologically active party sector, to strengthen it with people who have strong ideological convictions and who know how to think in the new way, to act effectively and to lead controversial discussions. To give special attention to the necessity of freeing ideological personnel as soon as possible from dogmas, outdated ideas and the stereotypes of yesterday, to the intolerable lagging behind by some of them in comprehending the crucial nature of an ideological opposition.

The structure of the mass media should continue to be improved and brought into accordance with social-political needs. Provide for the separation of joint publications of party and Soviet organs.

8. The Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party of Moldavia believes that party organizations must construct their ideological work based on the principle of a sovereign Moldavian SSR and Moldavian people, must instill in its representatives a sense of pride for their native land, history and culture. At the same time a logical effort must be conducted to impart understanding of the national problems of all ethnic groups living in the MSSR as well as respect towards each individual regardless of his nationality.

Taking into account the increasing tension in the republic in relations among nationalities the plenum demands from the Central Committee Bureau, party committees and primary party organizations an effective reaction to the complex political and ideological situation, its thorough study and analysis, well-thought-out and balanced actions aimed at a practical realization of the principles of Leninist national policy, the formation of a highly cultured level of relations among nationalities, a renewal of the forms and methods of patriotic and internationalist education. In everything related to the development of national relations, special sensitivity and discretion, principled behavior by the party and concern about the elimination of any existing conditions for dividing the population or labor collectives because of nationality must be shown. In the situation which has evolved in the language sphere party organizations and communists working in state organs must consistently put into practice the laws on languages and measures stipulated by the State Complex Program of Guaranteeing the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR with maximum respect for public opinion and its criticisms. More cardinal solutions are required for the problems regarding the development of the culture and language of the Gagauz, Bulgarian and other segments of the populations residing within the territory of the republic and the economy of the southern region.

9. The Central Committee Plenum emphasizes that party organizations and their elective organs, by bearing responsibility for development in the social-economic sphere, will increase their influence on social processes including the economy by political methods. They see their main goal in assuring in practice a real turnabout in economic development towards the needs of the individual and in creating adequate conditions for life and labor.

The basis for solving these tasks is the guarantee of the economic independence of the republic and the implementation of the economic reform.

The Plenum considers necessary the acceleration of the preparation and submission to the republic Supreme Soviet for analysis of the draft law "On the social-economic independence of the Moldavian SSR," the complex of proposals regarding the development of productive forces, the elaboration and introduction of an effective mechanism of economic accountability and the economic independence of the production collectives,

the development of various forms of ownership, structural transformations in the economy in favor of the consumer, taxation and price formation, the regulation of migration and the guarantee of employment for the population, the strengthening of discipline and organization in the work place and in the service sphere.

Special attention should be paid to the acceleration of the pace of housing construction, the manufacture of consumer goods, provision of food to the population, the development of welfare services and health care through a reexamination of priorities and an allocation of resources for these goals, the creation of an effective system of pooling the resources of enterprises, branches of industry and the local Soviets. Decisive measures are necessary which are aimed at the comprehensive material support of the strata and groups within the population which are insufficiently protected and which are in need of vital help and support; war and labor veterans, pensioners, poor families and the youth.

10. The Plenum attaches great importance to the necessity for a fundamental policy renewal in the field of ecology which must be directed towards preserving and replenishing natural resources, maintaining a favorable environment for the population, restructuring the regime of resource utilization in accordance with the special characteristics of the regions's ecological potential. A comprehensive strengthening of the environmental protection system is to be considered an important factor which determines the general level of ecological safety. This will be accomplished on the basis of the introduction of administrative-legal and economic levers, the strengthening of the public role in monitoring the implementation of approved ecological programs and in the resolution of questions associated with the deployment of new production entities, an increase in the level of ecological consciousness and the civil responsibility of the population of the republic.

The Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party of Moldavia calls on all communists to become active participants in the fundamental renewal of the Communist Party of Moldavia, for which there is no more responsible political mission today than the implementation of the strategic course towards perestroika and the consolidation of all public forces on the path of a revolutionary transformation in all spheres of life of the republic. DM/WHITE/aw 10/1537z may

Commission Chairman on Moldavian Delegate Selection

90US0887A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by B.M. Stratulat, chairman of the Moldavian CP Central Committee for developing a new democratic mechanism for the formation of delegates, editor of the newspaper KOMUNISTUL MOLDOVEY, and member, Moldavian CP Central Committee: "On

the Procedure for the Election of Delegates to the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia"]

[Text] The republic Communist Party organization assigns great import to the procedure for the election of delegates both to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Moldavian CP Congress. This issue has already long been discussed in primary party organizations. They justifiably assume that the results of the congress are going to depend upon the composition of the delegates. The spectrum of opinions on the account is fairly broad. Yet in the main, the essence is reduced to one thing: The election of delegates must be direct, secret, and on an alternative basis.

As of 1 January 1990, 195,400 CPSU members were on the register in the Moldavian CP. In accordance with the norm of presentation confirmed at the Central Committee Plenum 1 March of this year, 1 delegate for every 170 CPSU members, at the 17th Congress, 1,149 delegates must be elected (not including the delegates who will be elected by the Soviet Army military unit party organizations, and those of internal and border troops deployed within the territory of the Moldavian SSR).

At the last Central Committee plenum, the appropriate committee was formed in order to work out the new procedure for the formation of the body of delegates to the 17th Congress. With consideration for the preliminary proposals, the commission developed possible variations for the election of delegates; these were then transferred to the party raykoms and gorkoms, and published in the republic press for broad discussion by communists and all the workers of the republic. It should be noted that they all imply such a mechanism as would ensure the involvement of every communist in the formation of the body of delegates of our party forum. Guided by democratic norms, at the given stage of the preliminary work it grants broad freedom to the party organizations themselves to resolve issues associated with the election of delegates. In addition, it is necessary to emphasize that every primary party organization has the right to nominate a candidate for delegate, which will create the conditions for competition, alternative elections, and an objective evaluation of the political and moral qualities of the candidates.

The following is specified in the mechanism considered at the plenum: The primary party organizations in which the number of CPSU members corresponds to or is greater than the norm of representation (there are 110 such organizations in the republic) may elect delegates by secret (closed) ballot at their election meetings (conferences). At the decision of the party gorkom or raykom, other party organizations may unite on the branch principle in such a way that the total number of party members on the register not be less than the confirmed norm of representation, or by uniting on the territorial principle, to form party okrugs. Formation of both one seat and two seat okrugs is possible.

The aforementioned regards the first two variations of the election of delegates. The third variation assumes the participation in the election of all CPSU members, from nomination of candidates to voting—according to the list finally formed at the city, rayon party conference. At the same time, there are advocates of the election of delegates directly in the rayon and city party conferences. True, this stipulates the necessary condition of the nomination of candidates for delegate directly in primary party organizations, as was planned, for example, in the Kelerashskiy Rayon party organization.

Thus, the fourth variation, which was not published in the press, but appeared during the discussion of the first three, may be formulated in the following manner: In accordance with the effective CPSU Charter, the delegates to the congress are elected by closed (secret) ballot at the rayon and city party conferences. In this case, the elections are conducted on an alternative basis from among the candidates nominated in the primary party organizations, with consideration for the number of communists.

The commission members, in elucidating matters together with the party gorkoms and raykoms on the possible procedure of the elections, worked actively in the provinces. The individual discussions that took place with communists, the party meetings, and sessions of the primary party organization secretaries, party raykom and gorkom plenums, and the analysis of the proposals forwarded to the commission from all the party gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations for the "Schetmash" PO [party organization], the "Tractor Factory" PO, the "Tiraspolskiy PO 'Tochlitmash'," the Kakhulskiy city association of local industry, the "Patriya" kolkhoz, Rezinskiy Rayon, the sovkhoshtechnical college Aneniy Noy, the "Mikhaylovskiy" sovkhos, Lazovskiy Rayon, the "Druzhba" kolkhoz-agrofirma, Leovskiy Rayon, the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Avdarminskiy secondary school, Basarabyaskiy Rayon, the Rybnitskiy Rayon newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, the Kamenskiy Rayon hospital, the Ungenskiy hub party committee, and an entire range of other primary party organizations, many communists and non-party members confirm by majority approval the procedure for elections within party okrugs and at meetings convened on the branch principle. And in large primary party organizations in which there are more than 170 CPSU members, directly at party meetings.

However, as has already been said, there exists a certain incoherence in the opinions regarding the procedure of election of delegates. And this is completely understandable, since in every city and rayon party organization there are inherent concrete conditions leaving their imprint on the approaches to this matter.

The commission feels that it would be democratic if the party organizations, party gorkoms and raykoms were to determine for themselves which variation of the elections is most suitable for them. The main thing here is to

weigh out all the "fors" and "against" and to decide sensibly in order that the elections take place on a democratic basis, in order that in the final analysis authoritative party members, worthy representatives of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia become delegates, those who have recommended themselves positively in the process of perestroika and are capable of actively participating in the development and realization of the tasks of the renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party.

It would also be correct to concern ourselves with the representation within the number of deputies of communists of various nationalities, party veterans, women, CPSU members from among youth. The advisability of nominating and electing as delegates communist leaders of the republic, and social formations should also be borne in mind.

Taking into consideration that there functions in Kishinev a large detachment of communists from among the representatives of the creative intelligentsia on the register in various rayon party organizations in the city, the Kishinev party gorkom and raykom should think and find the opportunity to elect them as delegates in order that their representation at the congress be ensured to the greatest degree.

The mechanism proposed by the commission specifies the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress both from the party organizations of the Soviet Army, internal and border troops deployed within the territory of the republic. They will elect them at party meetings and conferences of military units. Servicemen communists will not participate in the elections of deputies to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress from the territorial party organizations.

The resolution "On the terms of the convocation of the 28th CPSU congress, the conduct of the election campaign in the party, the norm of representation and the procedure for electing delegates to the congress" specifies the creation of commissions (groups) from among the delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress for the development of the fundamental document and resolutions by the CPSU congress. I think that it would be correct if, as we have the delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress elected, a number of commissions or working groups were created from among their number for the preparation of the fundamental documents of the regular congress of the Moldavian CP. In each city and rayon party organization, the work on the nomination, discussion, and election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress must be completed before its conference, and right at the conference the delegates should be informed of the results of this campaign. This work should begin immediately after today's Central Committee plenum.

Summarizing all the proposals and comments, the commission prepared the draft "Procedure for the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress," which

was introduced for the consideration of today's Central Committee plenum. It also determines the forms and methods of the impending work of the party committees in the formation of the body of delegates. The plenum participants have the draft of the given document; therefore, I think that there is no need to pause on this in more detail.

The discussion and formation of proposals for today's plenum on the procedure for the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Plenum was conducted with consideration for the political lines and decisions of the February and March (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenums, and the "Procedure for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress" confirmed by the last Central Committee plenum.

The development of a new democratic mechanism of the formation of the body of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress, and the election of its delegates is an important phase in the preparation for the highest forum of the republic's communists. It is necessary to conduct this work, operating under the new conditions of political pluralism, on a high organizational and political level. It is important that the elections of delegates proceed on the basis of broad perestroika and democracy, in an atmosphere of party comradely relations, high principles, and lofty political culture. The manifestation of group, narrowly egotistical, and departmental interests is impermissible here. As has already been emphasized, among the delegates must be communists who by their political and business qualities are capable of moving perestroika forward, of resolving the main issues of the development of the republic and the renewal of its Communist Party. The new democratic mechanism of the formation of the body of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress is called upon to assist in this.

Moldavian Plan For Socioeconomic Independence Confirmed

90US0887B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] For the purpose of the practical preparation for the transition to the principles of socioeconomic independence starting 1 January 1991, the republic Council of Ministers confirmed by special resolution a plan for urgent measures for the preparation of the Moldavian SSR for functioning under conditions of socioeconomic independence, territorial self-management, and the self-financing of local soviets of people's deputies. In view of this, the republic economic organs, ministries, state committees, departments, and ispolkoms of rayon and city soviet of people's deputies are entrusted to provide for the realization of the measures specified by the plan in the course of the current year.

The resolution emphasizes that in the formation of the state plan of the economic and social development of the Moldavian SSR for 1991-1995, Gosplan, the republic economic organs, ministries, state committees, departments, and ispolkoms of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies must assume that the plan must simultaneously become the concrete program for the restructuring of the republic's economy as applicable to the conditions of socioeconomic independence, improving its structure and orientation toward a more intensive path toward development and the prioritized resolution of social problems.

Control over the implementation of the urgent measures for the republic's preparation for functioning under the conditions of socioeconomic independence, territorial self-management, and self-financing of local soviets of people's deputies is entrusted to the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers Commission for Economic Reform.

Resolution on Delegate Selection for 17th Moldavian CP Congress

90US0888A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 31 March 90 pp 3-4

["Resolution of the 19th Plenum of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee: On the Procedure for the Selection of Delegates to the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] The Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum resolves:

1. To take into consideration the proposals of the Commission for developing the new democratic mechanism for the formation of the body of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress and to confirm the "Procedure for the Selection of Delegates to the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress." To charge the Commission for organization and coordination with all the work for the election of delegates to the congress.

2. That the party gorkoms and raykoms conduct all the organizational work for the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress in accordance with the political lines and decisions of the February and March (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenums.

To ensure that the elections of delegates be held on the basis of broad perestroyka and democracy, in an atmosphere of party comradely relations, principles, and high political culture. To create everywhere such conditions as would actually ensure the involvement of every communist in the formation of the body of delegates to the congress.

To decisively depart from any sort of regulation of the process of discussion and selection of the candidacies, to stop any attempts to reduce the election of delegates to a

struggle of group, narrow egotistical, or departmental ambitions, to distort public opinion surrounding certain activists and party workers.

To conduct a firm line toward the election as delegates to the congress of communists displaying genuine courage in the struggle against the phenomena of stagnation, those who through their political and business qualities are capable of moving perestroyka forward, who can shoulder the responsibility of resolving the important issues of the republic's development and the renewal of its Communist Party.

3. That the editors of republic newspapers and magazines, and Moldavian SSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio] ensure the broad, party-principled coverage of the course of the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress. To involve in this work the best journalistic cadres; that they strive to work in constant search, giving fully of themselves, with high responsibility in order to find new, interesting forms of relating materials on the election of delegates, and an expansion of the democratization of the electoral process.

The Procedure for the Election of Delegates to the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress, First Variation

All primary party organizations in which the number of CPSU members corresponds to or is greater than the norm of representation elect delegates by secret (closed) ballot at their election meetings (conferences). Others, at the decision of the party gorkoms and raykoms unite in a district according to the branch principle in a manner such that the total number of party members on the register not be less than the confirmed norm of representation. Each primary party organization has the right to nominate a candidate for delegate, creating the conditions for alternative elections. All the candidates named are entered into the list for secret balloting. Candidacies are discussed and meetings with candidates are organized in each party organization.

Elections may be conducted directly in the following manner:

A) at meetings in primary party organizations, in each of which a general list of nominated candidacies is balloted separately;

B) at a joint meeting of communists of all primary party organizations.

The Second Variation

As in the first variation, the primary party organizations in which the number of CPSU members corresponds to or is greater than the norm of representation elect delegates by secret (closed) ballot at their election meetings (conferences).

At the decision of the party gorkoms and raykoms, others unite on the territorial principle, forming party election okrugs. It is possible that the number of CPSU

members on their register will give them the right to elect not one, but two or three delegates (that is, the formation of multi-seat okrugs is possible).

The nomination and discussion of candidates and the organization of secret (closed) balloting may be conducted as proposed in the first variation.

The Third Variation

The nomination of candidates for delegate to the congress is conducted on an alternative basis in all primary party organizations. All nominated candidacies are introduced for discussion at the city or rayon party conference.

Conference delegates may reject this or that of the proposed candidacies, or may introduce supplemental proposals for candidacies. In this manner, the final list for secret balloting for the election of deputies to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress is formed.

The conference then interrupts its work to conduct secret (closed) balloting in all the primary party organizations according to the list it has worked out.

The Fourth Variation

In this case, the delegates to the congress are elected on an alternative basis from among the candidates nominated in the primary party organizations. In doing so, the number of communists, the quantity of primary party organizations in the city or rayon, and the possibility of introducing alternative candidacies are taken into consideration. The elections are conducted in accordance with the CPSU Charter in effect by closed (secret) balloting at rayon and city party conferences.

It is advisable to conduct the nomination from low-membership party organizations at group meetings, thus ensuring an alternative basis, competition, and objectivity in the evaluation of the candidates' business and moral qualities.

Rayon and city commissions endowed with the appropriate authority are formed for the organization and conduct of the work of the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress at the plenum of the party committee. In accordance with the procedure for the election of delegates selected, and with consideration for the opinion of the primary party organizations and the norms of representation, the commission develops proposals for the formation of party election okrugs.

Okrugs are formed along either branch or territorial-production lines. The list of primary party organizations is simultaneously refined; their number will allow them, based upon the norm of representation, to elect delegates to the congress at their election meetings (conferences), that is, to form independent single-seat or multi-seat election okrugs. All the okrugs formed are confirmed by the party gorkoms and raykoms.

Okrug election commissions are created in the okrugs; they exercise control over the conduct of the election in the primary party organizations, and concern themselves with the creation of conditions for communists' meetings with the candidates for delegate to the congress, confirm the text of the okrug election ballot, and ensure the preparation of ballots and their provision to the primary party organizations. The commission also establishes the results of the election in the okrug and transfers them to the rayon and city commissions for conducting elections of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress.

The nomination and discussion of candidates for deputy and their election may be conducted not only directly in primary party organizations of the okrug, but at a general meeting of communists of all primary party organizations included in the okrug. In the latter case, the general meeting is opened by a member of the rayon or city commission for election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress. He has the right to control the competence of the meeting on all issues associated with the nomination and election of delegates.

All candidacies nominated in the primary party organizations of the okrug or at a general meeting of communists of the primary party organizations included in it are introduced on the ballot for secret voting in the election of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress.

Secret voting is conducted at meetings of primary party organizations (and shop meetings with the rights of primaries) or at the general party meeting of all primary party organizations included in the okrug within the framework of the election okrug. For this purpose, counting commissions are selected at the meetings. The voting is conducted: in the okrug, according to the lists of communists on the register in every party organization; at a general meeting of communists of an okrug, according to the single list of communists on the register in all party organizations included in the okrug.

Elections are considered valid if more than one-half of the okrug's CPSU members participated in them. In those okrugs in which no one of the candidates gathered more than one-half of the votes of those who participated in the elections, at the discretion of the communists, either a runoff between the two candidacies that gathered the greatest number of votes in the first round are held, or the free seats are transferred for the election of delegates directly at the rayon or city party conference.

The rayon or city commission reports the results of the elections of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress to the rayon or city party election conference. An excerpt from the conference's resolution on the results of the election of delegates, with an attached list and form of the delegates is transferred to the commission of the Moldavian CP Central Committee for conducting elections of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress. The delegates elected from primary party organizations comprising single-seat or multi-seat election okrugs are

included in the total number of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress from rayon or city party organizations.

If the okrug elections are invalidated, and also in the event that no one of the candidates on the ballot, including after the runoff, gathers the needed number of votes, the rayon or city party conference elects the delegate to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress directly to a free seat.

In conducting the elections of delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress at rayon or city party conferences, all the preliminary organizational work is also executed by the rayon or city commission.

The decision to nominate candidacies to primary party organizations is made by secret ballot at the discretion of the participants of meetings and conferences. It would be correct to publish the list of candidacies nominated in the city or rayon press.

Candidates who have gathered the greatest number of votes with respect to other candidates, but more than one-half the votes of the CPSU members or the conference delegates who participated in the elections are considered to have been elected delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress.

Delegates to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress from party organizations of the Soviet Army, internal, or border troops deployed within the territory of the republic are elected in accordance with the aforementioned procedures.

With consideration for the opinion of the primary party organizations, the city or rayon party conferences send to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress proposals on candidacies to the body of the election organs of the republic party organization.

Resolution on Moldavian CP Delegate Selection for 28th CPSU Congress

90US0888B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 31 March 90 p 4

["Resolution of the 19th Plenum of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee: On the Procedure for the Election of Delegates from the Moldavian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] 1. To agree to the proposals of the organizational committee for the preparation for the 17th republic CP Congress on the Procedure for the Election of Delegates from the Moldavian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress; to confirm the party election okrugs.

2. To form a Republic Commission for conducting election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and generalize the proposals for candidacies to the body of the central party organs. To direct the commission, in conjunction with the party gorkoms and raykoms, to conduct the necessary organizational work; to ensure the

nomination and election of delegates to the congress on the basis of competition, alternative candidacies, and an objective assessment of the political and moral qualities of the candidates.

It is important that these be authoritative party members who have recommended themselves positively in the process of perestroyka and are capable of participating actively in the development and realization of the party's policy.

3. To recommend that the mass information media assist the candidates in expounding their position on the basic issues of party policy and practical work, and give comprehensive coverage to the course of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The Composition of the Commission

For the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Moldavian Communist Party and the generalization of the proposals for candidacies to the body of the central party organs

Andronatiy Nikolay Antonovich—party organization secretary, Kishinev State Pedagogical Institute imeni I. Kryange, commission chairman.

Kretsul Dmitriy Vladimirovich—brigadier, combined brigade, SU-28 Tiraspol Construction Trust, member Moldavian CP Central Committee, commission deputy chairman.

Commission members:

Agapiy Aleksandr Georgiyevich—partkom secretary, Kolkhoz imeni Kirov, Brichenskiy Rayon.

Batushkina Tatyana Vasilyevna—partkom secretary, "Mezon" plant, Kishinev.

Kara Petr Stepanovich—partkom secretary, Kolkhoz imeni PRAVDA, Komratskiy Rayon.

Kirov Ivan Dmitriyevich—deputy chairman, Moldavian SSR people's control committee, member, Moldavian CP Central Committee.

Kodin Mikhail Ivanovich—head, Department of Party Organizational and Cadre Work, Moldavian CP Central Committee.

Melnik Anna Vasilyevna—personal pensioner, member, Moldavian CP Central Committee.

Moiseyenko Aleksandr Vasilyevich—primary party organization secretary, "Moldavkabel" plant, Bendery.

Nidelku Dmitriy Ivanovich—secretary, Moldavian Council of Trade Unions.

Onofrey Anatoliy Pavlovich—partkom secretary, Sovkhoz "Albota" Tarakliyskiy Rayon.

Popa Sergey Alekseyevich—chairman, Kolkhoz "Viktoria" Dubesarskiy Rayon.

Sakhanovskiy Konstantin Ivanovich—first secretary, Ungenskiy Rayon party committee.

Stelya Arseniy Maksimovich—newspaper editor, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, Ribnitsa.

Tabunshchik Georgiy Dmitriyevich—deputy chairman, Moldavian SSR Gosplan, Moldavian CP Central Committee.

Torlak Sofya Mikhaylovna—director, Baurchinskaya secondary school, Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon.

Usatyy Andrey Georgiyevich—director, territorial medical association, Aneniy Noy Rayon.

Shishiyanu Anna Georgiyevna—brigadier, essential olive oil brigade, Sovkhoz-plant "Roza Moldavii," Leovskiy Rayon, candidate member, Moldavian CP Central Committee.

Tsydrya Fedor Nikolayevich—Philosophy Department head, Kishinev Medical Institute, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent.

Burdukh Mikhail Dmitriyevich—partkom secretary, Kolkhoz imeni Kirov, Chimishliyskiy Rayon.

Zagorskiy Vasily Georgiyevich—Composing Department head, Moldavian State conservatory, member Moldavian CP review commission.

The Procedure for Elections of Delegates from the Moldavian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress

1. To form in the party organizations of the cities of Kishinev, Tiraspol, Beltsy, and Bendery multi-seat party election okrugs, and in accordance with the norm of representation to the congress grant them the right to elect the following quantity of delegates:

—from the Kishinev party organization (50,966 CPSU members)—13 (the formation of multi-seat okrugs by rayon is possible in Kishinev).

—from the Tiraspol party organization (13,243 CPSU members)—3

—from the Beltsy party organization (8,366 CPSU members)—2

—from the Bendery party organization (7,632 CPSU members)—2

Total—20 delegates.

2. To form single-seat party election okrugs in the Rybnitsa city party organization (5,109 CPSU members), Orkheyskaya party organization (5,472 CPSU members), and the Sorokskaya party organization (4,078 CPSU members).

3. To form multi-seat election okrug in the remaining rayon party organizations, grouping them in the following manner:

Group 1 Yedinetskaya party organization (okrug center), 3,746 CPSU members; Brichenskaya, 3,456; Dondushenskaya, 2,891; Drokiyevskaya, 3,415; Oknitskaya, 2,869; total, 16,377 CPSU members (4 delegates)

Group 2 Lazovskaya (okrug center), 3,348; Glodenskaya, 2,848; Ryshkansкая, 3,206; Feleshtskaya, 3,265; total, 12,667 CPSU members (3 delegates)

Group 3 Florshetskaya (okrug center), 3,112; Kamenskaya, 2,545; Rezinskaya, 2,085; Teleneshtskaya, 2,381; Sholdeneshtskaya, 1,665; total, 11,788 CPSU members (3 delegates)

Group 4 Dubesarskaya (okrug center), 3,863; Grigoriopolskaya, 2,556; Kriulenskaya, 2,741; total, 9,160 CPSU members (2 delegates)

Group 5

Kelerashskaya (okrug center), 2,433; Streshenskaya, 2,673; Ungenskaya, 3,693; Yalovenskaya, 2,308; total, 11,107 CPSU members (3 delegates)

Group 6 Kotovskaya (okrug center), 3,053; Keinarskaya, 1,102; Nisporenskaya, 2,408; total, 6,563 CPSU members (2 delegates)

Group 7 Chimishliyskaya (okrug center), 2,133; Basarabyaskaya, 2,022; Leovskaya, 2,286; total, 6,441 CPSU members (2 delegates)

Group 8 Slobodzeyskaya (okrug center), 3,927; Aneniy Noy, 2,547; Keushanskaya, 2,151; Sloboziskaya (okrug center), 3,927; total, 11,517 CPSU members (3 delegates)

Group 9 Kakhulskaya (okrug center), 3,572; Kantemirskaya, 2,092; Bulkeneshtskaya, 2,409; total, 8,073 CPSU members (2 delegates)

Group 10 Chadyr-Lungskaya (okrug center), 2,299; Komratskaya, 2,587; Tarakliyskaya, 1,956; total, 6,842 CPSU members (2 delegates)

The work of conducting the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and generalizing the proposals for candidacies to the body of the central party organs is entrusted to the corresponding republic commission (election commission).

Okrug commissions are formed in okrugs under the observation of the republic commission. Their qualitative and personnel composition are confirmed by party gorkoms and raykoms, and in okrugs encompassing several rayons, by the republic election commission itself at the recommendation of the party raykoms.

The work of organizing the elections is conducted by the party gorkoms and raykoms. The republic and okrug election commissions execute control over the conduct of the election in the primary party organizations; create, in conjunction with the primary party organizations,

conditions for familiarizing communists with the candidates for delegate to the congress; confirm the text of the election ballot for the okrug; ensure the preparation of the ballots and their supply through the party gorkoms and raykoms of the primary party organizations, and determine the results of the election in the okrugs. Expenses associated with their work are covered from the budget funds of the corresponding rayon and city party organizations.

The nomination of candidates for delegate is conducted up to 10 April 1990. Primary party organizations nominate candidates for CPSU congress delegates. Those organizations that number 15 or more party members hold meetings independently. They may unite for discussion and nomination of common candidacies. Low-membership party organizations (fewer than 15 party members) conduct group meetings, organized by the party gorkoms or raykoms. In large party organizations, the nomination of candidates for delegate to the congress may be held in shop party organizations according to the list of candidacies proposed by the meeting of representatives of these party organizations, or in another form acceptable to the communists. Each primary party organization, united, or group meeting of communists has the right to nominate only one candidacy. The meeting chooses the form of voting (open or secret).

The candidate who gathers the greatest number of votes with respect to the other candidates, who has received more than one-half of the votes of the meeting participants if the meeting is competent, is considered to have been nominated. The minutes of the meeting of communists, with an indication of the number of CPSU members on the register in the party organization, who were in attendance at the meeting of communists nominated in the discussion and presented for voting on the candidacies, as well as the results of the voting for each candidacy is presented to the party gorkom or raykom or to the okrug commission.

In okrugs encompassing several rayons, the list of candidacies nominated in primary party organizations is considered at expanded plenums of party raykoms with the participation of secretaries of primary party organizations and the candidates for deputy themselves. The party committee plenum determines the quantity of candidates from the rayon. The decision of the plenum is presented to the appropriate okrug election commission. The okrug election commissions consider the candidacies nominated by the primary party organizations and supported by the party gorkom and raykom plenums, verify the competence of the election of candidates for delegate, the presence of their written (telegraph) consent, and form their list. The list is published in the local party press, with an indication of brief biographical data on the candidates.

The candidate may be on the ballot in only one okrug. He may withdraw his candidacy at any time, but no later than 3 days before the start of the voting in the okrug.

The party organization that nominated the candidate may also recall the candidacy it nominated no later than by this deadline.

Preelection campaigning for the candidates nominated for delegate is conducted after the publication of the list of candidates in the press before the start of voting. Party gorkoms and raykoms, together with the okrug election commissions, inform all party organizations of the rayon, city or okrug of the list of nominated candidacies, organize meetings of communists with the candidates for delegate, and concern themselves with more complete information on the candidates' business, political, and moral qualities for the okrug's party organizations. Party organizations may conduct work for supporting their candidacies in other party organizations.

Voting for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress is conducted from 25 April until 8 May 1990. On the basis of the published list of candidates with consideration for possible recalls of candidates or their withdrawal of their own candidacies, the okrug election commission confirms a single ballot for secret voting, indicating the surname, name, and patronymic of each candidate, position and workplace. Then the ballot is stamped and sent to the party gorkoms and raykoms, which organize the voting in the primary party organizations. For these purposes, the party gorkom or raykom, with consideration for the proposals of the primary party organizations, forms the rayon, city counting commission. Analogous commissions are also elected at meetings of communists in primary (shop) party organizations. (In single-seat okrugs formed within the boundaries of one rayon or city, the okrug commission may fulfill the functions of the rayon or city counting commission).

During secret voting, every CPSU member leaves on the ballot the number of candidates that must be elected from the okrug according to the norm of representation.

The counting commission of the party meeting totals the votes, and compiles the minutes, indicating the number of communists on the register who took part in the voting, and the number of votes cast "for" or "against" each candidacy. The minutes of the meeting are sent to the rayon or city counting commission. Summary data on the rayon party organizations are sent to the okrug election commission in the form indicated.

According to this same form, the okrug election commission, on the basis of the summary data of rayon or city counting commissions (or minutes of election in primary party organizations) generalizes the results of the voting in the okrug, verifies the competence of the meeting and elections, and collates the information on the number of CPSU members with the given reports on the composition of the party organizations.

The minutes with the election results, signed by all members of the okrug commission, is sent to the republic commission for conducting the election of delegates to

the 28th CPSU Congress, which in turn reports to the 17th Moldavian CP Congress.

The elections are considered to be valid if more than one-half of the members of the party on the register in the okrug party organizations participated in the balloting. The candidates who gathered the greatest number of votes with respect to the other candidates, but no less than one-half of the number of CPSU members who participated in the election become delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

In those single-seat okrugs in which no one of the candidates gathered more than one-half of the votes, a runoff is held, in which only the two candidates who gathered the greatest number of votes with respect to the other candidates are on the ballot.

In cases where the election in multi-seat okrugs are declared invalid, free seats remain, or no one of the candidates (including after the runoff in a single-seat election) on the ballot in the okrug gathered the needed number of votes, the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress for free seats is conducted directly at the 17th republic CP Congress.

According to the report of the republic election commission, the 17th Moldavian CP Congress considers the results of the elections in the okrug and presents to the 28th CPSU Congress the list of delegates elected with an indication of the data on the voting results. The decision on delegates elected at the congress of the republic CP is appended separately.

Elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from party organizations of the Soviet Army, internal, and border troops deployed within the territory of the republic are conducted in accordance with the procedure established by the CPSU Central Committee.

The proposals developed with consideration for the opinions on the candidacies to the body of the CPSU central organs of the party organizations, plenums, and conferences of rayon and city party organizations are considered at the 17th Moldavian CP Congress and sent to the 28th Party Congress.

Tajik Plenum on Urgent Measures to Stabilize Situation in Dushanbe

90US0722A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Resolution of the 28th Tajik CP Central Committee: 'On Urgent Measures for the Stabilization of the Situation in the City of Dushanbe and in the Republic'"]

[Text] Having heard and discussed the report of the Tajik CP Central Committee Buro on the aforementioned issue, the plenum notes that the events of 11-14 February were a planned action having as their goal the destabilization of the situation first in the capital, then in

the republic, and discrediting the work of party, soviet, and economic organs in the implementation of political and economic reforms. The initiators of these actions speculated in the undecided status of many social and economic problems, the lack of foodstuffs and industrial goods, housing, personal plots, the low standard of living of a portion of the population, the lack of schools, of children's preschool institutions, and health care and cultural facilities.

To achieve the political, seniority, and mercenary goals set, which have nothing in common with perestroika, certain destructive forces utilized the most diverse methods, including extremist ones: threats and blackmail; pogroms and arson; apartment and store burglaries, and attacks on citizens using non-firing weapons and firearms, attempting to inflame interethnic discord.

The measures undertaken in this situation by the Central Committee and the republic government, communists, and broad strata of society, by all healthy forces of the city allowed the wave of extremism to be beaten, the brigandage, robbery, and violence to be halted, and life in Dushanbe to gradually be brought back to its normal flow.

The party organizations and the overwhelming majority of the workers of the city and the republic, representing various nations and nationalities, actively support the measures undertaken for the normalization of the situation, the imposition of order, and the restoration of what has been destroyed.

At the same time, the plenum considers it necessary to turn attention to serious shortcomings in the activity of the Tajik CP Central Committee Buro, the party committees and primary party organizations, and the leading soviet and law enforcement organs, which are not resolving urgent issues in a timely manner, are not functionally reacting to the alteration of the situation, the social mood of the masses, are not taking into consideration the concrete demands of the workers and youth, and are not taking the specifics of the republic's national situation into consideration completely enough.

The growth of the national self-awareness of the Tajik people is not always accompanied by an intensification of the inter-national and patriotic indoctrination of the population, first and foremost, of youth indoctrination.

The population's serious dissatisfaction, especially that of the intelligentsia, is caused by the fact that many decisions of the party committees and soviet organs on various aspects of the social sphere and national relations frequently remain on paper; precise, systematic information on their course is not always issued.

Many party committees and cadres of ideological organizations are not keeping pace with the dynamics of the social processes, are not implementing the needed explanatory work on the measures for nipping disorders in the bud; consequently, they frequently lose influence

over the formation of the public consciousness, and the danger is created of a situation's uncontrollability and unpredictability.

The law enforcement organs' insufficient preparedness for actions under the new conditions, in emergency situations, influences the course of stabilizing events. Their extremely weak links with the population and the neglect of preventive work also makes its mark, which, under conditions of the population's legalistic illiteracy, primarily that of youth, seriously complicates the situation.

The plenum feels that the hindrance factors of the weakening of tension are the distortions permitted in the placement of production forces, the economy's orientation toward turning out intermediary production, the low return of capital investments, the worsening ecological situation, the high natural population growth, accompanied by an ever-greater lag in the standard of living, and the growth of unemployment, especially among youth. At the same time, the decisions of the Central Committee and the republic government on these issues are being implemented poorly.

Production collectives have not yet become a center of political and indoctrination work, the basic sense of which is to bring to the consciousness of each worker the idea that only intense labor and strict observance of socialist legality will yield the opportunity to ensure an increase in workers' welfare, and resolve the urgent social and economic problems in the republic.

As a consequence of the omissions which are contained in the organizational and political work, the measures applied for imposing public order, the stabilization of the situation, and the creation of the necessary conditions for the normal work of industrial enterprises, commerce, transportation, and educational institutions are still not yielding the necessary results.

The Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum resolves:

1. Considering the actions of the Tajik CP Central Committee Buro for the stabilization of the situation in the city of Dushanbe and the republic, and the elimination of the consequences of the tragic events of 12-14 February 1990 to be correct, to direct the attention of the Central Committee Buro, the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms of the Tajik CP to the slow resolution of the crisis phenomena in the political, economic, ideological, and spiritual spheres in society's life, which are growing every year, especially of late, and to the lack of the needed activity in the conduct of national and cadre policy, and the weak control over the realization of the decisions of the Tajik CP Central Committee plenums.
2. The Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum demands that the Central Committee Buro (comrades K.M. Makhkamov, G.G. Veselkov), the Dushanbe gorkom (comrade D.Kh. Karimov), the party raykoms, and primary party organizations of the city adopt the most decisive measures for bringing order and discipline

among CPSU members, give a principled evaluation to communists who have taken a neutral position with regard to the events in the city of Dushanbe, who assisted the destabilization of the situation by their actions.

On the threshold of the 21st Congress of the Tajik CP and the 28th Congress of the CPSU, for the party obkoms, gorkoms to lay at the foundation of their activity the lines expounded in the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress, having directed their attention to the early renewal of the content of the work of the party organizations and all party cadres.

3. That the ideological commission (comrade Sh.D. Shabdolov), the interethnic relations commission (comrade K.M. Makhkamov), the Tajik CP Central Committee, party obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations radically change the style and method of indoctrination work, based upon the actual situation which has come about, and to make them dynamic in form and content, and forestalling in nature.

To accelerate the resolution of the issue of creating sociological services for the study of public opinion, the forecasting of possible development of events, to rapidly and correctly react to concrete and complex situations, to adopt without delay measures for the creation of a structured system of analytical and forecasting functions of ideological activity, to give a timely and well-reasoned rebuff to screamers, demagogues, and political speculators.

To conduct an active dialogue with the progressive portion of the clergy, various social formations and movements, giving realistic evaluations; to come to terms in relations with them; to consider in a timely manner the positive proposals forwarded by them.

In all of this work, to broadly utilize the potential of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, the mass information media, and cultural enlightenment institutions. To conduct certification of cadres working in the republic newspapers and magazines, on television and radio.

4. That Central Committee Buro members comrades A.D. Dadabayev, I.Kh. Khaeyev, G.B. Koshlakov, and V.V. Bakhidov adopt concrete measures for the elimination of the negative phenomena forming in branches of the national economy, especially in the social sphere, the utilization of labor resources, and the imposition of order in the strengthening of labor discipline. To introduce for the consideration of the first session of the Tajik SSR Congress of People's Deputies concrete proposals for the struggle against the "shadow economy," crime, and corruption.

To accelerate the finishing of the concept of the republic's transition to economic independence and self-financing.

5. That the communist leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (comrade M.N. Navzhuvanov), the Tajik SSR

Procuracy (comrade G.S. Mikhaylin), and the republic State Security Committee (comrade V.V. Petkel) accelerate, in strict accordance with existing legislation, the process of investigating the crimes committed by criminal groups from 12-14 February 1990, in order that not a single guilty party escape justice, and to provide broad publicity in this work.

That the party committee and communist leaders of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs thoroughly analyze the actions of the militia associates who manifested irresponsible and unprincipled behaviour in performance of services during the days of the mass disorders. To establish a close link with the population, to sharply increase preventive work and adopt the measures necessary for heightening the readiness of the law enforcement organs for action in emergency situations.

6. To propose to the republic minister of education, the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee, and the primary party organizations of higher and specialized secondary educational institutions that they concentrate attention on the elimination of shortcomings in academic-indoctrinational work. To increase demands upon the ideological-moral position of the professorial and teaching staff of the republic's educational institutions.

To order communists Sh.D. Shabdolov and O. Latifi to prepare and submit for the government's consideration proposals for the improvement of the housing and living conditions of young teachers, students, and youth taking courses who are living in dormitories and private apartments.

To recommend that the Dushanbe gorispolkom examine the issue of creating an economically accountable association concerned with the problems of the utilization and maintenance of student dormitories.

7. That the Central Committee members, the soviet organs in the provinces, the ministries, departments, and public organizations develop explanatory work in labor collectives, educational institutions, and at people's places of residence, and promote the normalization of interethnic relations, mutual enrichment of cultures, and spiritual development of all nations and nationalities of the republic. To adopt exhaustive measures to halt the population drain seriously weakening the republic's spiritual and economic potential.

All indoctrination work must be filled with the spirit of Soviet patriotism. To support the initiative of the Dushanbe labor collectives and residents for the organization of the organs of self-management in microrayons in the structure of local soviets of people's deputies.

8. That the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms of the Tajik CP, and the primary organizations adopt measures for the mobilization of the workers in effective, stable work of enterprises, organizations, and institutions of the industrial, agro-industrial, and construction complexes, and the sphere of service to the republic's population.

The plenum expresses its confidence that communists and the republic's workers will support the Central Committee's activity with their organization and solidarity, that they will manage to overcome problems which arise, and on the basis of perestroyka, will provide the work of the party organizations and soviets of people's deputies with the necessary tempo of social transformations.

Tajik Plenum on Election of Delegates Reported

90US0722B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST

TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 1

["Resolution of the 18th Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum: On the Conduct of the 21st Congress of the Tajik CP and the Procedure for Electing Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 21st Tajik CP Congress"]

[Text] I. In alteration of the decisions of the 15th Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum, to convene the 21st Tajik Communist Party Congress on 24 May 1990 in the city of Dushanbe.

II. To introduce the following issues for the consideration of the congress:

1. On the course of perestroyka and the tasks of the republic party organization. The report of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee. Speaker—comrade K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary, Tajik CP Central Committee.

2. The report of the review commission of the Tajik CP. Speaker—comrade A.B. Borzenko, chairman of the republic party organization review commission.

3. The elections of the leading organs of the Tajik CP.

III. To conduct the election campaign preceeding the 28th CPSU Congress and the 21st Tajik CP Congress in the following time frames:

—meetings in primary and shop party organizations, in March;

—rayon and city party conferences, in April;

—oblast party conferences by 15 May.

IV. To confirm the following procedure for electing delegates for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 21st Tajik CP Congress.

Delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress are elected by closed (secret) ballot by primary party organizations. Primary party organizations in which the number of CPSU members corresponds to the norm of representation (1 delegate for every 123 CPSU members) elect delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress directly on an alternative basis. All remaining party organizations whose membership numbers are less than the norm of representation elect delegates at interconnected (branch) meetings of communists, conducted by the decision of

the party gorkoms and raykoms, based upon the calculated number of delegates and the norm of representation.

Candidates for delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress are nominated at these same meetings on an alternative basis. The nominated candidates for delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the delegates to 21st Tajik CP Congress elected by the primary party organizations are considered and confirmed at rayon and city party conferences. Oblast, Dushanbe city, and united conferences of communists of rayons of republic subordination, based upon the norm of representation, elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress by closed (secret) ballot on an alternative basis from the number of candidates nominated in the primary party organizations, at interconnected (branch) meetings of communists, and supported by rayon (city) party conferences. The delegates of the united conference of communists of cities and rayons of republic subordination will be delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress, elected by the party organizations of these rayons. The lists of delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress are considered and confirmed at the 21st Tajik CP Congress.

In the event that election have not been conducted or there remain empty seats, elections of delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress are conducted directly at the rayon (city) or oblast party conference, and elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, at the 21st Tajik CP Congress.

The party organizations of the Soviet Army, internal and border troops deployed within the territory of the republic elect delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress, and the oblast, city, and rayon party conferences according to the norm of representation.

The primary party organizations introduce proposals for candidacies to the new body of all the elected organs from the raykoms to the Tajik CP Central Committee, which are then generalized by the commissions of the corresponding party committees and introduced for the consideration of the conferences, and the 21st Tajik CP Congress.

Proposals for the body of the CPSU central electoral organs, developed with consideration for the opinion of the party organizations, are considered by the 21st Tajik CP Congress and directed to the 28th CPSU Congress.

It should be established that the procedure of election of delegates for oblast and Dushanbe city party conferences is determined by the plenums of the corresponding party committees. In doing so, it should be recommended that the approaches established by this resolution for the election of delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress be utilized.

V. To confirm the body of the Tajik CP Central Committee commission for the organization of elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 21st Tajik CP Congress (appended).

To establish that the commission has the empowerment to act independently to resolve all issues associated with the nomination of candidates and the conduct of elections of delegates to the 21st Tajik CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress, with the exception of issues in the competence of the republic Communist Party Congress.

VI. During the course of the reports and the elections, to comprehensively analyze the state of affairs in every primary, rayon, city, and oblast party organization, to determine the measures for the radical improvement of party work. To discuss at meetings and conferences the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress and the draft CPSU Charter; to collectively work out concrete proposals for the program issues of the activity of the republic party organization. Particular attention should be directed toward the ideological and organizational consolidation of communists, the strengthening of the vanguard role of the party in society, attracting to party work people who enjoy the support of the party organizations, and capable of lending an active nature to the process of perestroika and the renewal of society.

VII. To entrust the Central Committee Buro with all the work associated with the preparation for the 21st Tajik CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress, and to conduct it with the involvement of members and candidate members of the Central Committee and the party aktiv publicly and openly.

Electoral Committee of Tajik Delegates Organized

90US0722C Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Tajik CP Central Committee Commission of the Organization of Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 21st Tajik CP Congress"]

[Text] 1. G.G. Veselkov, secretary, Tajik CP Central Committee, chairman.

2. N.D. Abakanov, personal pensioner.

3. M.S. Abdurakhmanova, first secretary, Oktyabrskiy Rayon party committee.

4. S.A. Afanasyev, second secretary, Gorno-Badakhshan oblast party committee.

5. V. Akhadov, film director.

6. O.B. Berdyev, first secretary, Garmskiy Rayon party committee.

7. L.Sh. Liderman, laboratory manager, Dushanbe hosiery factory.

8. D.L. Latifov, editor in chief, *KOMMUNIST TAJIKISTANA* magazine.

9. R.Z. Mirzoyev, first secretary, Dangarinskiy Rayon party committee.

10. Ya.A. Musayev, chief agronomist, sovkhoz "24th Party Congress," Ilichevskiy Rayon, Kurgan-Tyubinsk Oblast.

11. O.O. Olamov, member, party commission, republic party organization.

12. G.S. Savriddinova, first secretary, Isfara city party committee.

13. Sh.M. Sultanov, manager, party organization and cadre work department, Tajik CP Central Committee.

14. Z.D. Usmanov, director, Institute of Mathematics and Computer Center, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

15. K.G. Khasanov, assistant to people's deputy.

16. O. Yakubov, first secretary, Tajik Komsomol Central Committee.

Niyazov Addresses Turkmen CP CC Plenum

90US0756A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 8 Mar 90 p 1

[Address by S.A. Niyazov at the 17th Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] Comrades!

At the last plenum of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee we made a decision regarding the convocation of the regular 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress in September of this year. This date was coordinated with the timetable for the convocation of the 28th CPSU Congress and the time necessary for the selection of delegates.

At the CPSU Central Committee Plenum which took place in February of this year the Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress was approved and questions were discussed pertaining to the timetable for the convocation of the congress, the procedure for electing delegates and the upcoming electoral campaign in the party. In a few days the CPSU Central Committee Plenum takes place which will examine a draft of the CPSU rules and proposals of the CPSU Central Committee commission regarding party construction, personnel policy and the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum was held in a difficult time for the country and party. During the course of perestroyka problems which have existed for many years have become exacerbated, dissatisfaction with the situation in the economy has intensified as it has with manifestations of political instability and the rapid growth in certain regions of conflicts between nationalities.

The February CPSU Central Committee Plenum recognized as expedient the rescheduling of the timetable for the convocation of the party congress for the end of June or the beginning of July of this year. This decision

responds to the rapidly changing political situation in the country and the necessity of accelerating the ratification of documents on which, to a large degree, will depend the future of perestroyka, the fate of the country and the place and role of the CPSU in the current and most crucial stage of revolutionary transformations.

The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress approved by the plenum is a program document which represents a drastic change in the restructuring of the party itself and defines the guidelines for a solution to the political, social and economic crisis in the country.

The draft platform concisely and simply defines the role of the party in the life of Soviet society during renewal as that of a democratically recognized political leader acting through communists and which does not claim any advantage or support for its special position in the USSR constitution. Once again recognition of the party as the only source of power of the sovereign will of the people has been confirmed as has the crucial need for carrying out a profound democratization of the party on the basis of power of the party masses.

It is very important that the essence of the draft platform is not a collection of political directives but a program which provides the opportunity to apply creativity and initiative for each party organization and each communist.

In this regard I would like to call your attention to several elements which are highly significant for the future development of the republic and the state of its moral and political mood. Sometimes one hears that all is quiet in Turkmenistan, that people here are not interested in democracy and the new political trends. Such a position is naive and shortsighted. What kind of pluralism is it, what kind of freedom of action is there if a political cliché is put forth as the ideal of democracy which all republics and all regions are supposed to follow? We do not see our task in copying the events taking place in other regions or in imitating fashionable currents but in developing and moving forward, taking into account our special characteristics, the current political moment and life's reality. And they are such that they give rise to different opinions and different currents. And this is completely natural. We are for the freedom of opinions, but without ambitions, without speculation on glasnost and democracy. The most important things are the interests of the workers and our people. The soviets must be an expression of that will as much as possible.

That is what fundamentally defines our party platform. As far as the party itself is concerned, here our goals are also extremely clear. We are for a self-renewing democratic party which consistently defends its own principles, firmly stands on its positions and is capable of communicating them to the people. In strengthening the party we will be strengthening discipline as well because without discipline there is no party.

It was namely this, a strengthening of discipline and order, a restoration of legality, that our village leaders requested from us at a council of elders which became a very important event in the life of the republic. We will listen to the advice of our wise elders and we will not be complacent or flatter ourselves with what has been accomplished. Life today is moving faster than ever. Nationalist feelings of people have intensified and we cannot forget about that. With this in mind above everything else, local party committees must construct their work, foresee problems and not allow a slow work pace or indecisiveness to exist where urgent, and at times, harsh measures should be taken.

We all need to remember that much remains to be done, but that if we maintain calm in the republic and do not slow our work pace, I think that we will be able to achieve noticeable success.

In discussing today the tasks of the republic party organization on preparing and holding the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress and the upcoming election campaign, we must first of all base our actions on these fundamental guidelines.

It is natural that a change in the timetable for holding the CPSU congress poses for us the question about a new date for the convocation of the republic Communist Party congress and also the timetable and primary tasks on conducting the election campaign.

In the opinion of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Bureau the **24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress could be scheduled on 11 May of this year.** By this date spring work in the fields of the republic generally has been completed and there is enough time for the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress to prepare for the upcoming debates. Also a standard of representation at the congress of one delegate for every 200 communists has been proposed. According to calculations that will make approximately 575 delegates.

As far as the timetable for conducting reports and elections in party organizations is concerned, we propose to have them in March-April. In addition, election meetings in the primary party organizations with less than 15 CPSU members, that is, where they were conducted during the fall of last year, will not be held and they will limit themselves to a discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the congress and the draft rules as well as the selection of delegates to corresponding party conferences.

Now about the procedure for electing delegates to the party conferences, the republic Communist Party congress and the 28th CPSU Congress. This subject has prompted wide discussion in the party. Communists have spoken out in favor of the election of delegates to the CPSU congress, and also to the Turkmen Communist Party congress and the oblast party conferences having an alternative character, that the elections give the opportunity for each communist to influence the

formation of the membership of the higher organs of party organizations and the party as a whole.

The proposals of the CPSU Central Committee commission on party construction and personnel policy regarding this subject have been published in the press. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum which takes place 11 March will make a final decision on these proposals.

The proposals provide for three different variations of electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress:

1. Direct elections in single-mandate districts which are formed based on a representation standard and the number of communists. These districts with our structure and the small memberships of rayon party organizations would encompass from one to three or four rayons.
2. Direct elections in one multi-mandate election district. In this case the Central Committee plenum confirms a single list for the entire republic Communist Party from among the candidacies supported by the party conferences and submits it to a vote in the primary party organizations.
3. Elections on an alternative basis directly at the republic Communist Party congress from among the candidates nominated in the primary party organizations and supported in the rayon, city and oblast party conferences.

In all cases it is stipulated that these must be alternative, secret elections. The current Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee plenum is supposed to decide which option to approve. According to information received by the Central Committee from party committees, the majority of communists in discussing this question speak out in favor of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress directly at the Turkmen Communist Party Congress.

What types of arguments are presented?

In the first place, the argument is presented that the delegates themselves of the upcoming party conferences and Turkmen Communist Party congress will be elected in a new way, after a comprehensive debate in the primary organizations and a secret vote with a choice of several candidates. There is no doubt that these will be responsible people invested by communists with corresponding authority. The question is put directly: if the communists trust them to resolve all questions pertaining to the Communist Party of the republic, then there is no reason not to trust them in the election of delegates to the CPSU congress.

Fears also have been voiced that with the direct election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress local or nationalist interests will predominate as has happened on occasion during the elections to the soviets. Apparently, this is something which will have to be taken into

account. The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee commission on organizational-party and personnel work also voiced its preference for the third option.

The Central Committee Bureau, having thoroughly weighed all the "pros" and "cons" believes it expedient to conduct elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress at the republic Communist Party congress. Additionally, the entire electoral process must be democratized to the maximum level possible. The elections will take place on an alternative basis, and only from among those candidates nominated by primary party organizations.

Regarding the procedure for electing delegates to the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress. In the interests of a more democratic process of electing delegates which is taken directly to the primary party organizations, it might have been possible to elect them directly from the rayon (city) party organizations subordinate at the republic level as well as the oblast party organizations.

At their plenums the oblast, city and rayon party committees can decide which of the options to accept; single-mandate districts, a single multi-mandate district within the boundaries of the rayon (city) or directly at the conference.

As you see, comrades, the timetable for conducting the electoral campaign is extremely tight. In the upcoming two months we must analyze the situation in each party organization in depth and comprehensively without any sacrifices due to time limitations. A principled, and I would even say, harsh discussion is needed of the causes of the fall in the prestige of certain electoral organs and party organizations, about the place and the contribution of each communist to perestroyka. CPSU members must not close their eyes to the passive position, lacking in ideas, of those who only carry their party membership card in their pockets and who compromise the high rank of being a communist.

The second important task of the electoral campaign is to attract not only communists but nonparty members as well, whose participation in the meetings and conferences is very desirable for the discussion of the most crucial problems; especially those who are the cause of people's dissatisfaction and who serve as a basis for criticism of party organizations. The discussion must not degenerate into an indiscriminate railing against history, the work of the party and the electoral organs. We must honestly name the causes and the individuals who are guilty of a slow or unsatisfactory treatment of pressing problems and find constructive approaches.

The mechanism of staffing the supervisory electoral organs should be approached from the positions of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress. We must put an end to the flawed practice of staffing them based on offices held by the prospective

candidates. During the course of the reports and elections it is necessary to guarantee the right of communists to select those individuals whom they truly trust; active champions of democratic transformations, principled and progressive workers, peasants and representatives of the intelligentsia who enjoy a high level of prestige in their collectives. This will become a reality if each primary party organization responsibly approaches the nomination of its representatives to the membership of the rayon and city party committees. Both the rayon, city and oblast party conferences also must approach the election of candidates for membership in the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee in a corresponding manner. The question of direct elections of party committee secretaries on an alternative basis should be widely discussed at party meetings, conferences and at the congress.

The democratization of the electoral process in combination with a demanding approach to the evaluation of the activity of party personnel will undoubtedly put an end to the practice of staffing party bureaus and the committees themselves based on the official position of a potential candidate, raise the level of responsibility of those elected in relation to their party organizations and assure the leadership of the electoral organ over the apparatus.

Based on the goals of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the congress, the control functions of the party and the role of the organs of internal party control must be viewed in a new way. It is obvious that carrying out the party line regarding the differentiation between the functions of the party and those of soviet and economic organs and the election of commissions to supervise the activities of the administration loses its meaning and justification from the point of view of the law. In previous reports and elections this question was left at the discretion of the party organizations themselves. Now, taking into account the amendments to article 6 of the USSR constitution, we must unequivocally speak out about the uselessness of these commissions. As far as the election in the future of the control-inspection commissions of party organizations, which is what we are talking about, the final decision on them, obviously, will be made by the new CPSU rules and the decisions of the party congress.

The discussion of the pre-congress drafts of the CPSU Central Committee platform and the new party laws must become an important element of the upcoming elections. We cannot allow the documents under discussion to be approved as if they were just another circular to be forgotten soon after reading. A discussion on this issue must help us not only elaborate final proposals for the 28th Party Congress but also will help right now to concentrate all our efforts on the practical realization of the party platform, to define tactics, forms and methods of achieving the goals that have been established.

There is no doubt that the problems which characterize our social-economic climate today will be raised at the

meetings and conferences with great intensity. This is completely understandable. The food and housing problems, the situation with goods and services, the ecological situation today have become part of the sphere of crucial political tasks in whose rapid solution the inhabitants of the republic are vitally interested.

In this regard I must once again direct your attention to the fact that it is necessary not only not to weaken the attention of party organizations to economic and social policies, to questions of labor conditions and the workers' day-to-day problems, but, on the contrary, it is necessary to strengthen the influence of the party on their resolution.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize again that the upcoming reports and elections will determine the fate of the party. The decisions of the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the draft of the pre-congress platform create a reliable basis for deepening perestroika. We need to take them as a foundation and begin to act. To act with boldness, wisely anticipating the course of events. To move towards the established goal persistently, consistently, decisively overcoming all obstacles which may appear on our path.

Information Report From Turkmen CP CC Plenum

90US0756B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 8 Mar 90 p 1

[Report on the 17th Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Plenum of 7 Mar 90]

[Text] On 7 March the 17th Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Plenum took place. The plenum discussed the following issues:

1. On the change in the agenda and timetable of 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress, standards of representation and procedure for the election of delegates to the Turkmen Communist Party congress and the 28th CPSU Congress.
2. On conducting reports and the elections to the Turkmen Communist Party in 1990.

First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee S.A. Niyazov spoke at the plenum.

Taking part in the discussions were **B. Taganov**, foreman of a plastering crew at the SMU-2 Tashauz design-industrial construction association; **K.M. Orazov**, first secretary of the Mary party obkom; **G.M. Shpak**, secretary of the Bezmein party gorkom; **G. Bayramkuliyeva**, head of the kindergarten in the village of Kelyat in the Bakhardenskiy rayon; **G. Ashirov**, deputy director of the Lenin Chardzhou chemical plant; **G. Orazkuliyeva**, collective farm worker from the Gagarin collective farm in the Kunya-Urgenchskiy rayon; **N.T. Suyunov**, general director of the "Turkmengeologiya" scientific-production association; **O. Khodzhaev**, first secretary of

the Tashauz party obkom; **N.F. Baleshev**, first secretary of the Ashkhabad party gorkom; **Kh. Yazberdiyev**, first secretary of the Ashkhabad party raykom; **Yu. B. Serikov**, first secretary of the Kerkinskiy party raykom; **N. Orazgeldiyev**, first secretary of the Serakhskiy party raykom and **A. Shirmamedov**, lathe operator at the "Turkmenrybprom" production association.

The plenum resolved to hold elections for delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Turkmen Communist Party at the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress in accordance with the standard of representation and procedure ratified by the CPSU Central Committee from among candidates nominated in the primary party organizations and supported by rayon, city and oblast party conferences. The necessity to democratize to the maximum level possible the process of discussion and nomination of candidates, to guarantee the existence of alternative candidates, an objective evaluation of the political and moral qualities of the candidates, the nomination by the delegates of the most competent members CPSU members, worthy representatives of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia who have proved themselves during the course of perestroika to be active participants in carrying out party policy.

The plenum resolved to convoke the regular 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress on 11 May 1990 with the following agenda:

Report of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee.

Report of the Turkmen Communist Party Inspection Commission.

About the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th CPSU Congress and the CPSU draft rules.

Elections of supervisory organs of the Turkmen Communist Party.

Elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The plenum confirmed the standard of representation to the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress: one delegate for 200 CPSU members.

Elections of delegates to the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress will be held from rayon, city (republic subordination) and oblast party organizations according to a procedure ratified by the plenums of the corresponding party committees.

Communists, who are members of party organizations in the Soviet Army, Navy, border guards and internal troops, elect delegates to the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress together with corresponding territorial party organizations.

The plenum resolved that electoral meetings in shop and primary party organizations which have more than 15 CPSU members be held in March; rayon and city party conferences in March-April; oblast party conferences in

April 1990. Party conferences at which reports are delivered can be held in the Sakarskiy, Gasan-Kuliyskiy, Telmanskiy and Kara-Kalinskiy rayon party organizations which were formed in 1989-1990.

The plenum instructed party obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms and primary party organizations to conduct a broad campaign of information and discussions regarding the draft CPSU Central Committee platform and draft CPSU rules and the complete list of amendments and proposals regarding them. The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee commission on questions of organizational-party and personnel work will summarize the proposals received on these issues.

Measures on the continuing democratization of internal party life are to be carried out at the electoral meetings and conferences. The plenum emphasized that it is necessary to direct the efforts of party organizations towards an increase to the maximum extent in the activity of communists, to attract each party member to a real participation in the life and work of his party organization, towards the creation of the conditions for their participation in the formation and evaluation of the activity of the party electoral organs and their apparatus.

The plenum relieved R.A. Bazarov, Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Bureau member, of his duties in connection with his retirement.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Discusses Military Service, Health of Recruits

90US0983A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
6 May 90 p 1

[UzTAG report: "In the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] A meeting of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium took place on 5 May. It discussed the course of fulfillment of the republic Supreme Soviet decree "On Proposals of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on Changes and Amendments to the USSR Law 'On Universal Military Conscription'" dated 31 March 1990.

At the meeting, which was chaired by the Supreme Soviet chairman M.I. Ibragimov, reports were presented by representatives of the working group of deputies to monitor compliance with this decree, Uzbek SSR deputies A.N. Nosirov and K.Kh. Bakhriyev.

It was noted that the Supreme Soviet leadership and its standing commissions and the group of Uzbek SSR people's deputies had taken steps to implement this decree. The attention of the leaders of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on matters relating to defense and state security V.L. Lapygin, and the committee for youth affairs V.I. Tsybukh, the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I.S. Belousov, the USSR defense minister D.T. Yazov, the Komsomol Central Committee first secretary V.M.

Zyukina, and other leaders was drawn to the importance and urgency of the issues raised by the decree in improving the organization of training and the passage of military service for young men in the republic.

The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet standing commissions on questions relating to legislation, legality and law and order, youth affairs, and questions relating to interethnic relations, language, and international indoctrination were assigned the task of maintaining close links with the corresponding committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and ministries and departments and organizations, and of achieving full implementation of all clauses in the above-named decree.

The Uzbek SSR minister of public health S.M. Bakhramov was assigned the task of conducting an in-depth study of the situation with respect to physical examinations for the predraft and draft contingents, and of taking additional steps to insure prompt and good-quality outpatient care for young men aged 15 and older, and of improving treatment and health-maintenance work among them. Drafting sick young men and young men weakened by illness into the army should be stopped. Everywhere it is necessary to increase the responsibility of physicians for justification in cases of deferment of draft and for the quality of draftee selection for the ranks of the Soviet Army.

Within a 3-month period the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers is to complete work on a state program to train young men in the republic, and to take exhaustive steps to increase the responsibility of the draft commissions for the quality of selection of draftees during 1990.

It was deemed advisable additionally to include Uzbek SSR people's deputies and the deputies of local soviets in the draft commissions at all levels.

The chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet M.I. Ibragimov, his first secretary deputy B.I. Bugrov, and the chairmen of the Supreme Soviet commissions—E.Kh. Khalilov for questions of legislation, legality and law and order, A.A. Agzamkhodzhaev for youth affairs, Kh.M. Usmanova for public health, women's affairs, and mothers and infants, and E. Vakhidov for matters relating to glasnost—were assigned the task of reviewing as quickly as possible all letters and appeals from citizens on matters relating to service in the Soviet Army, and to carefully investigate all the facts connected with the deaths of servicemen drafted from the republic.

Materials on the deaths during 1990 of servicemen drafted from Uzbekistan have been passed to the USSR military procuracy.

At the first session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on 31 March 1990 republic people's deputies G.Z. Zakhritdinov, A.A. Agzamkhodzhaev and T. Khaydarov made up the deputy group to monitor compliance with the decree.

The deputy group was assigned the task of informing the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium about the results of its work during the third 10-day period of May.

The following members of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium took part in the discussion: standing commission chairmen Kh.M. Usmanov, G.Z. Zakhritdinov, T. Khaydarov, M.M. Mirziyayev, P.K. Kadyrov, A. Askarov, A.Kh. Tashkenbayev, R.Kh. Abdullayev, and A.Sh. Khabibullayev, the chairman of the Uzbek SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee Sh.Z. Urazayev, first deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet B.I. Bugrov, and Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee second secretary and USSR people's deputy A.S. Yefimov.

Uzbek SSR minister of public health S.M. Bakhramov, deputy military commissar for the republic U.Kh. Khasanov, and Sh.A. Ismatullayev and A. Zakhidov, representing the public, who had been invited to the session, also spoke.

President Karimov Outlines Benefits for War Veterans

90US0983C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 May 90 p 1

[Text "Ukase of the Uzbek SSR President 'On Additional Benefits for the Disabled, Participants of the Great Patriotic War, Internationalist Soldiers, and the Families of Fallen Servicemen in Connection with the Celebrations Marking the 45th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War'"]

[Text] In order to further improve living conditions for participants of the Great Patriotic War, internationalist soldiers and the families of fallen servicemen and to mark the 45 anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War:

The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, ministries and departments, the Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers, the ispolkoms of oblast soviets of peoples' deputies and the Tashkent city soviet of people's deputies, and enterprises and organizations located on republic territory shall during 1990 provide living accommodation for the disabled of the Great Patriotic War and the families of fallen servicemen, and in 1991 for all participants of the Great Patriotic War and persons equivalent to them, listed as at 1 January 1990.

From 1 July 1990 participants of the Great Patriotic War, internationalist soldiers, and the families of fallen servicemen shall be exempt from the payment of rents for their apartments. Benefits provided for the disabled of the Great Patriotic War shall be extended to all those who participated in the war and to internationalist soldiers with respect to payments for municipal services (supplies of water, gas, electricity and heating), and those who live in homes that do not have central heating shall be exempt from payment for fuel acquired according to the norms established for sale to the public.

The Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers, the ispolkoms of oblast soviets of peoples' deputies and the

Tashkent city soviet of people's deputies, ministries and departments, and enterprises and organizations shall:

—transfer to participants of the Great Patriotic War as their personal property the state and departmental homes and apartments in which they are living at this time.

During 1990 improvements shall be made in housing and everyday conditions for the disabled of the Great Patriotic War and for the families of fallen servicemen, and in 1991 for all those who took part in the Great Patriotic War and persons equivalent to them, by means of building and repairing housing using the resources of the ispolkoms of the local soviets of peoples' deputies, enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other sources.

In 1990 the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers shall do the following:

—from 1 July 1990 equalize the spending norms for food, drugs, furnishings in sanatoria, guest houses, and in-patient facilities for war veterans in the system of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Social Security to the norms set for hospitals for the disabled of the Great Patriotic War;

—allocate for participants of the Great Patriotic War and internationalist soldiers 1,750 small cars from the market stocks for sale for personal use;

—allocate to the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Social Security 100,000 Group I foreign currency rubles for the purchase of invalid carriages.

The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Communications, the Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers, and the ispolkoms of the oblast soviets of peoples' deputies and the Tashkent city soviet of people's deputies shall during 1990-1991 provide telephones for all participants of the Great Patriotic War, internationalist soldiers, and the families of fallen servicemen listed as at 1 January 1990.

Ministries and departments are given permission to use centralized material incentive funds, enterprises and organizations are given permission to use material incentive funds (unified wages funds), and establishments in the nonproduction sphere are given permission to use savings derived from spending estimates, to provide grants of up to R100 to participants of the Great Patriotic War no later than May of this year as memorial gifts.

The ispolkoms of local soviets of peoples' deputies shall acquire gifts for participants of the Great Patriotic War and nonworking pensioners using funds earmarked for sociocultural measures.

Giving due consideration to the special services rendered in defense of the motherland by Heroes of the Soviet Union and soldiers awarded the Order of Glory 3rd Degree, the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers shall guarantee priority fulfillment of the measures planned for 1990 connected with solving all questions related to improving their living conditions and medical, trade, and everyday services.

[Signed] I. Karimov, President of the Uzbek SSR

Update on Crime Situation

Legal Advisor on Unsolved Crimes

90UN1588A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 14,
2-8 Apr 90 p 7

[Article by M. Khazin, senior legal advisor: "Criminal Horror: Almost a Million Unsolved Crimes—Why?"]

[Excerpt] [passages omitted] It is indisputable that anybody who goes on the warpath against the law should be punished. Any liberalism under the guise of humanism in applying the law is not suitable. This is all the more true because among the extortionists there are genuine bandits, armed and very dangerous, not caring a bit about the lives of their victims, and in some cases, about militia workers.

However, bias and disinformation are impermissible as they distort public opinion.

What share do you think that this notorious racket has in the total amount of crime? A miserly one! Judge for yourself. Last year in Moscow 54,500 crimes were reported; 243 of them were extortion. This amounts to a few in each rayon.

Perhaps the situation is more terrible for the country as a whole? It is more terrible (more about this later), but not because of rackets. During the year 2,461,692 crimes were reported; extortion only made up 0.3 percent of these. For those who prefer absolute numbers, this is perhaps 6,939 cases.

I confess that I naively assumed for a long time that any society is constantly (at a given moment) obligated to be in a state of war against crime. However, in reality we were at peace with it for a long time. Or, if you will, we were in a state of positive neutrality. During this time crime increased its tempo. Law enforcement organs lost cadre, and sometimes professionalism and competence. Therefore, if war were to be declared, they would go to it unprepared and suffer defeats on all fronts.

A few more statistics.

Last year 927,931 crimes were unsolved. Almost a million! More than 2,500 homicides and even more rapes were unsolved—6,799 cases of robbery did not get to court because the guilty were not found.

Cooperatives who are victims of extortion are not afraid of reporting (verbally or in writing) crimes to the militia, where they will supposedly be helped. Ordinary citizens who are robbed do not have to be persuaded; they run to the militia or call them on their own. Last year there were 845,157 such cases. What happened? Sixty-four percent of private property thefts were not solved.

If this is war, it is sort of strange, a case of self-inflicted defeat.

Thus, we are overwhelmed by a crime wave that does not have a unified plan but, for better or worse, is well

prepared, and that means organized. Life demands that this be fought by well organized professionally trained investigators. Alas, this is not happening, and not always because of cadre shortages.

A person in Moscow disappeared. He was not very young. He had held solid jobs in trade. One morning he went to work and vanished without a trace. The family turned to the militia.

After a few months—there was nowhere to hide—the law enforcement authorities were aroused to launch a country wide search. The appearance of activity was created. There was a response from OVIR [Visa and Registration Department] stating that the missing person was not among those who had moved abroad (when he left the house he had only his pass). The Yaroslavl (?) Oblast Hospital was asked whether he were being treated there. Criminal investigations soon were halted because of lack of evidence of a crime; the search supposedly continued.

At the same time, a half decomposed body, bound hand and foot, was found in a lake near Moscow. Criminal investigators were called. Wasting no time or effort, they identified the person. It took several months for the related services, only 30 kilometers apart, to get together. The plans of Moscow searchers certainly required that they be acquainted with summaries of events around Moscow. (This is elementary!) In one of their reports the investigators from around Moscow indicated that they had visited the city and oblast trade administrations (there was a story that the victim had worked in trade!), but without bringing the missing person there... that's the way it is!

Obviously, no technology nor any additional transport can help without elementary discipline, honesty, interest in the matter and love for one's chosen profession. One will just take a broken down service vehicle and drive around solving deeply personal problems instead of finding a witness.

However, this is not all.

A few months latter another person disappeared. This time it was a senior trade worker, the superior of the previous man. He also left for work in the morning and did not return home. The family turned to the militia and called the missing persons department.

Your thoughts are all in vain if you think that by now there would be a unified investigating and operational force, highly capable intellectually and technically. You may recall that a year prior to the first incident another trade worker had been abducted in Moscow. They hauled him by car to an outlying area and killed him in a forest not far from the infamous lake. In none of the cases was ransom asked from their families, neither had anything been previously demanded from the victims. Were there other motives for the abductions and murders—revenge, settling personal scores? Alas, this is still unknown. This is because nobody is earnestly working

on these cases. This is not due to lack of resources, but to indifference ensuing from incompetence and, I repeat, to squandered professionalism.

There is no special concern about this attitude towards organized criminals, and there can be no doubt that the abduction of people is organized.

With such passivity and lack of skill towards solving reported crimes, what can one expect with regard to hidden crimes? Truly, absolutely nothing.

Even with the speculation rampant today, where the shortage of goods has raised black market prices to insane levels, criminal speculation is a rare guest in the courts. Behind the people there is always the most important element, the source of the scarce goods. There is no unified center in the struggle against speculation.

Is it really only speculation that remains unsolved? What about the bribe takers, without whom a single step cannot be taken in business activities? Talk with any more or less solid cooperative member. He hates the "racketeers", but hates the extortionists in official positions even more. This is because payments have to be made for everything: for business space (the price per square meter is steadily rising), for loans (there is also a tax—10 percent of the total), for installing telephones, even for state orders. Where are the criminal investigators? Are there enough of them?, Alas, alas.

The situation will not be corrected in a day, a month or even a year. It is necessary to work out an entirely new concept for selecting and training law enforcement personnel so that only professionals, in the highest sense of the word, will work there. This requires the recertification of present personnel; not to weed out those who have compromised themselves—this is going on all the time—but to avoid those who, because of their inborn personal qualities are unsuited for work as investigators, officials or prosecutors.

How can this suggestion be implemented? That is another story.

Moscow Procuracy Press Group's Findings

90UN1588B Moscow *VECHERNAYA MOSKVA* in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by Moscow Procuracy Press Group: "Alarming Statistics"]

[Text] The rate of serious crimes against people in our society is increasing. The absolute number has reached a 15 year record. Judge for yourself: In 1988 in Moscow there were 239 homicides and 141 cases of aggravated assault resulting in death. In 1989 the figures were 424 and 250.

These alarming statistics were announced today at a coordinating conference of heads of law enforcement organs in the city arranged by G. S. Ponomarev, procurator. The reasons for the increase in serious crimes were

also identified. More than 70 percent of the homicides were committed by people under the influence of alcohol, about 6 percent were committed by hooligans and 4 percent were motivated by self-interest. One out of three homicides was committed by a social parasite; 45 percent of the murderers had previously been confined in a penal institution.

Another problem that is becoming more acute is the low percentage of solved cases. Twenty percent of the homicides are not solved.

The coordinating conference has outlined measures to strengthen the homicide investigation group, and has made suggestions to provide improved equipment to the forensic medicine department and to improve the efficiency with which present crime fighting resources are used.

Criminologists Expose Inaccurate Crime Reporting

90UN1416A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 p 12

[Articles by Prof. A. Alekseyev and B. Tereshchenko, director of the USSR MVD Main Administration for Fighting Theft of Socialist Property: "Criminal Situation—Why? Who Is to Blame? What to Do? Crime About Which We Do Not Want to Know... Even Though We Create It Ourselves"]

[Text] "Crime is like an iceberg whose underwater, or invisible, part is much greater than what is above water," says Professor A. I. Alekseyev, director of the criminology and crime prevention department of the USSR MVD Academy.

"It will not change as long as we rely mainly on punitive measures and hardly touch the roots," states B. L. Tereshchenko, director of the USSR MVD Main Administration for Fighting Theft of Socialist Property.

It is well-known that the real crime figure is made up of two types of criminal actions: those that are reflected in crime statistics and those that are not, at least officially, reported, or latent crimes.

It is clear, however, that the real state of law and order and the moral climate of society is determined **not so much by reported as by real crime figures**. People suffer losses, mourn victims and curse malefactors regardless of whether or not a particular crime was entered into crime statistics.

According to A. A. Konov, an expert on latent crime, 20 percent of rape victims and 56.5 percent of theft victims keep silent about their misfortune. Reasons for such passivity vary and include embarrassment, desire to conceal one's own disreputable conduct, fear of revenge on the part of perpetrators, etc.

Moreover, with property belonging to nobody in particular, most crimes, notably economic, industrial and

office-related ones, do not seem to cause any tangible harm to anybody. And so it happens in such cases that the criminal is not impeded in his perennial desire to remain unknown. One exception is, perhaps, the Office for Fighting Against Theft of Socialist Property [OBKhSS], but this branch currently has more problems than achievements.

For a long time, latent crime was, in effect, only whispered about in Soviet criminology. It is no surprise, since we used to keep silent about many other glaring shortcomings, too.

Now, our idea about latent crime is starting to approach the truth, even though we should be realistic and admit that it will never be absolute.

I have made some simple calculations based on official crime figures about the state of law and order in the USSR in 1989. It turned out that in addition to some 2.5 million registered crimes there were 4.5 million non-reported crimes. True crime totaled 7 million.

Here is another figure. In the U.S., 13.5 million crimes were committed in 1988. If we look at these statistics in terms of crime rates, i.e., crimes per 100,000 people, (which makes comparisons more meaningful), it will turn out that the crime rate in the U.S. is almost 7 times higher than in the USSR: our crime rate was only 657 in 1988, while theirs was 5,510.

And now let us think it over. Why are we so fortunate? Are they, not us, plagued by pandemic shortages, have millions living below poverty line and ubiquitous coupons for soap, sugar, butter and meat? Were they, not us, oppressed by the horrible, historically unprecedented burden of stalinism, which distorted for generations to come the moral and legal consciousness of the people and which is still being felt sometimes? Did they, not us, live through the slaughter of peasantry, extermination of rich peasants, when human values were trampled underfoot, and an orgy of violence and cruelty? To complete the picture, I could list here some 200 or 250 other crime generating factors which, according to some criminologists, are causally or otherwise related to our enormous iceberg of crime. Crime does not come from the devil; it has deep roots in the form of economic, political, socio-psychological, ideological and numerous other phenomena.

Knowing our current problems, their history and scale, a question naturally arises: why should the crime rate in the USSR be seven times smaller than in the U.S.? What economic, social, national, historical, ethical, legal or other factors could explain this paradox?

I see no objective reasons. The only thing in which we have, perhaps, succeeded is the skill of ideologists of the Zhdanov-Suslov school in dressing up their wishful thinking as reality.

Our greatest need now is to know the truth about crime. Otherwise we will set wrong goals or lose sight of them altogether. Here is one example. In the October 11, 1989, issue of PRAVDA, TASS informed the public that in the first 9 months of last year economic crime declined 2.6 percent. Was it good or bad? It was, apparently, good. To use the language of TASS, speculators had been "squeezed" (a decline of 1.2 percent), and bribe-takers curbed, since almost 20 percent fewer of them had been exposed. As to large-scale thieves (or rather, struggle against them), the situation was a little "worse" According to TASS, which quoted official crime statistics, they had committed 2.3 percent more crimes.

It is easy to see through the truly childlike logic of the authors of this report: they believe that every last one case of speculation, bribe-taking and larceny in our fatherland is reported. What can be said here? They turned everything upside down: where the situation was apparently worse, it was in reality better, and vice versa.

I remember when I used to work for the OBKhSS in the late 1960s. Even back then it was pretty clear that crime figures reported by OBKhSS organs were to be used with the opposite sign: the fact that the number of crimes declined indicated that the fight against economic crime, which typically had a high level of latency, had slackened. Mafia was then mentioned only under the heading "Their Customs". The highest organ of state power was not addressing the issue of combatting organized crime. No one had heard of the billions of rubles in the shadow economy. But based on pure and simple common sense, we knew that latency in economic crime was such that we could go on tapping that well for a long time. Can it be that we have now exhausted it?

In short, as long as we continue to manipulate crime statistics in this manner, turning it inside out, we will not be able to see the true picture.

In this area, criminology has a great debt to repay to society. But we must not close our eyes to the fact that society has not yet given a clear order to work this complex issue out. Yet, this is where we must start. Then, there will be strong research groups, competition of scientific ideas and science-based recommendations. We must also incorporate allowances for latency into our forecasts in the area of combatting crime. They must be like instruments used in forecasts and plans of the MVD, the prosecutor's office and the KGB and in calculations and decisions of government entities. It is one thing to compute budget allocations, for instance, based on the crime figure of 2.5 million a year, and another, of 7 million crimes a year.

And of course it is very important to effect a **true perestroika in the work of law enforcement entities, so that they stop scaring people** (which is, unfortunately, still the case). Their work should show that they truly protect the rights and legitimate interests of citizens without once forgetting whose bread they eat.

In a conversation with an LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent B.L.Tereshchenko said:

Researchers computed that employees in our retail trade shortchange customers on average 400,000 times a day. In a month, 12 million thefts occur. What does it amount to in a year? And I do not even speak of other types of crime, such as concealment of goods, bribery and speculation.

But what is scary is not the true scale of crime, which was absolutely correctly described by Professor A.Alekseyev. Researchers polled sales clerks currently serving time at correctional facilities: among those who sold fruit and vegetables, for instance, 100 percent of respondents believed shortchanging customers was a normal part of their work.

In other words, there can be no doubt that the underwater part of the iceberg of crime is truly enormous. But what is the conclusion? Should we put a policeman next to every store counter? Open 400,000 criminal cases a day? Report and register all of them? Rely on the omnipotence of repressive measures?

In retail trade, we use a team method of material responsibility. But in the existing situation, it primarily gives rise to solidarity among workers: one person commits a crime but everybody is responsible. On the other hand, most retail trade employees lack opportunity to strive jointly for legal profit, legal incentives and legal gains. Economic accountability, you say? Ordinary sales clerks get almost no benefit from it. Leasing? What leasing can we talk about if the leased store has its hands and feet tied and completely depends on its superior agency? The latter allocates goods, sets salaries and distributes profits to the leased store.

One of the most reliable levers in combatting crime is competition in the goods market. Without it, real leasing does not work.

What do we need for true competition? Some say we need to saturate the market with deficit goods. This is true, of course. What could be better than a market bursting with goods? Nevertheless, I am convinced that even today, with our pauper's market, we could create competition.

How? First, by letting loose on the market numerous, diverse vendors, to use the professional language. Second, by making those vendors totally equal. In other words, by allowing them equal access to wholesale suppliers. Some say that if they were set free, and if state monopoly were abolished, those merchants would quickly take our last shirt from us, poor citizens. Nothing of the kind would occur if most important goods had fixed, firm state retail prices. He would win who could, given set prices, use his commercial acumen to organize business, preserve goods, increase turnover and provide a better variety of services.

I have a strong suspicion that in an honest competition state enterprises of the Ministry of Trade would lose while cooperatives would win. Today, cooperatives have incurred the wrath of the people who complain that these shameless blood suckers raise prices to the skies. But given the current lack of equality among sellers in the retail market and the effective exclusion of cooperatives from the wholesale supply network, excessively high prices there have been programmed into the system. This means that the hatred of the people toward cooperatives has been programmed in, as well.

Naturally, it is horrible when some cooperative dealer buys up a deficit good and sells it around the corner for three times the original price. Such abuses, however, can occur anywhere and do not reflect the essence of the cooperative movement.

Some may say: "What about bribes? If all sellers are equal as far as the wholesaler is concerned and state distribution, or allocation, of goods is abolished, he who greases the palm will get the most." It is my contention that the current system of state allocation not only does not exclude bribery but on the contrary encourages it greatly. As a consequence, it encourages large-scale theft, too.

There is such concept as a goods turnover plan. Whether or not it is fulfilled is the main measure of the work of a retail trade enterprise. If the plan is overfulfilled it is good, if it is not fulfilled, you are a bum. **The problem is, however, that the plan can be overfulfilled without providing goods for the consumer market.** In other words, the shelves may be empty while the plan is doing well. How can it be achieved? By various means. One way is the following: the store is empty for three weeks while at the end of the month the distributor drops off some deficit goods, to help the store's plan along. Or else, the distributor may reduce, or amend, the store's plan. Usually it is not done without compensation. Numerous trials show how money stolen at the bottom of the pyramid flows in a potent stream upward, settling in the pockets of so-called useful people.

The practice of concealing, or holding back, various goods has become commonplace. Deficit goods go from store rooms either to the useful people or directly to speculators. Here is just one example: every year, some 30,000 railroad containers with furniture sets are shipped from Moscow to the south. There, the furniture is sold for 2-to-3 times its nominal price.

What causes this practice? Once again, it is the fiat of the Ministry of Trade. For many years, the "Mosmebeltorg" complex, which is part of the ministry's system, has been getting over one half of the funds budgeted for imported furniture for the entire republic. The rationale for this is simple: to prevent the goods from being spread too thin in the market. They are not spread thin; instead, they are sold directly under the counter. Are Muscovites alone who are deprived of furniture? In Leningrad, orders for furniture sets are now being taken for the year

2011, while middlemen, with the connivance of store employees, systematically buy up dozens of sets.

On the surface, the Ministry of Trade is combatting this practice. It has even issued a special order: "On the Order of Selling Deficit Goods and Measures to Combat Their Concealment". Yet, the order has a number of clauses effectively allowing retail trade employees to build up, if they consider it necessary, a completely legal backlog of deficit goods. And so this backlog swells and grows.

In 1989, R55.8 million worth of various concealed goods was uncovered at USSR Ministry of Trade enterprises. During pre-New Year's inspections at liquor stores, violations were found in 1 out of every 5 stores, with R174,000 worth of goods held back. Name another country where a merchant profits by not selling and by showing the customer the door. But our Ministry of Trade does not care, as long as the plan of goods turnover is fulfilled.

The issue of opening commercial stores has been raised. It might be useful in the current situation, since it would help mop up existing liquidity. As a result, the goods market would benefit. I think, however, that we must be extremely careful here. First, the assortment of goods shipped to such stores should be strictly limited, so that they do not get a lion's share of deficit goods. Second, strict punishment must be set for reducing or terminating the production of inexpensive goods which are in demand.

And how is this business being envisioned now? The proposal of the Ministry of Trade on commercial stores lists, for instance, smoked sausage. It is referred to as a "delicacy product for holiday consumption purposes". It is proposed to raise its price 2.2 times. What would be the result of this? Currently, only about 100 grams of such sausage per person is being produced in this country annually. The turnover plan for it is R159 million. This means that without increasing the production of such sausage, without making any effort whatsoever and doing nothing, income from commercial stores will jump immediately to R347.5 million. If so, why make any effort, increase capacities or search for hidden reserves? This is monopoly in action.

Does this situation involve only smoked sausage? The Ministry of Trade proposal on commercial prices is, in my opinion, nothing but a form of hidden, unannounced and underhanded price hike in the goods market. For instance, the price of domestically produced candies (costing over R10 per box) would be raised 2 times, a liter of domestic table wine from R4 to R7, a coat with a fur collar from R630 to R1,000 and a light overcoat from R340 to R600.

The very same goods turnover plan is behind all this; it will essentially become a plan for extorting money from the population. The market would not be saturated with goods but money would be extracted anyway.

The monopoly of the Ministry of Trade benefits others besides the Ministry of Trade. Industry, which is not currently forced by the market to bend its back and earn its money by the sweat of its brow, is also quite happy with this easy life. We must, therefore, speak of a form of collusion between retail trade and industry, of communality of interests and of the whole monopoly complex. I think that this is the root of today's economic crime. Shortchanging, concealment of goods, speculation and theft are but consequences. The root cause is the industrial-retail diktat, the absolute power of the producer and the seller over the consumer and their freedom from the laws of the market.

And one more thing: the fight against crime must not hurt normal and natural interests of the people and society. The old medical rule Do Not Harm applies to our work. We often speak today of the black market. But let us think what it is built of. First, clearly, of deficit goods sold through the back door and from under the counter at inflated prices and, second, of goods brought in from abroad and also sold at insane prices. We term both transactions speculation. I would like to make a distinction between these two channels.

I would raise penalties for resale of goods concealed or stolen from stores, while not only allowing but actively encouraging the sale of goods brought from abroad, given our hungry market. On one condition, however: such trade must be officially registered and the state must levy a certain tax on it. If you conceal the sale and do not pay the tax you will be punished. This is done in many civilized countries. Such trade could be carried out through a wide network of stores accepting goods on commission, while allowing those who sell the good to set on it any price they want. The market would show whether or not the price is realistic.

I think that the proposed new ideas would help somewhat to turn the black market into a white, open one. It is well-known that nothing encourages crime in trade as dealing chased underground.

I am convinced that we must fight crime even more aggressively, more broadly and more intelligently than we do today. But we must not concentrate on catching every miscreant in retail trade or every dishonest cooperator. This will do very little. No, we must fight economic crime in its broadest form, i.e., the milieu that produces it: the all-encompassing monopoly of state trade, dangerous conspiracy of industry and trade, reduced availability of deficit goods caused by the desire of gain or for any other reason and concealment of income from financial auditors... Professor Alekseyev is absolutely right: we must fight the roots of crime, i.e., all those phenomena which in any form or aspect, under any guise, undermine the healthy economy. I only want to add that the fight against crime must be creative, not destructive. We know it all too well from our own experience: it is easier to destroy than to build. We have destroyed enough. It is now time to start building.

Statistics on Rising Youth Crime

90UN1564A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by A. Illesh: "Statistics and Our Commentary: Juvenile Crime"]

[Text] "Just recently there was truly a wave of reports on youth gang activity in the newspapers. The names of various cities were mentioned: Kazan, Naberezhnyye Chelny... Society was shocked. Today I am not seeing this sort of articles, even though I follow crime-related articles quite closely: I am a father myself. So what has happened to the gangs? Generally speaking, what is the real (not the emotional) status of youth crime, and in particular crimes committed by minors? Is it on the increase or on the decline?" This letter was received from V. Kuzmin of Moscow and is fairly typical of mail received by our editorial offices.

By way of response to his question let us take a look at crime statistics.

Thus, the percentage of crimes committed by persons aged 14-29 is as follows: 50 percent in 1987, 55 percent in 1988 and 57 percent in 1989. Indeed, this area of our lives is increasingly dominated by young people. Here is further proof of that: one speculator, currency trader or extortionist in three is a young person. Unfortunately the number of 14- and 15-year-olds among juvenile criminals is also on the rise.

The USSR MVD is concerned by this situation and feels that these figures must be changed decisively, especially in regard to the prevention of youth crime. Why crime prevention? There is a simple explanation: this problem is not only a source of pain and concern today, it to a large extent also represents the outlook for the future condition of our society.

At the present time the following can be stated with confidence. Crime committed by teenagers is rising particularly rapidly in Belorussia, Armenia and Moscow. In those areas the rate of increase exceeds the nationwide average by factors of two or more.

Nor are teenagers lagging behind when it comes to especially dangerous acts, either. They commit one crime in six, including one act of larceny in three. Participation by minors in group crimes is higher than among adults by a factor of three. One group in three manages to commit four, five or even more crimes before being localized by the militia. As for the letter writer's concerns, unfortunately audacious criminal acts continue to be committed by youth gangs in Moscow, Yoshkar-Ola, Izhevsk, Kazan and Cheboksary. True, just recently the Tatar ASSR minister of internal affairs claimed in a press conference before journalists from the central newspapers that the situation in that region is being normalized by law enforcement organs, and that youth gang activity has dropped off.

Unfortunately, today we are seeing an extremely low level of organization in regard to youth crime prevention in another region: the Uzbek SSR. Here are some figures which support this sad conclusion: in that republic young people commit as much as 70 percent of all violent robberies, thefts, apartment burglaries and acts of group hooliganism.

Wherein lies the reason for this state of affairs? Firstly, the personnel of juvenile affairs inspectorates have little contact with organs of public education and health care or with public organizations. Over one-half of all difficult teenagers do not have so-called public tutors. And a second unpleasant revelation: the level of information possessed by criminal investigation divisions is low. Other reasons which could be listed include this one: the militia avoids dealing with the problem of youth employment. Well, it is clear where idleness and the inability to make rational use of unlimited leisure time lead. I am certain that the militia (as well as other law enforcement organs) can deal with youth employment and recreation. But that is not their primary concern. Of late society has been heaping on the militia as great number of tasks for which it is not suited. What happens is that internal affairs organs do not have either enough energy or time to carry out their primary task: the fight against crime.

...Unfortunately, a majority of internal affairs administrations in Uzbekistan do not have special youth crime prevention divisions. There is no doubt that all these things affect the overall state of crime. In 1989 the number of minors committing repeat offenses increased by 49 percent, those committing group crimes by 13 percent, and those committing crimes together with adults by 34 percent.

What happens is that by not investing enough effort, ability, tact and, pardon me, money in work with so-called "difficult teenagers" we are almost consciously (or in any event with our eyes wide open) creating a very difficult future crime situation in our country. When one takes into account the fact that a teenager who has spent time in a prison camp often brings away from it nothing but hatred for adults and professional criminal skills, then the present situation in regard to youth crime looks particularly dismal. A separate topic for discussion is in what kind of places young people are serving their sentences. Reports of mass disobedience and the division of prison camps into various "colors" subordinate (in fact, not officially) not to the tutors but instead to corrupt authorities have become common. I am convinced that this problem, of which we have only scratched the surface by citing a few figures, is not just a subject for detective movies and literary research. It is a matter of concern to our whole society.

MVD Official Interviewed on Prostitution

90US0853A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in
Russian No 16, 21-27 Apr 90 p 7

[Interview of A. Guroviy, chief of the USSR MVD Administration for Struggle Against Organized Crime]

and Corruption, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent N. Maydanskaya: "Still Another 'Closed' Theme: 26 Percent of Hard-Currency Prostitutes Are Married: 23 Percent Have Children"]

[Text] Dear Editors! I am engaged in individual labor activity (prostitution). What kind of pension is stipulated for people in my profession? Inasmuch as this is "harmful" work, perhaps a pension will be set to begin at age 50?

The question is not an idle one. I have the possibility through a very highly placed client to obtain a bogus work book. Many of my "colleagues" do this. If I knew for certain that I would receive my minimum—80 rubles, then I would not try to take you in. I am already 40 years old, have no children (my husband did not want them), and I "work" out of boredom and out of revenge: My husband often goes on business trips and once brought me gonorrhea as a "present"... I decided to revenge myself on him (he knows nothing).

To be frank, I am somewhat against being engaged in this. ... But I earn big money, and once there is money there is also freedom.—Nina Kh., Kherson.

The struggle against prostitution in our country did not end even when, for reasons of propaganda, they began to ascribe this phenomenon itself exclusively to capitalist society. However, as is obvious from the letter, even today the results of this struggle remain extremely deplorable. So, perhaps it is not worth troubling over and it would better to turn to the experience of other countries and open brothels? This is the subject of an interview of the chief of the USSR MVD Administration for Struggle Against Organized Crime and Corruption, RSFSR People's Deputy and Doctor of Juridical Sciences A. Gurovii, by our correspondent N. Maydanskaya.

[Gurovii] We can turn not only to foreign but also to our own experience. In prerevolutionary Russia, in Saint Petersburg, there were brothels. And what is interesting is that, along with the registered prostitutes, there were approximately just as many who did not want to work under supervision. I think that, if we decided to open public houses, we too would run up against the same problem.

Another aspect is the moral one. Prostitutes have never been respected in Russia. The past 70 years, of course, served to constrict both Christian ideology and the patriarchal peasant structure. But the negative attitude toward prostitutes in the mass consciousness did not suffer any fundamental changes. Legalization of this phenomenon would have to overcome an ethical barrier that has stood for centuries. But how? And is it worth it? Wouldn't it happen, with the present moral and economic situation in society, that if you just permit them brothels will begin to grow like mushrooms, sucking young people into their whirlpool.

Prostitution is not terrible in itself. What is terrible are its results and consequences. More than 350,000 persons are infected by venereal diseases annually. Now AIDS can be added to them.

Medical people, and especially specialists concerned with pathology in the area of sexual relations, are coming out for the legalization of prostitution, inasmuch as they consider that physiology cannot be ignored.

I will not take it upon myself to discuss all these points. I only want to stress that the question of whether to open brothels or not requires thorough scientific study.

[Question] In all likelihood some readers will be indignant: Arrange the lives of prostitutes, and what is more from a scientific point of view! Shoot them, put them in prison, exile them—and be done with it.

[Gurovii] Alas, we have had all that. We have exiled them. No further off than during the year that the Moscow Olympics were held. And what happened? They corrupted only the local population. There was a time that they shot them, trying to liquidate prostitutes as a "class." But they "survived."

[Question] Is it possible to say with certainty today how substantial the scale of prostitution is with us within the system of organized crime?

[Gurovii] They came into the purview of the Mafia back in the beginning of the 1970's when, strictly speaking, the so-called central prostitutes also appeared—ones working in the hotels and restaurants and basically serving foreigners. Along with confidence men and pickpockets they became a subject of the rackets. Prostitutes were no longer capable of organizing a profitable business alone and pimps appeared.

Today, the business of prostitution represents an extensive structure with an allocation of roles, contacts with the administrations of hotels and taxi drivers, bribery of militia workers and of officials...

[Question] But then the thought arises that prostitution is ineradicable and that any struggle against it is useless.

[Gurovii] In 1987, a little more than 5000 prostitutes were called to administrative account. But this statistic does not correspond with reality. And not because the internal affairs organs are hiding something, but because they, unfortunately, still do not see all this. I think that it is necessary to establish a morals police which will not simply catch prostitutes but also uncover the reasons and the conditions for preventing this phenomenon.

The theoretical premise of Marx and Engels that prostitution would disappear along with the disappearance of exploitive society have not proven justified. An economic factor, of course, does exist. But it is wrong to see in this the main reason for the spread of prostitution. It is interesting that, back at the end of the last century, the Englishman Williams Butts, conducting research among prostitutes, discovered that only two percent of the

women entered brothels for reasons of economic need. The rest—out of interest, a lack of desire to work, at the behest of their partners... When I examined the reports of the Saint Petersburg police, I discovered the same gradation: Need stood in one of the last places.

If we are going to talk seriously about a struggle against prostitution then the only basis for success is the moral renaissance of society. It is urgently necessary to pass a government program. But not to do this in the way that we are accustomed, by means of declarations. In all civilized countries, money, and a good deal of it, stands behind state programs to combat prostitution.

[Question] If I have understood you correctly, you are opposed to the introduction of criminal penalties for engaging in prostitution.

[Gurovii] Criminal penalties for involving juveniles are necessary, and we already have these. They are also stipulated for pandering and for maintaining prostitution dens.

As regards "pure" prostitution, there is one legal measure, in my view: to make this occupation economically unprofitable. By an ukase of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, a prostitute noted for the first time receives an administrative penalty in the form of a warning or a fine up to 100 rubles. The same actions committed again within the course of a year will entail a fine of 200 rubles. And here is the first thing that needs to be done—to increase fines up to 1000-1500 rubles.

Weapons Seized from 'Underground' Arsenal in Moscow Oblast

90UN1480A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90
Second Edition p 8

[Article by A. Gomonov: "Mines, Bombs, Grenades... Militia Neutralizes Underground 'Laboratory'"]

[Text] About a year ago, a sixth administration was created in the Moscow Oblispolkom GUVd for the struggle against organized crime. Currently, its associates have carried out more than 100 operations. Fifty-four stable crime groups, including 35 bands of racketeers, have been arrested. From July to December 1989 alone, 681 pieces of firearms and about 7,000 cartridges were confiscated from criminals.

Here is a new report. The sixth administration, in cooperation with the administration for keeping public order and a special-purpose militia detachment from the Moscow Oblispolkom GUVd, an operation was conducted in the territory of Podolskiy, Serpukhovskiy and Chekhovskiy rayons to remove weapons from organized crime groups. As a result, the following was confiscated: 48 mortar shells, including large-caliber, 55 antitank hand grenades, five grenade fuzes, 19 shells of various caliber, two Nagant revolvers, five unregistered hunting rifles, two machine-gun ribbons, about 400 cartridges for various types of weapons, and 10 rifled-weapon barrels.

This is not counting cold steel weapons, American-made telescopic truncheons and an Italian bullet-proof vest.

"We received information that an underground laboratory, working to manufacture explosives and all kinds of bombs, was active in the oblast," said K. Velin, chief of the Moscow Oblispolkom GUVd, militia major general. "What we discovered can, without exaggeration, be called a laboratory of death. We took the criminals by surprise. They simply did not manage to realize what was going on, what had happened to them. For the time being, we will not give their names, but let me say that these people have been at odds with the law for a long time. They collected weapons in the battlefields of the past war. They cleaned and repaired them in specially equipped studios. One band, in particular, had 1939-model revolvers in excellent working condition.

It should be noted that the administration associates had taken high-power explosive devices from criminal groups before. Some had special adaptations for attachment, for instance, to cars. There have been cases where, in order to frighten cooperative workers, the criminals exploded cars before their very eyes. This was all used to terrorize people. However, this is the first time that so many explosives were confiscated at once. The members of the crime band had also manufactured home-made bombs. The bodies of hand grenades were also discovered: they needed only to be filled with tolite and...

"Production" was set up on a broad scale. The shells basically went for smelting of the explosive. Powder was obtained from the cartridges. The agents discovered airplane bombs with another person arrested at a nearby premise. They were in such a dilapidated condition that a guard had to be set on the building in expectation of sappers. It is easy to guess where the bombs could have been used.

Incidentally, the weapons confiscated earlier also came from this "laboratory."

Besides the dangerous arsenal, the criminals had about 26,000 rubles, as well as valuables from churches (icons, icon frames, bibles, silver chalices), the value of which is being established. An entire set of military shoulder boards and even the identity card of a militia associate who is not on permanent staff were confiscated from one of the people arrested...

As you can see, the criminals are well armed. Quite recently, a group was arrested, from which automatic weapons with silencers and sniper sights were confiscated. They are stealing weapons in military units and from VOKhR [Paramilitary Protection Service] employees, and attacking militia associates.

Why did the criminals make their deadly weapons? To whom were they sold? The investigative office is looking for answers to these and other questions.

Kazakh MVD Official on Crime Prevention, Corruption

90UN1866A Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh 5 May 90 p 4

[Article by A. Isabayev, Kazakh SSR deputy minister of internal affairs: "Our First Priority is to Prevent Crime"]

[Text] Last year a Preventive Services Administration, a new branch in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, was formed. Its function is to prevent crime and violations of law and to strengthen connections with the masses. Such branches have also been organized locally. Divisional inspectors, units to prevent violation of law among youths and teenagers, inspectorates for labor corrections and job placement, special units for exercising control over those sentenced for crime or placed on probation, and units controlling organizations for the correctional labor of young people will come under their control.

Strengthening preventive services units will have a major impact upon improvement of the composition of cadres. At present, those working as divisional inspectors are officials who have gained a great deal of experience in other branches of the police and persons who have completed higher and middle-specialized educational institutions of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs.

In their daily operations, preventive services units of Ministry of Internal Affairs organs rely on soviets of people's deputies and upon their executive committees. Our officials, who are deputies in local soviets, are making efforts to cooperate with people's deputies in strengthening social order and in actively carrying out measures to prevent crime. As is known to us all, local soviets have made a major contribution in organizing groups of workers to aid the police. It must be mentioned that there are now 143 such groups functioning in our republic, composed of nearly 4,000 members. Since these groups have become involved in guarding social order, they have put a stop to 4,500 activities violating law and more than a hundred crimes have been uncovered with their help. Worker groups, showing their best side in Temirtau City, have reduced street rowdiness 50 percent from what it was before. In this city of Kazakhstan metallurgists, the amount of crime in public places has decreased sharply.

Workers detachments have been active with noteworthy results in Guryev and Kzyl-Orda Oblasts. With their participation, hundreds of persons who have gotten involved in rowdiness, drinking in public places, being intoxicated and other crimes have been arrested, taken note of and sentenced to various punishments. In cooperation with divisional inspectors, such worker detachments have been carrying out many preventive measures. In Syr-Dariya Rayon of Kzyl-Orda Oblast, groups of senior citizens have talked with persons inclined to crime and violation of order. In Aktyubinsk City, a privately managed law center called "Femida" has been

organized with the resources of the Komsomol Committee and the city internal affairs division. This center has organized two groups of people's police. Their work to prevent violation of public order goes on from seven in the evening until the middle of the night. One noteworthy peculiarity of the work of the center is that young men who are ranking in sports and who work in special military units have been drawn into the work of helping the police. Those persons who come to the center during their time off and guard public order receive a salary of up to 200 rubles.

We are aware of the fact that recently various forms and methods have come into being for protecting social order and struggling against crime. One of them involves formation of cooperatives with the resources of retired police officers or of persons still serving. Let us look at what the "Guardian" Cooperative formed in Alma-Ata is accomplishing. "Guardian" is funded by city industries and organizations. For example, the "Yuzkasgeologiya" Union has contributed a sum of 10,000 rubles to support it. More than 7,000 rubles has come from the confectionary plant. These contributions would seem to show that labor collectives are interested in waging an effective struggle against crime.

At present there are 17,169 people's detachments in the republic, and they include in their ranks nearly 550,000 people's officers. Somewhat more than half are communists and komsomolists and most have become people's deputies. Each day some 12,360 of our public assistants guard public order in the republic. This is a great force. Last year they brought more than 49,000 rowdies and other violators of social order to internal affairs divisions and 1,397 crimes were uncovered with their active participation. During this period, 11,226 officers were praised for active participation in the preservation of social order and received valuable awards. It is our duty to further intensify the work of our people's officers.

We understand well that to achieve goals placed before us by the party successfully, we must find unexploited resources and designate ways to raise the quality and effectiveness of the branches of internal affairs organs. From this perspective, it can be observed that actions of division inspectors in cooperation with the masses to prevent crime and violations of law and order have begun to improve. Division inspectors have become the first line of defense in their assigned territories in prevention of violation of law. In addition to effectively organizing the work of social points to preserve order, they are also devoting their attention to working with residents, and to taking under their supervision those persons who have an inclination to violate order, or have previously been convicted, or who do not work and have become involved with alcoholism, or who have a tendency towards other kinds of extra-legal activities.

Just last year thousands of crimes were uncovered through the efforts of division inspectors and persons responsible apprehended after investigation. The number of divisions guaranteeing a reduction of crime

was 609, the number of those not allowing any manifestations of crime at all was 254, and the number of divisions uncovering 100 percent of crime was 652. We are struggling to increase their numbers. A great deal of work is being done by social points to prevent crime. Their number has now reached nearly 2,000. These points are devoting all their attentions to strengthening the connection of divisional inspectors with the masses, and to guaranteeing active participation by labor collectives and social units in guarding order. As experience has shown, the emphasis in the struggle against alcoholism, vagrancy and other anti-social activities belongs to labor collectives. For this reason, this emphasis must be at the forefront in police work and be exercised in an effective manner.

However, we do certainly have problems. For example, party and government resolutions on refinement of the work of division inspectors in local areas and regarding improvement of their material circumstances have not been fulfilled completely. Some 17 percent of divisional inspectors in the republic have not been guaranteed housing, and the figure is 24 percent in Alma-Ata City and in Chimkent Oblast. Some 35.3 percent of division inspectors suffer from need of transport and 24 percent of work space. All of this, taken together, has led to the deterioration of crime preventive measures. The major task which now stands before us is to mobilize more actively the broad masses, labor collectives and social organizations in elimination of the causes of crime, and to increase responsibility in every managerial collective regarding creation of a climate intolerant of every manifestation of violation of law.

In discussing the general difficulties and problems of our work, we cannot hide the fact that circumstances continue to arise leading to violation of socialist legality, violation of civil rights and even crime on the part of officials of internal affairs organs. However, we are struggling resolutely against such manifestations. Just last year 1,410 officials of internal affairs organs were fired for illegal activities. This amounted to 32.7 percent of all those fired by internal affairs organs last year. Since the beginning of this year some 469 persons have been fired for such reasons. Among them, 59 officials had worked in internal affairs organs for less than a year. Last year, whereas 102 internal affairs officials committed crimes, the figure for the first four months of this year is 17. Recently, Q. Qunaqbayev, chief investigator of the Alatau Rayon internal affairs department of the capital was arrested taking a 2,000 ruble bribe after issuing an order freeing a person who had committed a crime from criminal responsibility. These are a small number of improper manifestations for republic internal affairs organs with officials numbering in the thousands under them. However such things leave very deep scars on the minds of the masses. For this reason, we are making a great deal of effort to investigate in detail the reasons why such things have come about, to prevent their repetition in the future and to keep our ranks pure. Only when we keep our ranks pure can we fulfill tasks lying before us honorably.

Internal affairs organs continues to fulfill, more actively than before, their role as organizers of the struggle against crime. To this end, preventive work and glasnost are preconditions for success. At the same time, we note that we have recently begun to understand that we cannot struggle against crime solely with the power of the police. That we have begun to form various popular associations and workers groups is proof. We must develop such methods further, effectively in the future. This is because we will only be able to rid ourselves of the social disease of crime when we are mobilized as a people against crime. Thus, internal affairs organs, from their side, are carrying out sound measures to refine crime prevention work and to prevent crime. Aid and encouragement shown us by the party and the government in this regard is a reliable foundation.

Uzbekistan: Fergana Aftermath Prosecutions, Crime Rate Viewed

*90US1980A Tashkent KOMSOMOLET
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 4*

[Article by Vladislava Zablotskaya: "Criminal Chronicle: Fergana, March 1990"]

[Text] The press group at the Fergana Oblast procuracy reports that, as of 3 March, the workers in the USSR Procuracy's investigation group that is headed by Deputy USSR General Procurator A. V. Frolov, conducted investigation that closed 188 criminal cases dealing with 354 persons. Of them, 170 cases dealing with 331 persons were sent for review to UzSSR Supreme Court and to oblast and people's courts. The individuals involved included: for premeditated murder and attempted murder, 69; participation in mass disorders, 128; thefts and robberies from private individuals, 63; violation of national and racial equality, 8 persons... Two hundred sixty-five persons were arrested for having committed crimes during the mass disorders on the territory of Fergana Oblast. They included 112 persons aged 16 to 25 years; two CPSU members; and 35 persons being taken to court for the second time.

Since June 1989 the crime statistics have decreased noticeably. This, however, does not mean that the situation in Fergana Oblast is calmer and safer than it is in other parts of Uzbekistan. In our republic, as you know, crimes are committed on the average of once every six minutes...

Nighttime Fergana met me with a cold downpour. The headlights of the patrol vehicle shot ahead into a solid wall of rain streaming down. The rain drummed mercilessly on the roof of the Zhiguli, and the rapidly clicking windshield wipers barely managed to keep the streams of water off the windshield. We traveled along street after street. Through the curtain of rain on the right we caught the gleam of "scraper-knife center"—the city's prison—a majestic structure in the center of the city.

We bypassed the center of town and wound our way around the outskirts of Fergana. The lights became fewer

and fewer, and there was not a single person on the streets. Suddenly a drunk sprang up out of nowhere and dashed under the wheels of our vehicle. The man who had been roaming in the rain, so to speak, on "automatic pilot," proved, however, to be capable of recognizing among us a guardian of law and order. He excused himself and disappeared instantaneously into the space under a sign identifying the "Your Home" cooperative.

It was between 0200 and 0300 hours. Expectation was replaced by irritation, and irritation by insomnia. Thoughts as long as streams of rain seethed in my head: why am I doing this? Is it really "in order to get a few lines in the newspaper"?

That night the city slept. Nothing terrible happened. Nothing like, for example, what happened during my last arrival there, two weeks previously. That event had shaken the residents of Fergana. I myself saw people preparing to bury a young girl who had lived in this world 16 years. She had been killed by her father. Before her drunkard rowdy of a father had stabbed her to death, she had worked and gone to school, and had wanted to become a nurse...

A certain person named Nadzhimov dropped in to see Sharipova, a worker in the Kuvasaysteklo PO [production association]. Nadzhimov was a cook in that enterprise's dining hall. He stabbed the woman in the stomach. The victim went to the hospital, and the extremely embittered Nadzhimov went to the prisoner's dock.

A heinous crime was committed recently during the night in Buvaydinskiy Rayon. A person unknown broke into the home of rayprotreboysuz worker Kenzhayev, first stabbed to death Kenzhayev's mother, and then used the same knife to inflict several stab wounds on Kenzhayev, his wife, and his small son. All three of them went to the hospital in serious condition. The identity of the criminal has been established, and the procuracy is conducting an investigation.

Apart from these crimes, that are savage and senseless, thefts are flourishing in the oblast: cars and motorcycles and other personal property are being stolen. For the most part, the criminals are young people.

A certain M. Kurbanov, who does not work anywhere, drove around the roads in Leningradskiy Rayon on "his own" T-28Kh4 tractor with trailer. It turned out that he had bought it for 1000 rubles from a person unknown as long ago as 1988. Currently the seller is being sought.

The abundance of data that I obtained at the oblast procuracy's press group requires the appropriate explanations.

The number of crimes committed last years was 8049. For purposes of comparison, one can give the number of crimes committed since the beginning of this decade, that is, since 1980: it constituted 2929. That is a tremendous difference. But what is such a headlong increase in

the crime rate in Fergana Oblast linked? I discussed that question with Nikolay Ivanovich Sabardin, first deputy procurator of Fergana Oblast. He is directly in charge of the investigative work in the procuracy and the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration].

"The increase in crime in our oblast disturbs me primarily not only as a chief, but also as a human being. The last time, we spoke about a comprehensive program for combatting crime, but nothing has gone past the point of discussions. In my view, this kind of program can be developed on the oblast scale and we should not wait until it is lowered down to us by the Union and the republic. This kind of program must be prepared as follows: first of all, we need a thorough analysis of the state of affairs in the oblast. There is a low level of professionalism among the workers in the militia and the investigative agencies. For a long time we have put our hopes on getting not people who are more capable, but just on getting more people, and so it has turned out that we have a sufficient number of workers, but the situation is worsening. So, first of all it is necessary to resolve these questions. Certain people attempt to explain the increased number of crimes by the poor life that the people lead, but certainly people shouldn't kill their neighbors simply out of envy. At the present time, the crimes that predominate are premeditated murders.

"Last year holdups increased by 27 percent; robberies by 67 percent; hooliganism by 45 percent; and apartment break-ins by 79 percent. There was a 170-percent increase in the number of crimes committed by previous offenders. That happens because we take too cold an attitude toward those persons who have left the places of confinement, so that most of them have nowhere to live, they cannot find jobs, and so they have nothing left to do but to live a life of crime again. Those who have served a sentence behind bars have a different way of looking at things, and we must understand that...

"I have a plan for creating on an oblast scale a social rehabilitation center. It could be founded some enterprise where the people would be offered a job, a place in a dormitory... I think that that is one of the most important elements for combatting crime."

"But isn't it difficult even to keep the number of crimes at a definite level?"

"It is my personal opinion that in about two years we will be able to achieve a considerable reduction in the number of crimes, and to stay at that level for at least several years. But, of course, that is provided that we will be able to react instantaneously to the warning messages coming in from the places where the crimes are occurring, and that, as I have already said, will be possible only with highly professional personnel."

"Do you think that the DND [voluntary people's patrols] have become obsolete?"

"The DND are one of those numerous public organizations that can be tremendously beneficial in the fight

against crime. There are a very large number of people's *druzhinas* and detachments, and it is necessary to force them to work. At this moment, the DND provide practically no benefit, because the people sitting at their posts with a DND armband are either women or elderly people, who only become the victims of insults and hooligan attacks. Nevertheless I think that it is simpler to resuscitate an old organization than to invent a new one. It would seem now that the militia's worker detachments have come to replace the DND, but I do not welcome that. The people working in them have been released from their direct job, but they receive their wages there, even though they are absolutely incompetent. But I am convinced that this newly arrived detachment will not last long. That is my personal opinion."

Speaking for myself, I would like to note that I do not agree entirely with Nikolay Ivanovich's opinion concerning the militia's worker detachments. Because Leonid Voronin's group is in operation in Fergana. He is a lawyer by profession. That group sprang up at the Ferganaobuv PO, and currently consists of approximately 70 persons. The group has already detained 18 participants in various demonstrations. I see good prospects here. If things continue to go as well for the Voronin group, which was created on the example of the cities of Kherson and Gorkiy, the law-enforcement agencies in Fergana will have a worthy assistant. But time will tell.

Ukrainian MVD Official on Combatting Shadow Economy

90UN1482A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
10 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Dmitriyevich Gladush, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, colonel-general in the internal service: "The Shadow Economy"]

[Text] Our correspondent asked I.D. Gladush, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, colonel-general in the internal service, to answer a number of questions about work by the MVD and its agencies to strengthen the struggle against economic crime:

[Gladush] There is no need to speak of the topicality of the problem in question. The republic MVD has drafted and is implementing a number of organizational and practical steps which, in our opinion, will affect the results of the struggle against speculation, related violations of the law, and other mercenary abuses. This year, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium introduced a change in the Criminal Code and Code on Administrative Law Violations of the Ukrainian SSR. Their goal is to increase responsibility for speculation and the illegal sale of goods.

Steps were taken jointly with the republic prosecutor's office and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court to punish criminals who have infringed on the foundations of the socialist economy, "as deserved," yet at the same time

not allow the institution of strict criminal responsibility for citizens who have committed insignificant violations for the first time.

A corresponding set of measures, aimed at revealing and exposing dealers in the shadow economy, their protectors and also officials who have permitted gross violations of the law when conducting foreign economic activity, was drafted and is being implemented jointly with the Ukrainian SSR Committee for State Security.

[Correspondent] Ivan Dmitriyevich, in the republic press you repeatedly stressed the primacy of prevention over the exposure of petty, insignificant cases of mercenary law-breaking?

[Gladush] Of course, along with the orientation of the efforts of the BKhSS [Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] service toward exposing dangerous groups of embezzlers, speculators and hard currency dealers, we are devoting increasing attention to the prevention of mercenary crimes. Jointly with other ministries and organizations, invested with the functions of intra-departmental monitoring, an extensive auditing program was drafted for 1990, touching on virtually all sectors of the republic's economy. The Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee is coordinating work to implement it.

We are also carrying out preventative measures against entirely specific, premeditated crimes. In 1989, about 6,000 mercenary crimes were halted in the preparation stage by BKhSS offices.

[Correspondent] The shadow economy, which is ever more showing itself, is causing well-founded alarm among broad society.

[Gladush] Yes, this is an extraordinarily dangerous factor. Not finding serious resistance on the part of the executors, who control the law enforcement agencies, before our very eyes it has turned into a dangerous negative force, obstructing the normal development and restructuring of the economy.

Hidden from control by society, such activity reduces the republic's economic potential, since it is not taxed and, as a result, the budget does not receive considerable funds (billions of rubles, according to estimates by several jurists).

Illegally obtained incomes, including nonlabor incomes, substantially weaken the system of economic incentives, aimed at establishing a close tie between payment for labor and its final results, which accelerates society's dangerous property stratification and contributes to the growth of social tension.

The concealment of large expenditures and shortfalls, massive figure-padding and other distortions in book-keeping hide the true state of affairs in the economy, intensify its imbalance, and support the belief among egotistical people and even in whole collectives to the

effect that intense, highly productive labor is not mandatorily necessary for a salary. Today, this is one of the main reasons for the deformation of the labor mentality and the decline of discipline in industry.

Of course, the shadow economy is a base for the formation of negative parallel structures, organized crime above all, and since it has significant material and monetary resources, it is capable of influencing parts of the economic reform that are disadvantageous for it.

Due to a significant extent to this, the planned progressive transformations such as the conversion of enterprises to cost-accounting and self-financing, granting state and cooperative organizations the right independently to export to foreign markets, the use of elements of market distribution of goods and raw materials, the reduction of the inspection apparatus (under the guise of an administrative apparatus), and other measures are not justifying themselves in connection with strengthening socialist ownership.

Cooperatives, many of which, as practice shows, have a predominantly, obviously greedy orientation, are not solving the problem of saturating the market with goods and services and have become a convenient way to "launder" the capital of the shadow economy. Recently, we spoke repeatedly of these problems in the press and have shown convincing examples, but the situation is not changing. Here is another one, which graphically illustrates the aspiration of criminal elements to create criminal structures in various spheres of activity.

Last November in Donetsk Oblast, the director of a large factory in the city of Kramatorsk, who had organized a crime group from among the leaders of a number of cooperatives for the purpose of embezzling state funds, was arrested. Because of the registration of false contracts and other documentation for the manufacture of various output for the needs of the plant, with the subsequent deduction of money for the cooperative workers, the state suffered a loss of several hundred thousand rubles. An investigation is being conducted.

On 16 October 1989, the following people were convicted by the Cherkass Oblast Court for the embezzlement of more than 100,000 rubles: Zozul, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Chernyakhovskiy, Umanskiy Rayon, was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment; his deputy, Voloshin, to 7 years; and the farm's chief bookkeeper, Poberezhnaya, to 10 years. They not only organized the theft, but also involved many people in criminal activity.

There are many such crimes. In the last year alone, according to a final investigation of criminal cases of embezzlement, the sum total of damage was 12 million rubles. In economics, 11,000 cases of theft committed by way of appropriation, embezzlement, or abuse of official position, more than 1,000 cases of bribery, and 250 illegal hard currency deals were brought to light, and 3,150 crime groups that had infringed on state economic interests were exposed. Also, 32,500 people were convicted for committing mercenary crimes, including 898

accounting and bookkeeping employees and more than 1,400 managers of various administrative units. The money and valuables confiscated from the criminals amounted to 20.5 million rubles.

[Correspondent] Do these processes in the economy influence speculation?

[Gladush] In a most direct and straightforward way... Under the conditions of an increasing shortage of many goods and services, a literal explosion of speculation has occurred. Last year, more than 21,500 such cases were exposed, including 7,396 criminally prosecutable cases. Money, valuables and objects of speculation worth about 5 million rubles were confiscated from people arrested for speculation. At the same time, during the indicated period the internal affairs agencies halted 10,400 cases of concealment of goods, worth over 6.8 million rubles, by trade employees from free sale to the population.

In Berdichev, a 10-person group of speculators who purchased scarce food items for bribes in stores in Moscow and Murmansk Oblasts and later sold them at speculative prices in Zhitomir Oblast was exposed. It was established that in just part of a year, the members of this crime group had resold 48 kg of sturgeon and salmon caviar, a half-ton of valuable species of fish, more than 1,000 bags of coffee and about as many packages of Indian tea. Their profits amounted to 30,000 rubles. Money and valuables amounting to more than 100,000 rubles were confiscated from the criminals.

In the city of Rovno, a group of five speculators were arrested. They had purchased jewelry in jewelry stores and resold them to foreigners. During the investigation, it was disclosed that they had also sold tsarist gold coins. Sixty-two such coins, 48 pieces of jewelry, and over 40,000 rubles of money on hand and in deposits were confiscated from the law-breakers; property worth 20,000 rubles was described. The investigation is continuing.

All this is a manifestation of the shadow economy's action, caused by the most diverse social, economic, legal and other factors. Naturally, the problem of existence of a shadow economy cannot be solved through the efforts of the militia alone, or even by the efforts of all law-enforcement agencies.

The question of a new legal status for the BKhSS is long past due. It is acutely in need of reorientation, technical equipment and personnel reinforcement. The changes occurring in our economy dictate this. In our opinion, only powerful economic and legal organizations are capable of dealing with shadow dealer-millionaires, who are growing like mushrooms. We have taken the first steps in this direction.

We also hope that the new body of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet will carefully study the elements of the shadow economy, thoroughly examine the existing situation, proceeding from a realistic assessment, and will pass appropriate laws to

strengthen the struggle against this dangerous phenomenon that has appeared in our socialist society.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, must be done first?

[Gladush] Militia workers, above all, from the BKhSS and investigative services, are striving to the utmost to fulfill their official duties, but not everything depends on us. Today, for example, serious changes are needed in the article of the Criminal Code which stipulates responsibility for speculation. Concealed by cooperative or individual labor activity, people are speculating both as groups, as well as individuals. Sometimes it is impossible to halt such criminal activity, since the subject of this type of crime can only be a private person. We must draft a criminal and legal norm which the people would understand and which will protect honest citizens from any illegal transactions, no matter from whom they may originate. Everything in reality is a matter of legislation. In particular, there is a system for levying fines, but no mechanism for exacting the fines. We should create conditions so that the law can operate. There is an imminent need to introduce alternative punishments for people who maliciously evade payment of fines.

In order to balance out the criminal policy, today the corresponding proposals were again submitted to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, just as was done in the RSFSR.

We estimate that passing this law will help improve the situation in the republic markets and trade enterprises.

We are sure that until economic methods are developed for struggle against law breaking, there will be no proper financial and legal control, and it will be impossible to eliminate economic violations of the law with a few repressive measures.

A unified criminal policy is needed for all law-enforcement and monitoring agencies. Consideration of this question was further developed at the republic's Supreme Soviet. Currently, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers has drafted a coordinating plan for urgent measures in the struggle against crime in the future which, along with the solution of problems to improve legislation and the legal regulation of law enforcement activity, while ensuring reliable protection of social order, stipulated a number of measures to strengthen the struggle against crime in the economy. All ministries and departments, financial and people's control agencies, the republic's scientific potential, the local soviets and social formations are called on to implement them.

Certainly, well-developed normative acts which regulate economic activity will contribute to creating an effective legal base for the struggle against economic law violations, making it possible to strengthen socialist law and order.

Thefts, Poor Security Noted at Moscow Airport

90UN1423A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90
Second Edition p 6

Article by V. Miroshnichenko: "Shots at the Airport, or the Reasons for the Crimogenic Situation at Sheremetyevo-2"]

[Text] In a matter of minutes the restaurant where the noisy group was celebrating was surrounded. When a check began of the documents of persons who were, as the professionals say, "of operational interest," expressive cursing and threats rang out, and matters went so far as a direct attack on the guardians of law and order. And only several rounds of automatic-weapon fire into the ceiling, along with the highly-developed hand-to-hand combat skills of the boys from the special division for combating organized crime, cooled the ardor of the violators. About 20 persons were arrested, and the stormiest walked to the paddy wagon in handcuffs.

You will agree that it's a story perfectly worthy of a hit movie whose action takes place somewhere in Sicily. However, the episode that has been described took place quite recently in a hotel restaurant at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-2 International Airport.

The criminogenic situation at the airport has been steadily heating up. It has become commonplace to hear about extortionist taxi drivers who rip off fabulous prices, sometimes up to hundreds of rubles, for the half hour's drive to the capital's center, as well as about the speculators in video equipment and the hard currency dealers. The "criminal element" gathers there like flies on honey and has been growing more and more brazen by the hour. Nonetheless, today I want to assess the situation from a somewhat different perspective, and to talk not about speculation, racketeering or currency manipulations—phenomena that are unquestionably scandalous—but about the causes underlying this criminogenic iceberg.

Along with Militia Colonel I. Fadyushin, deputy chief of the Moscow Internal Affairs Administration for Air Transportation, and Militia Lt Col I. Yevseyev, chief of the LOVD [expansion unknown] at Sheremetyevo Airport, we paid visits to many services, talked with dozens of people, and were able to assess the situation that reigns at the airport.

We had not had time to take the elevator down to the baggage-handling section when we met Sr Sgt M. Zakharov, who was carrying a mohair blouse:

"Look what I just found next to the baggage carrier."

A few minutes later in another secluded spot an imported cosmetic kit "turned up." And that was just one more item—in the loading zone cameras, video cassettes, jeans and shoes stolen from baggage are found almost daily.

"There's nothing to be surprised about here," frankly remarked two baggage handlers, who asked us not to mention their names, "until everyone connected with international flights is paid in hard currency, you won't eradicate the theft."

So that's the "philosophy." And our conversation was being listened to by a young militia sergeant, who is duty-bound, if necessary, to confront bandits' gunfire, and by officer N. Gribov, one of the department's best duty patrols, who has been living for 10 years with two children in a 15-meter communal apartment. They don't ask for hard currency, although their wages are half those of the baggage handlers who were making such imposing pronouncements.

We move into the airport's loading complex. On uncovered carts there were torn-open suitcases belonging to passengers changing planes at the airport. Part of the contents was already lying on the wet asphalt, but that did not bother anyone. Nor did the wide-open containers carrying semifinished footwear components from India. Cardboard boxes had gotten soaking wet, once-white boot tops had turned brown, and insoles had warped from moisture. The warehouse computer put out information about that container. 160 pieces of leather goods for the Togliatti Footwear Factory had been lying around—there is no other way of putting it—since last 18 September. There was a kind of tandem of irresponsibility: One party was in no hurry to claim its cargo, which had been paid for in hard currency, and the other, which was responsible for storing it, spat on that responsibility.

The same picture was apparent in the huge storage facility. Masses of boxes and crates with disturbed packing that had openly been robbed. Outsiders were walking amid the mountains of cargo without anyone accompanying them. I think that any warehouse director of a small-time rural trade organization would have immediately fainted upon seeing such "responsible storage."

From a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs report:

"In 1989 70 Aeroflot employees were arrested for the theft of items of material value in transit at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport; in the first three months of this year, 58 have been arrested. Thus in February 1990 an 11-person group of thieves of baggage, mail and cargo was exposed; since December 1989 they had stolen 110 different articles, mainly imported video- and sound-recording equipment. The vast majority of thefts are committed by the airport's employees: baggage checkers, loaders, drivers of self-propelled mechanisms, fitters and dispatchers.

"The safety of items of material value in transit has been deteriorating monthly. Whereas last year 2,017 commercial claims and 11,868 internal storage-facility claims were drawn up for missing cargo, in the first two months of this year the corresponding numbers of claims were 600 and 4,000."

And here are some outrageous facts cited in the same report: "The latest violations uncovered include the following: in the course of nine days about 120 kilograms of silver lay about unguarded, like discarded material, on the cargo ramp. Packages of currency weighing a total of 161 kg lay about in the yard of the cargo complex under the same circumstances. Militia officers found a package containing 1.5 kg of gold coins on the aircraft parking area. Several hours later, after an airplane had been unloaded, a sack containing a kilogram of diamonds was found among the packages in the dispatcher's office."

On 19 December 1989 eight packages of currency (about \$3 million, U.S.) were supposed to arrive on the New York-Amsterdam-Warsaw-Moscow flight. Neither the militia nor the cargo complex received any notification of this. No one was there to meet the currency. The packages stayed for nearly 24 hours unguarded amid the ordinary cargo. Later only six packages of currency were found in the storage facility. A criminal case was initiated in connection with the loss of \$800,000.

One could go on and on with similar distressing stories. Flagrant violations of the procedures for handling transit cargo, poor control over access (last year alone three citizens boarded airplanes without authorization and flew out of the country unimpeded), the lack of personal accountability on the part of airport employees who allow the loss of baggage, and connivance at violators create a nutrient environment in which human vice grows like wildfire.

It cannot be said that no one is worried about the situation in the country's largest international airport. To judge from the quantity of documents adopted and conferences held at various levels in the past few months, there would seem to be a desire to rectify the situation: the question of the state of law and order at Sheremetyevo has been taken up by the Moscow City Provisional Committee for Combating Crime; representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR KGB, the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the customs services are serving on a temporary emergency committee set up directly at the airport. V. Bakatin, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, has sent a representation on the matter to A. Volkov, former USSR Minister of Civil Aviation. But has the situation changed for the better since this?

Statistics indicate that the number of cargo thefts at Sheremetyevo increased fourfold and the number of baggage thefts by a factor of 2.5 during the first two months of this year in comparison to the same period last year.

When you acquaint yourself with the situation at the airport, you see our common problem: the endeavor to cure primarily the symptoms, rather than the disease. And so, during a meeting with V. Nacharov, general director of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation's Central Administration for International Air Transportation, and G. Vorobyev, director of Sheremetyevo-2's air

terminal complex, the idea keeps being insistently repeated that control units must be reinforced, militia staffs beefed up, and new equipment introduced for guarding against theft.

It is difficult not to agree with such proposals, but have the aviation employees themselves done everything they could to establish elementary order: the precise observance of rules for the handling of transit cargo, the strict inventorying of it, full material accountability on the part of baggage checkers, loaders and stewards along the entire technological chain from the moment baggage is checked until the passenger picks it up, and prompt compensation for any material loss that is caused? When you try to put the question in just those terms, the enthusiasm of the aviation employees begins to sharply wane. They immediately find a mass of "weighty" reasons for justifying the mess.

But among them one does not hear what in my view is one of the most important: in allowing widespread thefts and losing baggage and cargo, Aeroflot itself loses nothing. Rather, it's just the opposite. Last year claims totaling about 5 million rubles were filed against Aeroflot, but only 43,000 rubles was paid out on the claims. Aeroflot is helped by a protective palisade of departmental instructions that doom passengers and cargo owners to a lack of legal rights. If you recall the several tens of million rubles that the aviation monopolists receive for the above-normative storage of transit cargo and the sale of unclaimed baggage, it cannot help occurring to you that the worse things get, the better things are for Aeroflot's services. And isn't that indirectly confirmed by the following fact: alarm over the serious criminogenic situation at Sheremetyevo-2, which not only causes clients great economic harm, but also compromises the country in world public opinion, has been sounded by the press, the law-enforcement agencies, and Soviet and foreign passengers, while only the civil aviation officials maintain Olympian calm.

Is it possible that a "bell" that is louder than assault-rifle rounds is needed to bring about the resolute imposition of order at Sheremetyevo?

Ways to Smuggle Contraband Via Odessa Noted

90UN1392A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by R. Ignatyev, special IZVESTIYA correspondent: "One-and-a-Half Million in Contraband"]

[Text] Odessa—The Odessa regional customs service seized a large shipment of Japanese-made Funai videocassette recorders. The attempt had been made to smuggle these expensive products into our country.

"This shipment was delivered to Odessa Airport from Bulgaria, more precisely from the city of Varna," states P. Yatkovski, chief of the regional customs service. "It was consigned to a Soviet-West German joint venture in

Moscow. Closer examination of the corresponding documents by our services revealed that the VCR's had been illegally routed. The schemers had falsified the customs declarations. So it was that they tried to smuggle in 1132 VCR's with an aggregate value in excess of 1,650,000 rubles.

"We 'arrested' this shipment. Criminal proceedings were instituted and an investigation is in progress.

"Alas, this is far from being an isolated instance. Contraband in excess of more than three million rubles has been seized of late. Attempts to smuggle 689,600 rubles in Soviet and 121,600 rubles in foreign currency, and almost 300,000 rubles' worth of valuables have been foiled. The smugglers used various ways and devices, the most common of which was the use of special hiding-places. Thanks only to sophisticated technical inspection devices and the professional and skillful action of customs personnel is it possible to discover them. For example, 543 electronic timepieces were discovered in the bulkhead of the dishwashing compartment of the m/s Lev Tolstoi. They were valued at 21,000 rubles. A bulkhead in the galley pantry concealed video equipment and other highly popular items valued at more than 30,000 rubles. Pieces of our jewelry made from gold and precious stones were found concealed in metal meat-tenderizing mallets. They were valued at approximately 65,000 rubles. These 'presents' were sent through the international mail from the USSR to the USA by private persons.

"If we total everything, in these last 3 years the Odessa regional customs service has contributed about 23 million rubles in unplanned revenues to the union budget. But our service would function far more efficiently if it were not for various kinds of serious problems.

"In connection with the intensification of foreign economic activity, various oblast-level travel organizations conclude contracts, e.g., with Polish travel firms for cruises aboard Soviet ships. They emphasize commercial interests but do not take into account the side-effects of such measures. Thus, practice shows that the majority of travelers on these cruises are people trying to extract maximum profit from the sale of goods brought into the USSR from abroad. The organizers of these cruises do not coordinate their plans with the customs service and do not brief tourists on the appropriate rules. The result is serious conflict situations as was recently the case with 287 Polish tourists who arrived in the port of Odessa from Istanbul aboard the m/s Estoniya. They brought with them a combined total 1400 pieces of luggage weighing about 75 tons: jeans, cosmetics kits, fur coats, jackets, and other popular items. The Poles refused to obey the lawful demands of the customs service that they pay duties on the goods they had brought in and called a strike: they did not leave the ship for 3 days. While this has already been reported in the press, I would like to tell how this instance, which is instructive for us and for Polish tourists, ended.

"We ultimately had to send the strikers off on a special train that included three freight cars. Armed guards were also assigned. They had to be escorted to the western border. En route some of the 'tourists' tried to bribe the guards to allow them to sell their goods on the way. The total sum offered was as high as 250,000 rubles. The speculators realized that it would not be to their advantage to bring the goods purchased during the cruise into their own country. And their feelings proved to be true. At the border, the Polish customs service assigned 30 of their people who spent 2 days calculating the duties on 'presents'

carried across the border by the travelers and presented them with a bill in excess of 400 million Polish zlotys...

"And here a question arises. Why could we not collect the same money at our border as is the practice in every civilized country? I think the reason is our imperfect legislation. As a result the state suffers a shortfall of millions every year. Thus in 1989 alone, the same Polish tourists carried a combined total of 177 million rubles' worth of goods duty-free into the USSR through the port of Odessa. Our leadership should obviously appeal to the government to improve the existing legislation."

Shakhnazarov Explores 'Ideology of Perestroika'

90UN1533A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 18 Apr 90 p 10

[Interview with Georgiy Shakhnazarov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, by Oleg Moroz: "What Kind of Ideology Do We Need?"]

[Text] [Moroz] Probably like many others, I was interested in your article in the fourth issue of KOMMUNIST, "The Renovation of Ideology and the Ideology of Renovation." It seems to me, the central idea of the article is an appeal to do that which, according to you, Lenin did not succeed in doing, "the reverse 'reorientation' from the idea of communism to the idea of socialism." Did I understand you correctly?

[Shakhnazarov] It seems, it is not quite right to attach the concept of "communist ideology" itself to the set of ideas that we usually call the teachings of Marx and Lenin. We have always proceeded from the thesis that communism, as a formation, consists of two stages: socialism and communism proper. That is, Marx believed that we can say nothing definite about communism, with the exception of the most general guesses. To make any specific judgments here, to outline its specific features would mean to indulge in hair-brained schemes. Lenin also addressed the word "communism" very precisely.

In short, it seems to me, the ideology that arose in the ideas of Marx and Lenin is, nonetheless, a socialist ideology. Therefore, the meaning of my article, to put it briefly, is as follows. We should not reject the idea of communism. I think that this idea is entirely acceptable as a hypothesis. It is highly likely that a communist society is possible. However, for the time being there is no real, living material whatsoever, no facts by which to promote the building of communism as a specific task in the foreseeable future. Communism is a noble ideal, but ideals cannot be the goals of practical policy, they serve only as guidelines for the future.

As far as the idea of socialism is concerned, this is no longer simply an idea, but has become flesh and blood. Despite all the distortions and deformations, to a certain extent it has been incorporated into our lives and is being incorporated throughout the world in various forms, through various methods.

[Moroz] However, the phrase "communist ideology" is most widespread here. It is like "mama" or "papa" for our ideological workers. Consequently, is it worthwhile to re-teach, to replace the usual words with new ones, with "socialist ideology?"

[Shakhnazarov] This is a very sharp and painful question. On the one hand, it is absolutely true that such a replacement is necessary. On the other, after all, not only ideology relates to the concept of "communism," but a large segment of our history. So, rejecting this concept is not really so simple. I was on the front and I remember

very well that this was not simply a word on the front, but a very serious idea for which people gave their lives. Remember Mezhirov: "Communists, forward! Communists, forward!" What will things be like now?

[Moroz] Yes. "Socialists, forward!" really does not fit.

[Shakhnazarov] It does not sound right, in general. A great deal that is valuable became part of our lives under the epithet "communist." It seems to me, we should not cancel out all of this. When it comes to replacing epithets, in my opinion, nothing should be forced. We should not force anyone to make this replacement. As psychological readiness matures, I assume, everything will happen on its own.

[Moroz] Possibly, a change in the party's name is also inevitable.

[Shakhnazarov] I personally see nothing wrong, if such a change occurs, if we return to the origins, to that with which we began. Logic requires this. Yet, once again the party masses must recognize the need for this. I think that this question will be discussed at the congress. As you know, the party has already been renamed elsewhere, for instance, in Bulgaria.

[Moroz] It seems to me, those who generally did not include the epithet "communist" in the party's name were more far-sighted, although they followed roughly the same tracks. I am referring to the former ruling parties of Hungary, the GDR... The "reverse 'reorientation'" turned out to be easier for them.

However, let us return to ideology. In your opinion, can we manage without it in general? Millions of people have become accustomed to interpreting this word as nothing other than the infringement on their spiritual freedom on the part of cynics, who themselves believe in nothing, neither in God, nor in the devil, but thrust some sort of belief on others.

[Shakhnazarov] To me, it seems very important that the state system be based on some kind of spiritual discipline. This discipline, as a rule, is created by what a person believes: that the existing order is the best. He can regard one or another aspect of it critically, but nonetheless he prefers it to any other order. It is a sort of prop, without which it is very hard to manage a state. Incidentally, today in our country we sense this fully: many slogans, appeals and even laws are being perceived skeptically. Why is this happening? Among other things, because society was extraordinarily ideologized and was not used to living without the belief that the existing order is the most preferable.

[Moroz] However, after all, there are a number of countries where ideology does not play such a role, and the administration does not suffer from it.

[Shakhnazarov] True, but there they have many years of experience in life under such conditions and a habit of approaching matters pragmatically. However, a ruling ideology does exist in many countries. This may surprise

some of our fellow countrymen, but it is true. Consider the U.S.: this is a very ideologized country. The idea of freedom, of which the Americans are very proud, lies at the foundation of American ideology. Japan has a very powerful ideology...

[Moroz] Yes, but in our case it is a question, after all, of state ideology. This is an invention of totalitarian regimes.

[Shakhnazarov] You are right. A state ideology is a theocracy. In fact, our system, the way it was in the recent past and to a significant extent remains today, is only now leaving this condition and could be called theocratic. Really, one of the criteria for the formation of a rule-of-law state is the principle: no ideology whatsoever should be the state ideology. Unquestionably, there should be freedom here, the freedom of choice. At the same time, I am sure that if the people on the whole are not presently inspired by some kind of great idea, the country will not achieve well-being and greatness. Great exploits are achieved only when people are inspired by a great idea.

[Moroz] Is this dragging us, as before, toward sovereign greatness and exploits? In my opinion, it is time for us to stop fussing over this and simply live, like all people live: do one's job, plant and cultivate grain, bear and raise children, write poems, compose music... In my opinion, no other greatness even exists: it is all a mirage...

[Shakhnazarov] By exploits, I did not mean anything abstract or contrived. I meant getting out of the sad state we were in on the eve of perestroika and approaching a different quality: precisely toward a time when it will be possible to live like human beings, to plant and harvest crops, create machines, and arrange our daily lives. For us, this will be equivalent to a great exploit. To do this, the whole country must burn with this idea.

[Moroz] Any normal person has an allergic reaction to the word "ideology." Does it not seem to you that under such circumstances it will be rather difficult to assert an updated socialist ideology in society or, in other words, an ideology of renovation?

[Shakhnazarov] Of course. Perhaps, the entire complexity of the moment lies in this. Nonetheless... If we carefully read the key party documents—M.S. Gorbachev's "righteous" article on socialism, the CPSU Central Committee platform on the ethnic problem, the draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, and many other documents, from which the ideology of renovation is gradually taking shape—then, after all, this is nonetheless a remarkable breakthrough in all directions. One cannot help but see this. Also, is it not true that 5 or even 3 years ago it was impossible even to dream of anything similar. Nonetheless, all this is being perceived sluggishly somehow, without delight, without emotions, and even, conversely, with a certain amount of criticism. Here you are entirely correct. Most likely, we must simply endure this. There is no other way to get through it. Society must recover somewhat from the former sway of ideology. The

main thing is the standard of living. If it is brought up to a normal level, people will again begin to think, they will again have a taste for discussing the concepts of freedom, equality, etc., which, strictly speaking, make up the basis of any progressive ideology.

[Moroz] So, you think that a unified ideology is still necessary? Yet, maybe a number of ideologies, which could struggle for people's minds in free competition, are needed?

[Shakhnazarov] I did not say that they are required—in a rule-of-law state they ought to have a right to exist. With the exception, it goes without saying, of those which are incompatible with the law. For example, I consider nationalistic ideologies such. They are harmful. With regard to these, we should take steps to prevent their spread. All ideologies which stay within the limits of reason and constitutionality have a right to exist. I do see nothing terrible in it, even if someone supports a monarchistic point of view.

What society needs is another matter entirely. I think that our society needs a well-developed democratic-socialist ideology. First, the socialist tradition, with all the costs of following it, has already become a national tradition and it would be foolish to reject it. The more so, since, as far as I understand, it is the will both of the majority of the working class, as well as of the peasantry... We have no allergy to socialist principles. On the contrary, everyone wants to be a good socialist. Second, the socialist trend is the overall trend throughout the world. Even if conservatives or Christian democrats do win elections somewhere, this often happens because they are taking socialist principles to arms. Third, socialism is the only possible future for mankind: the solution of all global problems and prevention of global threats can only be achieved on the basis of socialist principles. Therefore, I believe that if we select any non-socialist ideology as the dominant one right now, we will have committed a grave historical mistake.

[Moroz] Another ideology may assert itself, if another non-socialist party comes to power. Or a bloc of the party. I do not think this is unrealistic, especially considering the experience of East European countries. So what? Should we be frightened of such a possibility?

[Shakhnazarov] Right now, only two directions are taking shape for now, which claim the role of opposition: the liberal and the conservative. However, neither of them is rejecting the socialist idea, but simply looking at certain things differently. Some are in favor of allowing private ownership, others are against it. So, I see no possibility in the foreseeable future for asserting any kind of non-socialist ideology. As to what will happen in the future, let us live and see.

[Moroz] By the way, do you consider the basic contenders for filling the ideological vacuum to be "relatively moderate and solid concepts, rooted in the traditional divisions of Russian social thinking into its Western and slavophilic wings?" Are these really the

basic contenders for our minds? In my opinion, these are concepts that reflect the split in the Union of Writers, a microscopic phenomenon on the scale of the country's social life, although there is a great deal of fuss surrounding it. Much has already been said about its real underlying cause and this is not worth repeating now. In reality, the opposition is probably taking a different line, precisely that of the democratic and conservative concepts, which you already mentioned, or even of the field of national ideologies, etc. Is this not so?

[Shakhnazarov] Not quite. The writers are a very sensitive instrument which measures society's mood. Like a thermometer, they respond to profound changes in temperature, often not even realizing this themselves. Theoretically, they can help. So, I believe that that which you call an internal writers' split is in fact a reflection of the struggle surrounding the general dilemma facing our society right now. We are faced with a choice: either integrate into world life, or remain a separate island, once again claiming originality. Supporters of the second viewpoint are essentially living in the past. In no way can they realize that we will gain nothing on this path, that of self-isolation. In fact, it is a question of the most general dilemma that has always faced Russia. Peter the Great opened a window to Europe... Lenin took this path... Gorbachev is trying to do the same... That is, in fact, all reformers in our history have tried to integrate Russia into the outside world. Their opponents have always claimed that this threatens the loss of our personality. Of course, any integration in one way or another affects national life and forces it to transform. However, I think, tremendous accumulated experience proves that this by no means signifies a loss of originality. Look at Japan. This country, highly developed in the technological respect, willingly assimilates many European and American values, yet at the same time it preserves all the features of its national character. The same applies to other countries. Why should we fear that our country, which has such a powerful cultural tradition, will lose itself in an interdependent world?..

But what does it mean not to integrate into the world? No matter what ideal system we establish, we will still lose, if only because 80 percent of all discoveries, technical achievements and cultural values are created abroad. They say: "Let us take everything we need from there, but still remain to one side." Things do not work out like that. This century is not like that. Previously it was possible to be this way, but it is impossible now, because today's world is increasingly becoming one "entity"—social, economic, cultural and legal.

[Moroz] You believe that one of the reasons for the recent dominance of ideology in our society is the exaggeration of the Marxism's role in the system of social knowledge, and that Marxist theory should be returned to its "legitimate" place in the social sciences: Marxism ought to be considered only one of the sections, one of the chapters in scientific socialism. To me, this seems quite reasonable and long ago imminent. However, is practice ready for this? How many similar concepts are

shared within the bounds of this one building (we are in the CPSU Central Committee building—O.M.)?

[Shakhnazarov] It is difficult for me to answer your last question: this requires conducting sociological survey. However, in general, as far as I understand, most of the people working on the theory of socialism and practical politics are gradually approaching this concept. The formulations in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 20th Congress were also made in the same spirit. Meanwhile, of course, not everyone is ready for this. After all, it is no secret that many party functionaries and propagandists are used to believing that Marxism is the theory of socialism, and everything outside the bounds of Marxism is something hostile. Of course, perestroika will be difficult for these people, but I still think that this process will occur very rapidly. To the contrary, I worry that there might be a backlash, a preponderance of negative attitudes toward Marxism.

[Moroz] A year ago, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was not bold enough to print an article concerning one certain mistake made by Marx, which arose from the fact that he never possessed a mathematical apparatus, which was created a considerable time after his death. Right now, powerful criticism of Marxism is appearing in the press, including criticism of the works of its founders. Naturally, this is annoying the ideological old guard, which believes that even though the classics of Marxism really may have erred on some things, from a tactical viewpoint it is still better to stay quiet about this. What is your opinion on this?

[Shakhnazarov] The time has come for truth, I think. For a long time, theoreticians, myself included, were fettered in their judgments. We were unable to say everything there was to say. Well, now we must not be afraid to speak. The main thing is to seek out the truth.

I disagree with those who try to entirely cancel and refute the Marxist legacy. This is ordinary foolishness, rushing from one extreme to another, and simply attests to low culture. Marx was unquestionably one of the outstanding thinkers, and his ideas have become part of the flesh and blood of world civilization.

We should impartially analyze Marxist teachings, expose the existing contradictions and, mainly, overcome the central mistake—the fact that this teaching was elevated to an absolute. We must teach ourselves to look at any great teaching as a part of the process of development, not as the crown of creation. In this specific case, we should gradually get used to the fact that the science itself was not called Marxism-Leninism, but the theory of socialism. It is another matter that the "royal" position in it should be given to Marx's theory, since at present it is the greatest one created in this sphere.

[Moroz] In the four March issues of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, material on "The Myths of Our Revolution" was published, in which there were many critical opinions both of Marx, as well as of Marxism. Do you agree with them?

[Shakhnazarov] With many, but not all. The frivolous tone of some of them does not sit well with me. Some of us too hastily are burning that, toward which we once bowed almost religiously.

[Moroz] Only one part of your article surprised me, the part where you claim that "in a number of important features" the Stalinist regime could be considered socialist. However, is not humanism really an important feature of socialism? It is precisely this which did not exist! As everyone knows, the Stalinist regime was utterly inhumane, and in many ways was close to fascism. How can it be ranked with socialism?

[Shakhnazarov] Let me answer your question with a question: where did you get the idea that humanism is an important feature of socialism?

[Moroz] A strange question. In my opinion, this is an elementary truism. The founders also thought this. The idea existed before them. What else could attract millions to the idea of socialism, if not its—at least, stated—humanistic essence? Take the first definition in the encyclopedic dictionary: "Socialism is a higher form of democracy, ensuring political freedoms for the working people and guaranteeing social rights and the equality of nations and nationalities." This, under Stalin, was a higher form of democracy?

[Shakhnazarov] The subject you have touched on is a key point in the question of what socialism is. As before, the attitude toward socialism like an ideal is widespread here: socialism is a humane, good, kind system that should ensure well-being for all. This is not a scientific approach, but an idealistic and scholastic one. In fact, socialism is simply a society in which the common prevails over the individual. Both a good society and a bad one can spring from this. For example, I am a collectivist both by nature and by upbringing, and all my life I have sensed the tremendous advantages of collectivism: you can always rely on someone, people treat you cordially, someone will always help you and you will help someone... However, like any other person, I often felt the opposite side of this: who sets things right, when people are pressuring you, forcing you to do what you do not want..?

I again repeat, the scientific approach to socialism is as follows: socialism is the predominance of the common over the individual, of the collective over the private, of the controlled over the spontaneous... With this approach to the matter, it is easy to understand that socialism can be both totalitarian, as well as authoritarian or whatever else you wish. I once also thought that there could be no socialism without democracy. As it happens, it can exist, in the same way that capitalism can accompany various forms of rule—both a democratic republic, as well as a monarchy, or even a fascist dictatorship. Thus, under a socialist system, the forms of rule can also be different.

[Moroz] Consequently, in the mid-1930s we nonetheless built socialism, although not very good socialism?

[Shakhnazarov] Entirely true. It was a socialist society.

[Moroz] I still assume that far from everyone agrees with you. The range of opinions is very broad. Yu.M. Kobishchanov, for example, thinks that the Stalinist regime was a combination of slavery (the GULAG), serfdom (the kolkhozes) and capitalism (uncertain tolerance of market relations).

[Shakhnazarov] This is one of the extreme viewpoints. I think most researchers, despite the entire diversity of opinions, agree about socialism, although with various refining epithets. Thus, our editor-in-chief, as far as I know, thinks we had state socialism under Stalin. Others call it feudal socialism, barracks socialism... I personally agree with F.M. Burlatskiy. Whatever it might have been, one thing is important: it was nonetheless socialism.

[Moroz] In this case, apparently, history has known many socialisms: isn't the prevalence of the common over the private, the collective over the individual inherent in many societies?

[Shakhnazarov] Entirely correct. Unfortunately, here this idea is insufficiently developed. We have always followed the thesis that socialism is the peak of social development, requiring a very high level of production forces. In fact, the socialist principle in one way or another has existed in various societies. The whole question lies in what sort of combination there was of these principles with other, opposing principles. I always use the example of Sparta. This was a very interesting state. In the course of several decades, it set the tone in the then hearth of civilization, Greece. What principles were upheld there? They had state ownership of the land, which was leased without the right of division. A familiar approach, is it not?

[Moroz] It is familiar. Our Supreme Soviet only just finished inventing this long-ago invented bicycle.

[Shakhnazarov] ...Without the right to sell, but with the right to transfer by inheritance. Each citizen could receive a section of land, but was obliged to work it. Children were sent to something like kindergartens, where they were trained in the spirit of collectivism. They also instilled a devotion to the homeland, the state, and ideals and virtues. Two kings had executive power, and the national assembly was considered the supreme body. One asks: really, are there not elements of the socialist approach here? Thus, we must rid ourselves of our schematicism, by which one type of society arises right after another from iron logic and necessity, and the vector of social development is single and uniform.

[Moroz] At the end of our talk, it seems, we unexpectedly hit a rather deep layer, which we can hardly manage in the context of this conversation. Maybe this is a topic for another talk. I still want to ask you the following: as has already been repeatedly stated, socialism has no proper inherent economic mechanism, specific to it. All attempts to construct one have inevitably failed, since

more and more people are coming to the conclusion that it is impossible to conceive of anything other than a market economy, the traditional opposite of socialism. This is the first item. Second: in general, you deny socialism a certain attractiveness, you insist that socialism is just the sum of rather arbitrarily selected principles: the prevalence of the common, of the collective, etc. Here is a question: in this case, is it worthwhile for us to build humane, democratic socialism, one which does not exist anywhere yet and scarcely could exist? Maybe, we should start building humane, democratic capitalism? At least this is something definite and real.

[Shakhnazarov] Once again, your question contains a limited concept of socialism, based on rejected models that have not justified themselves. I am absolutely sure that the idea of socialism has far from exhausted its entire tremendous content. Evidently, we should more respectfully treat Lenin's thoughts that a new society can achieve optimum parameters only if it is the result of the sum total of all mankind's activity with. Perhaps, our whole problem is that for a long time we have assumed that it is somehow possible to build various islands of socialism and even of communism in the tremendous sea of the surrounding world. One of the main lessons that came from the experience of the entire 20th century, the experience of our socialist experiment, may be precisely the realization of the truth that the establishment of a new social system in an interdependent world today is only possible as the result of efforts by all countries. Or rather, as the result of an objective social process.

Must we now set the goal of building humane, democratic socialism, or capitalism? Would it be better to reject these terms and simply build a humane democratic society? Or, not even build, but solve specific present-day problems: create new technologies, build housing for people, etc. That is, we should solve practical problems. It is the work of theoreticians to assess how close we come to socialism in this or whether we are creating some other social institution. Thus, we once again return to Marx's idea that socialism and communism are a movement.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that right now it is very important for us to find an idea which would enable us to inspire the further process of perestroika. Perestroika itself is, after all, an idea too, and its own ideology is taking shape around it—that which I called the ideology of renovation. This ideology has already acquired a fairly clear form, although not all of its branches have been shaped and registered. It seems very important to me that the ideology of perestroika, the ideology of renovation not develop in isolation from real political life. Therefore, the basic slogan for today, it seems to me, should be a slogan of consolidation while keeping the originality of the various movements that have appeared here. The fact itself of the appearance of a number of these movements, organizations and parties is gratifying. However, this should not lead us to irreconcilable divisions. Bitter experience indicates that we must not set any ideology whatsoever above common sense.

All-Union Census Population Figures

Family Size by Republics

90UN1776A Moscow SEMYA in Russian No 14,
2-8 Apr 90 p 5

[Article by D. Ivliyev: "The Census Knows Everything"]

[Text] In the past 10 years the population has grown in all the Union republics. Natural growth is the principal growth factor in the majority of them.

In the period between 1979 and 1989, the urban population grew by 25.2 million, and its share in the overall

population grew from 62 percent to 66 percent. The principal reason for the decline in the rural population remains the migration to urban areas. In the 1980s, however, it declined to an average of 900,000 persons a year. For comparison's sake, it averaged 1.5 million persons in the 1970s.

Men account for 134.7 million (47.1 percent) of the Soviet Union's total population, and women for 151 million (52.9 percent). In 1979 there were 869 men for every 1,000 women, while in 1989 there were 892.

According to the census data, there are 73.1 million families. That is 6.8 million (10 percent) more families than in 1979.

Number of Families Grouped by Size and by Union Republic

	Number of families (thousands)	Including the number of families consisting of					Average family size (members of family living together)
		Two-person	Three-person	Four-person	Five-person	Six-person and larger	
USSR	73,078	22,918	18,880	17,801	6,984	6,495	3.5
RSFSR	40,246	13,759	11,281	10,154	3,354	1,689	3.2
Ukraine SSR	14,057	4,939	3,804	3,384	1,209	721	3.2
Belorussian SSR	2,796	972	766	748	212	98	3.2
Uzbek SSR	3,415	409	433	570	509	1,494	5.5
Kazakh SSR	3,824	866	852	972	520	614	4.0
Georgian SSR	1,244	265	242	314	200	223	4.1
Azerbaijan SSR	1,381	203	200	294	252	432	4.8
Lithuanian SSR	1,000	338	287	255	80	40	3.2
Moldavian SSR	1,144	351	292	306	127	68	3.4
Latvian SSR	732	277	210	165	55	25	3.1
Kirghiz SSR	856	146	148	178	131	253	4.7
Tajik SSR	799	89	91	115	103	401	6.1
Armenian SSR	559	70	78	147	116	148	4.7
Turkmen SSR	598	71	78	98	84	267	5.6
Estonian SSR	427	163	118	101	32	13	3.1

The greatest growth in the number of families was observed in the republics of Central Asia, in the Azerbaijan SSR, and also in the Kazakh SSR and the Moldavian SSR. Typically, average family size has not changed over the past 10 years in the country as a whole. It amounts to 3.5 persons—3.3 in urban areas and 3.8 in rural ones. The number of two-person families has grown. At present, 255.8 million persons, or 89 percent of the country's population, live in families.

According to the census data, there were 68 million married couples in the USSR in 1989. There are 77.9 million children below the age of 16 in the USSR.

Growth in Bashkir ASSR

90UN1776B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 17,
Apr 90 p 7

[Article by Staff Correspondent R. Abdullin: "Awaiting the Four-Millionth"]

[Text] The basic results of the 1989 All-Union Census for the Bashkir ASSR have been calculated and have just been made public.

Thus, the population of Bashkiria numbers 3,950,500 people. There are grounds for assuming that the

landmark four-millionth resident of the country's largest autonomous republic will be born this year. According to the data, as of Jan 12, 1989, there were 1,856,500 men and 2,094,000 women, 2,520,600 urban residents and 1,429,800 rural residents.

As compared to 1913, the urban population has grown almost twentyfold(!), while the rural population has declined by almost one-half.

The largest number of urban dwellers live, naturally, in the capital city of Ufa (more than a million). The populations of cities and towns of republic subordination (there are 14 of them) range from 32,400 (Uchaly) to 247,500 (Sterlitamak).

The republic is "graying": The number of people over the age of 60 has passed the half-million mark. The growth of this age-group in the past decade has been the largest for any group—13.8 percent. The able-bodied population had declined by 41,300 and amounts to 1,210,900 persons.

Bashkiria is a multinational republic. Representatives of more than 70 nationalities and ethnic groups live there. The largest of them are Russians—1,548,300 (39.3 percent), Bashkirs—863,800 (21.9), Tatars—1,120,700 (28.4), Chuvashs—118,500 (3.0), Maris—105,800 (2.7), Ukrainians—75,000 (1.9), Mordvinians—31,900 (0.8), Udmurts—23,700 (0.6), Belorussians—17,000, Germans—11,000, and Jews—4,900.

According to the census data, the following numbers of peoples named their national language as their second language: 7,200 Bashkirs, 900 Russians, 17,500 Tatars, 2,900 Chuvashs, etc.

A total of 1,774,100 people, including 227,900 non-Russians, named Russian as their native language; 1,736,900 named Russian as a second language that they speak fluently. Thus, 3,511,000 people, or 89 percent of Bashkiria's population, speak Russian.

Migration, Labor Statistics in Estonia Assessed

90UN1566A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 10 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by L. Yakovleva, economist in the Population Statistics Division of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Department of Statistics: "Estonia in a Statistical Mirror"]

[Text] Taking into account the crisis in the country, the compilation of the regular All Union census in January of last year was timely as never before.

The question of sovereignty and the problems of the indigenous population and other national groups associated with it has recently moved to the forefront in our republic. How does the republic's population picture itself on the threshold of its independence?

In the ten years after the 1979 census, the number of people in the republic increased by 6.9 percent. According to the results of the January census, 1,565,662 people live permanently in Estonia. In addition to Estonians, more than 70 nationalities are represented.

For the same period the number of indigenous nationalities living here has increased by 16.6 percent, and of Estonians, in all, only by 1.6 percent. The proportion of the native population in Estonia is one of the lowest among Union republics after Kazakhstan (39.7 percent), Latvia (52 percent) and Kirghiz (52.4 percent). At the same time the level of migration is the highest in the Union. The average annual increase in migration per 10 thousand of the republic's population was 65, 48 and 36 people respectively for the years between censuses (1959-1969, 1970-1978, 1979-1988). For all the union republics for the same periods it was on an average 22, 20, and 15 respectively. If this is considered on a union level, the position of the Estonian nation is most depressing.

The migrational processes had a negative effect not only on the republic's national composition but also in practically all areas of social life. Of the union republics only in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] is the proportion of the urban population higher (74) percent than in Estonia (71.6 percent), while less than half the entire population lives in cities and city-like settlements in the Central Asian republics and Moldavia: 33 and 47 percent respectively. Taking into account the lack of adequate sources of raw materials, such a position destroys the balance of economic relations in Estonia. And the introduction of the concept of self-support cannot help but have an effect on the republic's budget. Transportation and social expenses connected with the import of raw materials and workers and the export of manufactured goods, all of which have been practically ignored until now, are a big luxury for a self-supporting republic. As a result, partial restructuring and curtailment of different areas of industry in the future are inescapable at the current level of our industrial technology and technical equipment, when natural population reproduction, the economic situation and the restriction on migration are taken into consideration.

Until now industrial development in the republic was based on the influx of a working force from abroad. Such a policy cannot be promising either in satisfying social needs or with respect to the development of the republic's scientific and technical potential. The presence of an eastern neighbor, which, as a matter of fact, is a constant source of cheap labor, makes it possible to sustain the required level of gross output without specific losses in the improvement of industrial technological processes or technical equipment. At a given stage a deficit in the work force is necessary for the republic, so that the available scientific and technical potential will start working with complete efficiency under conditions of self-support.

In the last ten years the proportion of the able-bodied population in Estonia has decreased from 57.8 to 56.2

percent of the total number, despite a 3.9 increase in the absolute population. If we take into account the fact, that the portion of the population younger than 16 has increased by 10.4 percent for the same period, a small increase in the working age population must be assumed. But with limitation on migration it is apparent that the proportion of this category of the population to the total number will decrease. As a result a deficit in the working force will be unavoidable; it is possible and necessary to make up for it by more progressive technology.

For the same period the total increase in the able-bodied population as a whole throughout the USSR was 7 million; of it almost 5 million (about 70 percent) was in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. It is obvious and not necessary to have an advanced degree to understand that there is no objective necessity to develop an industrial complex and construct economic objectives either in Estonia or in those republics. In addition, if we proceed from the data of the last census (it is appropriate to emphasize that these data were obtained by surveying the population), the level of education in those republics is not lower than in Estonia.

Thus, the multiyear policy, carried out by the government for the purpose of creating a single, indivisible state, where representatives of the phenomenon known as the Soviet people with eroded national characteristics live, has led to deterioration not only in the political and economic sphere but in the spiritual and the demographic as well. Natural processes of assimilation, which originated and still do throughout the world and in our country, are used even now to defend and justify this policy.

However, those methods, which have accelerated those processes in our country, and the results of similar acceleration are not subject to any sort of revision.

There is "Russification" of the native language both in the USSR as a whole and in Estonia. 94 percent of the republic's population considered the language of its nationality native, in this past census, while in 1979, 94.6 percent did. 98.9 percent of Russians and 7.0 percent of representatives of other nationalities consider Russian native (in 1979 it was 98.4 percent and 5.5 percent respectively). Compared to 1979 the number of inhabitants of Estonia who consider Russian their native language has increased from 31.7 to 34.8 percent of the entire population.

Both now and in 1979 census, 98.9 percent of Estonians in the republic considered Estonian to be their native language. At the same time 33.6 percent of the entire indigenous population speak Russian and 0.1 percent, other languages of the peoples of the USSR (in 1979 2.31 and 0.1 percent respectively). Thus, the number of Estonians who are fluent in Russian has increased in 10 years by 47.9 percent. We are speaking of fluency. The representatives of other nationalities living in Estonia are less interested in the language of the people, in whose land they live—in all, 13.3 percent of them speak Estonian. Compared to 1979 the number of people fluent in Estonian has increased by 37.4 percent.

As was already noted, after RSFSR, Estonia is the most urbanized republic in the USSR. Nevertheless, at present, compared to the entire country, the population is better provided with food. In all, 28.4 percent of the population lives in the country. Of this, 87.4 percent is Estonian; this is 40.6 percent of the total number of Estonians in the republic.

Only part of the material obtained from the census has been used in this article. The total amount of it is large and requires time for processing and analysis.

I hope in the future after this bitter experience our government will listen to a greater extent to the advice of the demographers in planning the development of the economic complex so as to avoid various distortions.

All-Union Census Results for Georgian SSR

90UN1410A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
23 Mar 90 p 2

[Report by the Georgian SSR State Committee on Statistics: "On the Results of the 1989 All-Union Census for the Georgian SSR"]

[Text] The Georgian SSR State Committee on Statistics reports the final results for the republic as a whole and for its four regions (autonomous republics, autonomous oblast and Tbilisi) concerning the size and age breakdown of the population, marital status, number and size of families, education, nationality and languages, and sources of livelihood; these data were obtained by processing the results of the 1989 census.

1. As of 12 January 1989 the size of the population present in the Georgian SSR was 5,443,300 persons; compared to 1979 it had increased by 428,500 persons, or by 8.5 percent.

	Size, thousands of persons				Average annual growth rate, percentage		
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1989
Total population	4,044	4,686	5,014	5,443	1.3	0.7	0.8
Urban population	1,713	2,240	2,600	3,035	2.6	1.6	1.5
Rural population	2,331	2,446	2,414	2,408	0.4	-0.1	-0.02

SA relatively high average annual population growth occurred in the 1960s (58,000) because of a higher birth rate in the first half of the 1960s and a higher natural population increase; on the other hand, starting in the early 1970s the average annual rate of population increase dropped from 1.3 percent to 0.7 percent, and

during the 1980s it rose slightly to 0.8 percent, or an average of 43,000 persons per year.

In 1979-1988 the population grew in the city of Tbilisi, all the autonomous formations, and most of the cities and rayons of the Georgian SSR. There were substantial differences among the republic's various regions in changes in population size.

	Population present			Permanent population		
	thousands of persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	thousands of persons		1989 as percentage of 1979
	1979	1989		1979	1989	
Georgian SSR	5,015	5,443	108.5	4,993	5,401	108.2
Tbilisi City Soviet	1,069	1,263	118.2	1,056	1,247	118.1
Abkhaz ASSR	505	536	106.1	486	525	108.0
Adzhar ASSR	354	393	111.0	354	392	110.7
South Osetian AO	97	99	102.1	98	99	101.0

The highest percentage of population increase was for the Tbilisi City Soviet, at 18.2 percent. That is mainly attributable to the population influx into the city of Tbilisi from other regions of the republic. Population increases that were greater than the republic average occurred in Marneulskiy Rayon (24.7 percent), Bolnisskiy Rayon (20.4 percent), Dmanisskiy Rayon (18.6 percent), Gardabanskiy Rayon (13.7 percent), Sagaredzhoskiy Rayon (11.3 percent), Goriyskiy Rayon (10.2 percent), and others, which is related to the high birth rate in those rayons. The population declined in Onskiy Rayon (by 20.7 percent), Ambrolaurskiy Rayon (by 17.3 percent), Kharagaulskiy Rayon (by 10.0 percent), Tsalkskiy Rayon (by 8.9 percent), Khonskiy Rayon (by 7.9 percent), and others.

In the Georgian SSR as a whole, the urban population in 1989 had increased by 435,200 persons, or 16.7 percent, since 1979. As a percentage of the overall population, the urban population grew from 51.9 percent in 1979 to 55.8 percent in 1989.

The number of rural inhabitants declined by 6,700 persons, or 0.3 percent, from 1979 to 1989.

The main reason for the decline in rural population was a migrational outflow to cities. From 1970 through 1978 that outflow amounted to 29,300 persons per year. In the period between 1979 and 1989, the outflow of rural inhabitants declined, but it still averaged 23,000 persons a year.

2. The distribution of the permanent population by age is characterized by the following figures:

	Size, thousands of persons			Percentage of total	
	1979	1989	1989 as percentage of 1979	1979	1989
Total population	4,993	5,401	108.2	100	100
Ages, in years					
0-9	844	907	107.5	16.9	16.8
10-19	940	851	90.5	18.8	15.8
20-29	776	881	113.5	15.5	16.3
30-39	574	779	135.7	11.5	14.4
40-49	699	558	79.8	14.0	10.3
50-59	529	650	122.9	10.6	12.0
60-69	334	458	137.1	6.7	8.5
70-79	213	224	105.2	4.3	4.2
80 and older	79	93	117.7	1.6	1.7
No age given	5	—	—	0.1	—
Younger than working age	1,398	1,423	101.8	28.0	26.3
Working age	2,837	3,039	107.1	56.8	56.3
Older than working age	753	939	124.7	15.2	17.4

Noteworthy in the age structure is the decline in the number of persons ages 10-19 (by 3.8 percent in comparison to 1970 and 9.5 percent in comparison to 1979), as well as the 3-percent decline over the past 10 years in the number of such persons as a percentage of the total population. Despite the fact that the number of persons under nine years of age increased by 7.5 percent as compared to 1979, that number still did not reach the 1970 level (946,000 persons). There was a significant increase in the 20-29-year age group (by 54 percent in comparison to 1970).

Over the past 10 years the increase in the working-age population (men 16-59 years old, women 16-54 years old) came to 202,700 persons, or 7.1 percent, while the size of that population as a percentage of the total population declined by 0.5 percent.

The republic's population has been undergoing an aging process. In the period between censuses the number of

persons older than working age increased by 24.7 percent, and this age group already accounts for 17.4 percent of the total population, which is 2.2 percent more than in 1979 and 2.5 percent more than in 1970.

3. Of the republic's total permanent population, there are 2,562,000 men (47.4 percent) and 2,839,000 women (52.6 percent). There has been an improvement in the population's gender structure. Whereas in 1979 there were 881 men per 1,000 women, in 1989 there were 902 men per 1,000 women. The number of females begins to exceed the number of males, on the average, at 21 years of age; this is due to the higher mortality rate of men in the older age groups.

4. As of census day in the Georgian SSR there were 1,284,000 married couples.

The distribution of the republic's population by marital status is evident from the following table:

	Percentage of persons of given marital status in the given age group							
	men				women			
	never married	married	widowed	divorced and separated	never married	married	widowed	divorced and separated
Total population over 16	24.8	69.9	2.8	1.5	17.4	61.0	16.7	4.1
16-19	95.3	3.4	0.0	0.0	81.5	16.5	0.2	0.4
20-24	70.1	27.1	0.1	0.5	40.7	55.2	0.5	2.0
25-29	34.7	62.5	0.2	1.3	20.9	73.3	1.0	3.8
30-39	12.5	84.3	0.4	2.1	10.9	79.9	2.7	5.9
40-49	4.2	91.6	1.1	2.5	6.6	78.7	7.8	6.5
50-59	2.0	92.7	2.9	1.9	5.6	71.8	16.8	5.3
60 and older	1.5	83.5	13.0	11.2	5.0	37.8	53.7	2.7

Over the past 10 years in Georgia the percentage of married persons has increased: of men, from 69.3 percent to 69.9 percent, and of women from 58.9 percent to 61.0 percent. The increase in the percentage of married persons in the 16-19 age group, especially of women (from 13.8 percent to 16.5 percent), indicates an increase in the number of persons marrying at a younger age. At the same time, the percentage of divorced persons also increased, with the greatest increase (of men—from 1.6 percent to 2.5 percent, and of women—from 5.7 percent to 6.5 percent) being noted in the 40-49 age group.

5. According to census data, the number of families was 1,244,000, which was 93,000, or 8 percent, more than in 1979, and 16 percent more than in 1970. The average family size in the Georgian SSR rose from 4.0 to 4.1 persons over the 10 years (according to the 1970 census, this figure was also 4.1 persons); this increase over the past 10 years occurred only by virtue of an increase in the average family size in urban settlements from 3.9 persons in 1979 to 4.0 persons in 1989 (in 1970 this figure was 3.8 persons). Certain changes in the family structure in terms of number of members also took place.

Changes in the structure of average family size over the past 10 years:

	Number of families, thousands			As percentage of total	
	1979	1989	1989 as percentage of 1979	1979	1989
Number of families	1,1151	1,244	108.1	100	100
Family size					
2 persons	243	265	109.1	21.1	21.3
3 persons	229	242	105.7	19.9	19.5

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4 persons	288	314	109.0	25.0	25.2
5 persons	192	200	104.2	16.7	16.1
6 and more persons	199	223	112.1	17.3	17.9

The number of families and their grouping by size for individual territories of the Georgian SSR in 1989:

Number of families, thousands	Number of families, by size						
	2 persons	3 persons	4 persons	5 persons	6 and more persons	Average family size	
Georgian SSR	1,244	265	242	314	200	223	4.1
Tbilisi City Soviet	291	61	60	82	42	46	4.0
Abkhaz ASSR	122	29	25	29	18	21	4.0
Adzhar ASSR	81	11	14	19	15	22	4.6
South Osetian AO	23	6	5	5	4	3	3.9

In comparison to 1970, the average family size increased by 0.2 persons for Tbilisi and the Adzhar ASSR, and declined by 0.3 persons for the South Osetian AO.

5,049 persons, or 93.4 percent of the republic's population, live in families. In addition, 186,000 family members (3.4 percent) live apart from their families but are connected with them by a common budget; 166,000 persons (3.1 percent) have no families or have lost

connections with them (single persons). The percentage of family members living apart from their families and of single persons in the Georgian SSR is substantially lower than the union average, where that group constitutes 11 percent of the population.

6. The level of education of both the entire population and the employed population rose significantly in the period between censuses:

	Education					
	Higher or secondary (complete or incomplete)	Complete higher	Incomplete higher	Specialized secondary	General secondary	Incomplete secondary
Total population ages 15 and older, thousands of persons						
1979	2,862	425	79	415	1,212	731
1989	3,561	613	98	760	1,474	616
1989 as percentage of 1979	124	144	124	183	122	84
Per 1,000 persons ages 15 and older						
1979	774	115	21	112	328	198
1989	877	151	24	187	363	152
Employed population, thousands of persons						
1979	2,157	378	36	358	958	427
1989	2,480	523	44	598	1,042	273
1989 as percentage of 1979	115	138	122	167	109	64
Per 1,000 employees						
1979	856	150	15	142	380	169
1989	942	199	16	227	396	104

An evening-out of the educational levels of the urban and rural populations occurred. Whereas in 1979 the percentage of urban inhabitants ages 15 and older with a higher or secondary education (complete or incomplete)

was 86.7 percent, and the comparable percentage of rural inhabitants was 67.3 percent, in 1989 the corresponding percentages were 93.4 and 80.4; that is, the gap was reduced by 6.4 percent.

An evening-out of educational levels among the cited regions of the republic also occurred. In 1979 there were an average of 774 persons with a higher or secondary education per 1,000 of the population of the republic as a whole. This index was highest in Tbilisi (895 persons) and lowest in the South Osetian AO (698 persons). Over the past 10 years the education index for the republic as a whole increased by 13 percent and came to 877 per 1,000; in Tbilisi it rose by 6 percent and came to 949 persons; and in the South Osetian AO it increased by 19 percent and came to 830 persons.

7. In the course of the 1989 census information was obtained on the population of all nationalities living in the Georgian SSR. As in previous censuses, nationality was indicated by members of the population on the basis of their self-identification. Children's nationality was defined by their parents.

In 1989 the number of Georgians came to 3,787,000 and was 10.3 percent higher than in 1979. The number of persons in most nationalities also increased over the period between censuses.

The change in population size in Georgian SSR by individual nationalities is given in the following table:

	Number of persons in given nationality		1989 as percentage of 1979	As a percentage of the total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	4,993,182	5,400,841	108.2	100	100
Georgians	3,433,011	3,787,393	110.3	68.8	70.1
Armenians	448,000	437,211	97.6	9.0	8.1
Russians	371,608	341,172	91.8	7.4	6.3
Azerbaijanis	255,678	307,556	120.3	5.1	5.7
Osetians	160,497	164,055	102.2	3.2	3.0
Greeks	95,105	100,324	105.5	1.9	1.8
Abkhazians	85,285	95,853	112.4	1.7	1.8
Ukrainians	45,036	52,443	116.4	0.9	1.0
Kurds	25,688	33,331	129.8	0.5	0.6
Georgian Jews	7,974	14,314	179.5	0.2	0.3
Jews	20,107	10,312	51.3	0.4	0.2
Belorussians	5,702	8,595	150.7	0.1	0.2
Assyrians	5,286	6,206	117.4	0.1	0.1
Tatars	5,089	4,099	80.5	0.1	0.1
Other nationalities	29,116	37,977	130.4	0.6	0.7

One must assume that the deepening of peoples' feelings of national awareness in recent years has had a certain influence on the dynamics noted in the above table and the following tables.

Figures are given below on the population distribution by nationality for the Abkhaz ASSR, Adzhar ASSR, South Osetian AO and Tbilisi City Soviet.

Abkhaz ASSR					
	Persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	486,082	525,061	108.0	100	100
Abkhazians	83,097	93,267	112.2	17.1	17.8
Georgians	213,322	239,872	112.4	43.9	45.7
Armenians	73,350	76,541	104.4	15.1	14.6
Russians	79,730	74,913	94.0	16.4	14.2
Greeks	13,642	14,664	107.5	2.8	2.8
Ukrainians	10,257	11,655	113.6	2.1	2.2
Belorussians	1,311	2,084	159.0	0.3	0.4
Jews	1,976	1,426	72.2	0.4	0.3
Osetians	952	1,165	122.4	0.2	0.2
Tatars	1,485	1,099	74.0	0.3	0.2
Other nationalities	6,960	8,374	120.3	1.4	1.6

Adzhar ASSR

	Persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	354,224	392,432	110.8	100	100
Georgians	283,872	324,813	114.4	80.1	82.8
Russians	34,544	30,042	87.0	9.8	7.7
Armenians	16,101	15,849	98.4	4.6	4.0
Greeks	7,072	7,396	104.6	2.0	1.9
Ukrainians	5,402	5,943	110.0	1.5	1.5
Abkhazians	1,508	1,636	108.5	0.4	0.4
Azerbaijanis	994	1,077	108.4	0.3	0.3
Other nationalities	4,731	5,676	120.0	1.3	1.4

South Osetian AO

	Persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	97,988	98,527	100.6	100	100
Osetians	65,077	65,232	100.2	66.4	66.2
Georgians	28,187	28,544	101.3	28.8	29.0
Russians	2,046	2,128	104.0	2.1	2.1
Armenians	953	984	103.3	1.0	1.0
Other nationalities	1,725	1,639	95.0	1.7	1.7

Tbilisi City Soviet

	Persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	1,056,140	1,246,936	118.1	100	100
Georgians	656,431	824,412	125.6	62.2	66.1
Armenians	152,900	150,138	98.2	14.5	12.0
Russians	129,143	124,867	96.7	12.2	10.0
Osetians	27,891	33,157	118.9	2.7	2.7
Kurds	23,413	30,304	129.4	2.2	2.4
Greeks	16,179	21,722	134.3	1.5	1.8
Azerbaijanis	12,867	17,986	139.8	1.2	1.4
Ukrainians	12,614	16,074	127.4	1.2	1.3
Jews	11,432	6,828	59.7	1.1	0.6
Georgian Jews	3,374	6,645	196.9	0.3	0.5
Assyrians	2,247	2,753	122.5	0.2	0.2
Belorussians	1,257	2,149	171.0	0.1	0.2
Tatars	1,434	1,331	92.8	0.1	0.1
Other nationalities	4,958	8,570	172.9	0.5	0.7

8. By source of livelihood, the republic's population was distributed as follows:

	Persons		1989 as percentage of 1979	As percentage of total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	4,993	5,401	108.2	100	100
Employed in the national economy (except for those engaged solely in personal auxiliary farming)	2,519	2,634	104.6	50.5	48.8
On stipends	115	107	93.4	2.3	2.0
Pensioners and persons receiving allowances, and other persons on state support	664	741	111.6	13.3	13.7
Dependents of individuals, and persons engaged only in personal auxiliary farming	1,689	1,914	113.3	33.8	35.4
Persons with other sources of livelihood and those who did not indicate a source	6	5	76.2	0.1	0.1

The 1989 census also counted persons having two sources of livelihood (in 1979 only one source was counted). They made up 14.9 percent of the population. They were mainly employed pensioners, as well as persons combining their principal activity with engagement in personal auxiliary farming, or persons receiving a stipend, pension, allowance, or assistance from their parents.

Abortion, Family Planning, Medicine Discussed

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Second Edition p 5

[Article by I. Manuilova, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, president of the Soviet "Family and Health" association; and V. Kulakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, director of the VNITs [All-Union Scientific Research Center] on mother and child care: "Wanted Children"]

[Text] It seems that our leading demographers and sociologists have finally begun to discuss the pressing problems of demographic policy in the USSR. This was also the subject at the "round table" whose materials were published in PRAVDA on 30 January under the headline, "The Individual and the People."

We have an extremely complex demographic situation in our country. The USSR is in 50th place in the world with its infant mortality rate. The number of abortions, especially in the European region of the country, exceeds Western levels by 10 times or more, and life expectancy is far lower than in the developed countries. Foreign experience has shown that these kinds of demographic statistics are present where there is inadequate attention paid to family planning services and there is no regulation of the birth rate with the help of modern means of birth control.

It is perfectly obvious that the creation and implementation of family planning services are necessary for the normalization of the demographic situation in the country. These organizations would allow women to

exercise their right to maintain their health through optimal birth control taking into account the age of the woman, interval between births, number of children in the family as well as other factors. According to the Alma-Ata declaration (1978) "family planning is the control of the reproductive function for the birth of only children that are wanted." It was decided to view this aspect as a vital element of primary medical care necessary for the maintenance of health.

Nonetheless, during the 12 years which have passed, there has been no significant shift in the psychology of doctors in our country, of the organizers of the health care system or of the population itself in favor of the necessity of the broad utilization of methods to prevent unwanted pregnancy. As a result, its artificial interruption has become the main method of regulating pregnancy. According to scientists' data the Soviet Union is in next to last place among the developed countries in the dissemination of birth control devices.

Family planning means safe motherhood, the presence of only wanted children and the maintenance of the health and well-being of the family. This can be achieved only through correct sex education for teenagers, complete information about modern forms of contraception and their accessibility. Also important is medical consulting assistance regarding ways to avoid undesired pregnancy and also early, frequent or late births and the treatment of sterility among couples.

However, scientific-technical progress in the field of human reproduction has passed us by. This has prevented the organization of the industrial production of modern birth control devices at the level of international standards. In this regard the urgent need arises to create a state family planning service which would provide information and medical assistance to the entire female population.

The preventative significance of family planning has also been confirmed by research which demonstrates the

unfavorable influence on the body of women and children given short intervals between births (less than 2 - 2.5 years). This significantly raises both the incidence of disease in the mother and child as well as the mortality rate. Selected data from the USSR MZ [Ministry of Health] VNITs [All-Union Scientific Research Center] of the OZMiR [Society for the Protection of Mother and Child] obtained in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan confirmed the data of foreign scientists regarding the unfavorable influence on the state of the health of the mother and child given excessively frequent births with an interval of less than two years. This not only leads to an increase in pregnancy and birth complications but also to early infant mortality.

It has been established, for example, that mother and infant mortality rates among women 19 years of age and younger and among older women, 35- 40 years, are significantly higher than among women 20-24 years old. Mother mortality rates among women 40 years of age and older are five times greater in comparison with women 20-29 years old. Among women giving birth for the first time at the age of 40 or older the rate is 15 times higher. The research of American scientists has shown that half of women who die during childbirth are older than 30 or have three or more children. One-half of the women in the world do not want to have more children, yet 500 thousand women die each year from illnesses associated with pregnancy and birth. (One out of 25 women in Africa and one out of 1750 women in Europe die during pregnancy and birth.)

Currently there are family planning associations in 130 countries. Their goal is to provide the population with information and medical consulting assistance regarding issues of sex education and regulation of the birth rate, something which will avert unwanted pregnancies, excessively early, frequent and late births as a result of which the health of women and children will be maintained.

The International Federation of Responsible Parenthood and Family Planning (MFPS) with its headquarters in London coordinates family planning in six regions of the world taking into account national, economic and demographic characteristics.

The federation promotes an expansion of the population's education on issues of family planning and responsible parenthood. It conducts work on maintaining the mental and physical health of children, teenagers and adults through supporting effective means of family planning.

In addition, MFPS acquaints the world's population with demographic problems and stimulates scientific research of all the aspects of fertility and its regulation.

Many people still think that family planning is a purely medical problem and quite often associate it only with limiting the birth rate. In reality family planning is a medical and social issue. Thus, the infant mortality rate in the regions of Central Asia, which are two times higher

than the national levels, could be drastically reduced if women could be convinced not to give birth more often than every two years.

In this regard the experience of those countries in which family planning is carried out at the state level and is viewed as a part of its social policy deserves attention. Thus, at the present time the governments of 120 countries in the world provide direct or indirect assistance to family planning services.

The negative attitude towards family planning which has developed in our country has lead to the situation in which more than half of women use traditional ineffective methods. Only 12-15 percent of women use modern birth control methods. As a result the unwanted pregnancy is more often interrupted than avoided.

International experience has shown that the utilization of modern contraceptives by just 40 percent of women allows for a reduction in the number of abortions by one and a half to two times and a reduction in mother mortality by one-third.

At the World Forum on the Ecological Problems of Development for Survival (Moscow, 1990) the director of the United Nations Population Fund N. Said in his report "The Planet and Mankind" viewed early, frequent and late births as three basic factors which significantly increase infant and mother mortality rates. This provides a reason to include family planning among ecological factors which guarantee the health of the family.

In order to normalize the situation in the country, assistance is needed in every way possible in the elaboration and realization of a series of medical and social measures on family planning directed towards the development of a family policy taking into account regional characteristics which would allow women to have only the children they desired. It is finally time to call the attention of society to demographic, economic and social-health problems of the family. It is time for us to leave behind stone-age ideas about the prevention of unwanted pregnancy and the treatment of sterility, psychosexual offenses, venereal diseases and AIDS. After all, we are talking about the health of the nation.

The Soviet Union, having created the "Family and Health" association and having joined the international association on responsible parenthood, has taken only the first step in the organization of a family planning service. Let's not be frightened by the fact that yet another organization has been created. How many must we have? It has been calculated that one dollar spent on family planning allows us to save ten dollars for the health care of mothers and children. But you can't measure by any amount of money the happiness of motherhood that is welcomed.

Soviet Child Abuse Problems Receive Increased Attention

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[Article by Natalya Kolesnikova: "I Begot You...."]

[Excerpts] I remember (more than 10 years have elapsed, but I remember!) when LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published several articles about children being cruelly humiliated, crippled, maimed, tortured, and savagely murdered.... In the capitalist world, of course. All the terrible events cited in these articles occurred in such countries as the United States, FRG, Great Britain.... Moreover, these were not random instances. The articles cited the following statistics: thousands of children perish every year due to the cruelty of parents, and thousands remain crippled. It was extremely painful to read about this. But it was easy to calm oneself down by shifting the painful sensation and assigning it, so to speak, to a far-away place. It happened over there "among them," but not in our country! No, no, not in our country.... Alas!....

Recently Professor Stanislav Yakovlevich Doletskiy, the very renowned children's surgeon, invited a NEDELYA correspondent to a benefit lecture. The topic was "Children and Cruelty." This lecture had been organized by the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin. The speakers were Professor E. Kess [?] from Canada and Professor S.Ya. Doletskiy. Stanislav Yakovlevich showed slides. They were not from abroad; the pictures shown in the slides were taken in our country. It was impossible to view them without shuddering....

How can a normal person (or one who considers himself normal) strike a child? A tiny, defenseless child....? We are not talking about spanking a child on a certain soft place or giving him a playful slap, but striking him in such a way that the fragile little bones are broken and blood vessels burst.... No, not just striking but beating up regularly. There are more and more splinters of repeatedly broken little bones piercing the liver and lungs; there is sometimes no untouched place left on the little body. Such beating is done not with the palm nor at times even with the fist, but with whatever is at hand—a stick or a piece of iron. Some children are burned with a cigarette, pierced with a needle, fork, or a knife.... My hand refuses to write what else is done to children—little girls and boys.

But it must, it must be written about, as well as spoken from the television screen and from all possible rostrums. It must be shouted out! It's high time that we said goodbye to the lulling idea that all this happens over there, "among them," while in our country childhood is golden. These things happen in our country too. Children are being tortured, crippled, and murdered in our country. And it is not just a few, isolated sufferers who perish at the hands of sadists, but thousands.... Can we be more precise? Impossible. In our country statistics are not kept on this matter.

We do keep statistics on deaths and injuries from auto accidents, those burned to death or suffocated in fires, and we have data on those persons who have drowned. But statistics do not provide data on a nationwide scale regarding children who have died from injuries inflicted by parents, by live-in partners of the mothers or fathers, or by adults in general. It may be assumed that this figure would be terrifying if it were given out in a honest and uncowardly manner, if those who perished were not shamefully and hypocritically recorded, as is done up to the present time, as being the victims of "accidents."

As a person devoted to children's lives, the surgeon Doletskiy knows his own mournful statistics. Over the extent of many years he has kept track of the cases which he himself has encountered in the Moscow Children's Hospital imeni Rusakov, where only a few of those who can still be helped are brought. At times they are brought in too late.

Stanislav Yakovlevich (it would be impossible to call his lecture an impassioned or fervent speech) said that he had tried to cry out many times about the cruelty which he had to witness. But he was not heard or listened to. People did not want to hear about this. They have only now begun to hear. And, probably, the more people who are heard, the broader and more powerful will be the public reverberations, and the more chances there will be to erect at least some wall of protection for those persons who without protection and defenseless.

"They brought in a little boy with a fracture of the neck vertebrae," said S. Doletskiy. "The father had beat him about the head with his fist. I asked him: 'But why did you beat him that way about the head with your fist? In the old days it sometimes happened that children were thrashed or whipped, and cruelly so, but without maiming them!' 'Thrashing,' the father replied, 'it's a complicated business, for a long time, I hit him here—and everything....' The dossier on this case of the young boy with the crushed head was brought up for a consultation and opinion from the experts. The mother, who had been unemployed and a streetwalker, had given birth to a rather dark-complexioned boy, and then his skin began to darken rapidly. It was obvious that the father had been a Negro, i.e., the father of the little boy, but not this woman's husband. And the mother had crushed the little head...."

After such case histories, photographs of a boy with a bloody ear, torn off by a parent's hand, or a teenage girl whose back was one mass of continuous bruises (her papa had punished her for lingering later than she was supposed to) seem not to cause such shudders nor rent the soul. But, of course, these are merely mute photographs. But what about the living—if they are still living!—children, bloody, black-and-blue, who no longer have the strength to cry and who remain silent. For some, it is because they do not yet know how to talk; for others, it because they are afraid. How can people remain unshaken by such witnesses to cruelty?!

Nevertheless, it's obvious that they are not shaken. Otherwise, how are we to explain the fact that, with our walls, which are so thin that everything can be heard, neighbors almost never react to the sounds of children's weeping and crying? The principle of not interfering in other people's business in a situation whereby, right next door, on the other side of the wall, in a neighbor's apartment, a child is suffering—such a principle is utterly unacceptable. The lack of a desire to “soil oneself” or “butt in” does not have any right to exist. Does this suffering really not call out to the human conscience?

For some reason, up to now it has not so called out.... More likely, it has called out very quietly, at the level of this same neighbor's corridor and no louder. Furthermore, who was there to turn to if there was, supposedly, no such torturing of children in our country?! To the police, the public education organs, the Social Security Division, the raykom, to the torturer's place of employment? “I see nothing, I hear nothing, I say nothing to anybody....” Can it possibly be that, even with regard to children, we are like those three monkeys in the Oriental parable, those who closed their eyes, ears, and mouths?!

“Don't just walk on by! Report every instance of cruelty being manifested to a child!” This is the appeal being made by the Soviet Children's Fund. S.Ya. Doletskiy reminded his listeners that in Poland a law has been passed providing for punishment of those who knew about a child being tortured and failed to report it to the authorities. We do not have such a law in our country. But we do have a conscience and compassion! The law of morality and humanity—it is also inviolable and important, and it was always inherent in our people.

But does our country provide for criminal punishment of those persons who treat children so cruelly? Of course, there is an appropriate law. But how is it being implemented? In how many cases does the judicial system operate, whereas in how many cases do those on whom the implementation depends adhere to the principles of the three monkeys? Deprive the mother and father of their parental rights, and send the child to a children's home—it's easy to say these things! How much fuss and bother is required to put this in the proper legal or de jure format! Furthermore, a space must be secured in a children's home, but there are no spaces....

The readiness to close one's eyes to the cruelty which is happening can, probably, not be explained simply by the indifference of the people who chance to witness a child's sufferings. Here one also senses an echo of the former viewpoint of the ostrich which has stuck his head in the sand: “This can never occur here in our country!... Because I don't wish to see it.”

But just how are we to explain the inexplicable cruelty of adults? Stanislaw Yakovlevich Doletskiy undertook to analyze this problem, which he considers to be one for all mankind. In his opinion, the source of cruelty lies in the insufficiency of spiritual forces, the expenditure of which

becomes more and more possible for adults as civilization develops. It is not sufficient for children.... This insufficiency is superimposed upon a traditional, or to put it more correctly, a Domostroy [Household Order], in the worst sense of that word, attitude toward children, as if the parents' own property: “He's mine, and I'll do what I like with him! If I want, I'll thrash him; if I want, I'll whip him; if I want.... I begot him!”

Adults beat and torture children when they are tired and irritated, when they are excited by alcohol or a quarrel, when they are in a hurry or nervous. And—the most repulsive type of cruelty!—when they are experiencing uncontrollable sexual arousal.

Does social status or standing—financial income, cultural standards, moral climate—affect the level of cruelty? The figures relating to crimes against children, which may be found in Western publications, attest that even in very successful, highly developed countries this problem is very acute. But there it is discussed for all to hear, and measures are being undertaken to solve it. Whereas in our country....

How many disapproving words are sometimes caused by television pictures which show tortured victims—children. These are pictures which are shown from time to time in reports by the Leningrad program “600 seconds”?! Many people say “Why show this?! What a passion for bloody horrors! Life is gloomy enough even without this!” Such are the remarks made by the adherents of tranquility. One feels so much like telling them: “No, indeed, be so kind as to view these pictures! It is your indifference and your exclusive concern for your own tranquility which have given rise to such an evil.”

Recently “600 Seconds” showed a story about a 9-year-old boy who had been tortured by his stepfather. Galina Kachuk, a NEDELYA correspondent who was in Leningrad at that time, say the boy and met the physician of the Pediatric Institute's Surgical Department, which had received the child—beaten up and unconscious. When he came to, he openly talked about everything that his stepfather used to do to him when his mother was away, how he would beat him up and press upon his carotid artery—a method of torture well-known among criminals.

And on that day the stepfather and mother of the beaten-up child (she is a dishwasher in a cafeteria and, in the boy's words, “does not drink always—because she does have to work!”) had gotten drunk and were angry at the boy because he was touching the radio. The stepfather beat the child up (the boy was brought to institute with an injury to his skull and brain), and his mama gave him pills, after which he lost consciousness.

For now he is being cared for by the physicians, nurses, and the Leningrad Mercy Service. But what will happen later? The boy requested that a letter be sent to his family, who showed no interest whatsoever in his condition. He said that he wanted to come home (but only if his stepfather was not there), but if he were to be sent to

a boarding home, it should be together with his sisters. There are six children in this family; the eldest son is in special boarding home; the fate of the others is not difficult to predict if they are not rescued or saved somehow.

But what about the stepfather and the mother? Will they be punished for the crippled health and violated psyche (physicians assert that violence never passes away without leaving a trace), and for mutilating the children's fates?

Inasmuch as this specific case has received publicity thanks to television, we may hope that, on this occasion, the crime will not go unpunished. But who knows how many similar crimes are committed every day within four walls and remain unnoticed?! Unnoticed by anyone except for the voiceless victims.

"Every woman has the right to be a mother," said Doletskiy. He stated this sentence as a theoretical premise. That is, *ab initio*, proceeding from the nature of the given, of course, every woman can and should be a mother. But.... But Stanislav Yakovlevich himself began by showing a frame from a film made by students from the Cinematic Institute. The following scene was shown: a gravestone in a cemetery in the city of Kharkov, a photograph of a little girl and an inscription declaring that he life had been cut short by her mother's hand....

"...Never shake a child by the shoulders or throw him up into the air," said the professor. "A child's head is supported on a frail neck. The small or fine blood vessels feeding the brain are blocked by a sharp, crude shove or impact. Blockage can be fatal...."

How necessary such lectures and such discussions are for both old and young persons! And how rare they are in our country. But the number of children suffering from cruelty is constantly increasing....

Suicide-Prevention Services Examined

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[Article by Natalya Boyarkina, special correspondent:
"On the Far Side of Life: About the Suicide-Prevention
Service and Not Only About That...."]

[Text] One could almost "drown" in this enormous armchair, upholstered in a tender pink plush. Under one's feet is a brightly colored shag rug, which muffles the steps of those persons who enter this living-room. There are lace curtains on the windows, two sofas, an upright piano, a small table for magazines, and a television set.

Older persons and teenagers come in and go out: men and women. Some are very neatly dressed, while others are wearing slippers or sneakers and bathrobes. They are all somehow subdued and thoughtful.

In the reports and documents of the Ministry of Health these persons are termed "patients," but they are not ill with any particular disease. Although literally a few days before their lives were characterized by resuscitation, medicine-droppers, the stitching up of wounds, tendons, and veins. They were on the brink of death and striving to reach it.

The cozy, tastefully furnished living-room where I saw all these persons is located in the crisis station of the All-Union Scientific-and-Practical Center for Prevention of Extreme Conditions. To put it more simply—suicides. All the sad people here are suicidal; they have all attempted to commit suicide or have strong tendencies in that direction.

The soul of each of them has its own pain—a burning pain which does not leave for one moment. But the situations which led them to such an impasse are diverse and varied.

One woman was home, and her child drowned in the bathtub, while she herself was talking on the telephone with her girlfriend.

A young actress was depressed and crushed by her lack of creative successes. She suddenly decided that she had no talent and had nothing to live for.

Each person has his or her own grief. But they are united by one common factor—these people do not want to live. But they are here in order to learn how to live anew by overcoming their pain.

Since 1924 the statistics on suicides in the USSR has been a closed matter. In our "justly" constructed society, naturally, there could be no place for such a phenomenon as suicide. It was only in 1989 that "moral" statistics were published, and there much to be amazed at.

The State Committee on Statistics reported the following: in 1975 some 6,000 suicides were committed. In 1984 this figure was 81,000. That amounts to 30 persons per 100,000 people. For 50 years in a row our country has been reading about suicides in France, people jumping off of the Eiffel Tower, and inhabitants of the FRG who "prefer" a noose or poison to life in a society of flourishing business.

The level of deaths from suicide in Great Britain, for example, amounts to 9 per 100,000 people, in the United States the figure is 12, the FRG—21, France—22, and in the USSR—30. Thirty!

For a long time it was acceptable to consider that the only persons capable of attempting suicide were either psychologically abnormal or weak-willed. Strong, spiritually rich persons find reserves of will within themselves and.... Nothing of the kind. Among suicides most persons are mentally healthy.

Every year in the world more than 500,000-600,000 persons take their own lives. That is the population of an

entire city! But the number of those persons who attempt suicide is greater by a factor of 5-10.

According to the data of sociological studies, the growth in the number of suicides in our country occurred during the years of stagnation, the peak year being 1984. Some 41-60 percent of suicides are workers. Office employees and specialists comprise 10-19 percent. The mortality rate of men from suicide is quadruple that of women.

A statistical compilation reports that "the high level of mortality from suicide is conditioned, to a considerable extent, by the spread of alcoholism." In fact, during the year when the well-known "Directive" appeared, the monstrous figures began to decline somewhat. Although the percentage of suicides among drunkards varies from 12 to 20. From 1984 through 1987 there were 27,000 fewer suicides, thus amounting to a 37-percent decrease. Nowadays the curve is creeping upwards again.

But despite the epoch of glasnost, there are topics about which the State Committee on Statistics does not report anything. Neither pedagogues, nor sociologists, nor physicians like to talk about this. It is a topic which is too dreadful: children's suicides.

Yelena Moiseyevna Vrono, candidate of medical sciences and senior scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific-Methodological Suicide Center, is one of the few scientists who knows virtually everything about this problem.

Yelena Moiseyevna, together with the center's other physicians, finds her patients in the resuscitation unit of the Children's Hospital imeni Filatov.

"A child is endowed by nature with a good, even temperament, optimism, and an inclination to live. He is interested in everything new, a lively imagination allows him not to notice the unpleasant aspects of everyday life; even poverty does not bother him. Therefore, it cannot be said that children's suicides, i.e., suicides committed by children prior to reaching the age of 12, are a frequent phenomenon. Nevertheless, science knows cases of suicide by six- and seven-year-old children," Ye. Vrono says.

Last year in Moscow approximately 400 attempts at suicide were made by children. Just what kinds of griefs and troubles lead children to a desire to escape from life?

"If you receive another grade of 'Two' today, your Papa and I have firmly decided to hand you over to a children's home!" Such was the promise made for "educational reasons" by a Mama, as she saw her second-grader son off to school.

In the very first lesson the dreaded "Two" was again precisely entered in his schoolbook in red ink. Eight-year-old Vova was convinced that this time his parents would carry out their promise. Upon arriving home, he did not show his schoolbook but went straight to his room. Choking back his sobs of grief, he made a noose

from a rope. Without thinking, he put it around his neck and tied the other end to a battery or a radiator.

He never thought that it would be so painful to die; and so he could not stand it and cried out. The resuscitation brigade managed to save the child's life.

That's the kind of story we hear.

It turns out that children have an extremely confused or vague idea about death. In trying to guard the child's psyche, parents almost never speak seriously with them about this topic. The death of persons close to a child—grandmothers and grandfathers, for example—the parents explain to the tiny tot that such persons have simply gone away, have left for a long period of time. Therefore, it is very difficult for children to believe that death is an ending, rather than some sort of other existence from which it is possible to return.

As a rule, children are incapable of predicting their own actions. Therefore, in deciding upon suicide, many of them are convinced that they will observe the scene of their own funerals, the despair and distraction of their close relatives, i.e., those at whom, as a rule, the suicide is directed. And, furthermore, the "offenders" will understand that they were wrong, and a new, remarkable, conflict-free life will begin.

Children, more often than teenagers or adults, have recourse to the most difficult, crippling, or maiming types of suicide: hanging or jumping from a great height.

With her eyes downcast and her lips pressed closely together, the little girl named Ira is sitting on a chair. She is 14 years old. She has become bitter against the whole world and does not want to talk to anyone.

Yelena Moiseyevna remains silent along with her. Then, as if nothing at all were the matter, she begins telling her a story from her own schooldays... She never asks the girl any questions.

Standing on the other side of the door are Ira's parents. On the first occasion the physician Vrono herself invited them to come in for a talk. They refused, considering a meeting with a psychotherapist to be even insulting to themselves, saying: "We'll sort things out by ourselves. This is an internal, family matter." That was a year and a half ago. But nowadays they come here of their own volition, distraught and frightened.

There is no sense in recounting the import of the conversations between the physician and the girl or her parents. They are complicated, lengthy, and could scarcely mean anything except to those directly involved. Every case has its own plot, details, and circumstances. Only the story itself is instructive.

It turned out that Ira had decided to commit suicide for a second time. This time too resuscitation miraculously saved her from the most serious consequences of poisoning by an overdose of medicine.

When Ira was 7 years old, some well-meaning grannies sitting on a bench at the entrance-way informed her that the man she thought of as her papa was not really her father but her stepfather. And then, when her mother and stepfather had a child of their own, Ira began to feel that she was not their own daughter. From that day on the girl was acutely aware of any differences between her parents' attitude toward her and toward her newly born brother, who became the family idol. Every day she was convinced that her parents did not need her. And, in fact, this was the case. The daughter was "getting in the way."

The adult members of this family did not possess much in the way of delicacy or tact. The girl suffered a great deal. But what could she use in opposition to this injustice? Aggression, crude behavior, shouting, mischievous tricks. Because, after all, a child is dependent upon its elders. The irritation of the parents grew larger like a snowball: "We're doing everything, but she's as ungrateful as a pig." The child was branded as "difficult." The school was unable or did not want to get involved enough to analyze a complicated, family conflict. It was an almost insignificant fact which served as the "trigger" for the first attempt at suicide.

A schoolteacher lost 10 rubles from her handbag. Suspicion fell upon Ira among several other children. There followed an insulting examination in the director's office. Then the parents were called to the school. And then the people close at hand, not knowing what the matter was about, began to remind the daughter about all her "transgressions" in succession....

The parents refused the help of psychotherapists the first time, and, therefore, this dreadful incident was not a lesson for them. The second time, in the opinion, the reason for the attempt at suicide was again a trifling matter.

Ira's mother, upon arriving at the school in connection with something relating to her son, glanced into Irina's classroom journal. There was a mark there indicating that classes had been missed, even though the daughter had left for school in the morning. Shouts of "deceit" resounded at home, together with the entire "arsenal" of "methods" of upbringing. But again Ira did not "confess" her guilt....

Yelena Moiseyevna explained the unexpected details of this matter. It turned out that the schoolteacher had simply "made a mistake," in marking the absence by another pupil on the graph opposite Ira's last name. A feeling of insult, of an unjust attitude toward her, overwhelmed the girl. She chose the most dreadful means to escape from this.

But, of course, the teenage psyche is capable of being wounded by improbable matters; the mood varies from hour to hour; and the evaluation of his own individual personality is unstable. A teenager is capable of experiencing completely adult feelings: love, dissatisfaction with himself, and, at the same time, he is so dependent

upon adults that he must ask his parents for a few kopecks to buy some ice cream or to go to a movie.

"Many adults know that teenagers are inclined to suicide, but they consider that these attempts are not serious and that they resemble blackmail instead. They supposedly have a single goal: to frighten the persons around them so as to gain something personally for themselves. But this is not the case," the physicians warn.

Suicide ranks third on the list of causes of death among teenagers. First is tuberculosis, and second is accidents.

There are approximately 80,000 teenagers living in Moscow. During a year's time in the capital they make about 2,000 attempts at suicide. Two percent of them end in fatal results.

A 15-year-old girl drank an enormous quantity of a chemical medication after the "math teacher" refused to permit her to skip a class in order to participate in a ski meet. As a result, this sports school's all-star team lost.

This girl left a note filled with accusations against the schoolteacher, who, it must be said, really did have a despotic nature. The children were not fond of her.

In talking with the physicians who returned this ninth-grader to life she continued to insist on her point of view: "Yes, my life would be worth having Anna Petrovna dismissed from the school. She is cruel and cold. And then our class would stop suffering."

This is a typically teenage kind of logic, which is, so to speak, a discharge of accumulated tension. From an adult point of view, all this is nonsense when compared with the value of a life. But for a teenager this is an invalid argument.

The awareness of life's value has not yet evolved. Hence the passion for risk, aggression, and hatred, often directed against themselves.

There is even a term: typically teenage killing. It is characterized in brief as an emerging desire to depart from life in order to escape from a burdensome or onerous situation, to "extinguish" a conflict, and to revenge oneself upon "offenders."

"Moreover, this striving toward death is not long-lasting. A teenager is 'set right' by a serious illness or a mutilation, i.e., that situation in which he will be pitied, cared for, and forgiven," states Yelena Moiseyevna by way of clarification.

Every year the countries of Western Europe register 14,000 attempts at suicide by teenagers. Certain scientists predict an increase in the suicidal acts among juveniles by 85 percent by the year 2000!

In recent decades it has been noted that the increase in the number of teenage suicides coincides with the growth

of drug addiction, toxic-substance abuse, and the misuse of medicines among young people.

In our country physicians have noted not only an increase in drug addiction but also a sharply younger composition of its victims. Last year, against the background of social inventions, the USSR witnessed the creation of the Society for Saving Children from Drug Addiction and Toxic-Substance Abuse. Drug addicts 10-12 years old can be counted in the thousands. But the parents do not understand until the last moment what is happening with their child.

Physicians term such behavior by teenagers and children as auto-destructive, i.e., self-destructive. It is the equivalent of a suicide of the spirit and the body, slow, day-by-day, and subconscious.

Professor Ayna Grigoryevna Ambrumova, director of a suicide-studies center and a doctor of medical sciences, has made a scientific study specially devoted to this topic. And she came to the following conclusion: the self-destructive behavior of teenagers proceeds from a lack of spirituality, that they have nobody to trust, nobody to try to equal, as well as from an upbringing deprived of an individual approach to the personality, one which devalues this individuality, and the uniqueness of a human life. It also derives from the mercantilism which has engulfed us, the thirst for pleasures at any prices.

Not so long ago a child was brought into the resuscitation unit in a state of unconsciousness. He looked weird. His head was wrapped in rags soaked in gasoline with a polyethylene on top. The toxic action of the gasoline had brought about suffocation, and the child died.

"They killed him? Who? Why?," his mother thrashed about hysterically. She did not want to believe either the resuscitation people or the psychotherapists, who had immediately understood that the boy had been a toxic-substance abuser. And he had done all this with his own hands, for a "high".

Ambrumova notes one more dreadful and frightening trait: the tendency towards "self-destruction" very simply makes a transition to aggression, vandalism, an unthinkable, so to speak, inexplicable cruelty on the part of teenagers towards others. She sees a close tie between unconscious suicide (auto-destructive behavior) and teenage crime.

These are the kinds of complicated problems which engage the modest-size collective of the suicide-studies center.

At the beginning of the 1970's bureaucrats from the field of medicine did not even wish to listen to people saying that such things can and should be studied and by physicians. Just imagine what kinds of accusations were cast against Ambrumova, who had resolved to create a suicide-prevention service. She was told that she was pushing a dirty, bourgeois ideology into our bright,

shining world. When the center was founded, notwithstanding, too few people knew about it for a long time.

Many persons need "outside help." And so the "Telephone of Trust" appeared. It was also called a "bourgeois invention." But this service gained rapid and firm popularity. At any hour of the day or night you can call the Moscow telephone number 205-05-50 and hear the voice of a person who will help you to figure out what is happening to you and will give advice as how to proceed.

The Telephone of Trust has 10 lines at the same time. And yet it is difficult to get through. There are as many as 500 calls a day, and the conversations sometimes last up to an hour or even two hours.

Moscow has 20 anonymous offices for social and psychological help. Any person with any problem can also go to these offices with any problem. At 15 Park Street there is such an office for teenagers. If it were not on the outskirts but rather in the center of the city, its staff members would not be able to cope with the workload.

Ayna Grigoryevna founded another crisis station with 30 beds. Now it is being doubled. This station has no staff people in "white coats" nor any "patients." There are persons in a state of spiritual crisis and those who can help them.

There is probably nobody to whom the thought of voluntarily ending his one life has not occurred at least once, at least for an instant. Each person needs an individual, personal psychotherapist. We do not know how to calm people down, not to undergo nonsense, or not to lose confidence in themselves. In this sense, the patients at the center treat themselves. The specialists teach them this.

Analogous services have been set up in Leningrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Minsk, Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn. But many persons find out that such services exist in these cities only when they come to the capital for help. There is virtually nowhere to obtain information about psychological-aid services. It's as if advertising such a service is like praise for a funeral bureau. People are afraid of the word "psychotherapist." It seems to everyone that all you have to do is drop in to see one, and the label of "psycho" would be attached to you forever. From the register in the health center it would not be removed during your lifetime, and your entire career would begin to go downhill.

This service conceals nothing like that, and so it is providing genuine benefits.

Nevertheless, social and psychological help in our country is worn out and poor. Insinuating cooperative operators have already sensed a vein of gold here and are "helping" people everywhere. There are just no funds—repeat, no funds—to expand the state services in each large city. But can we really put a price-tag on saving a human life?

New Legislation for Psychiatric Care Discussed

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30 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by N. Safronova: "Is the Iceberg Melting?: A Law Is Being Created Regarding Psychiatric Help; It Is Supposed To Ensure Legal Protection for Patients and the Presumption of Every Citizen's Mental Health"]

[Text] Shakin telephoned in the evening and told me the following information:

"Thank God, the diagnosis has been crossed off the register!"

Thus the multi-year epic of Rostislav Shakin came to an end a few days ago.

...Quite a bit has been written and said in recent times about the unfavorable situation in psychiatry. In my opinion, nevertheless, glasnost has still just barely touched this delicate sphere. As was the case previously, a serious analysis of the state of affairs here has been made difficult by obvious forces of retardation along the path.

Through the Eyes of Experts

In front of me is the voluminous report—more than 100 pages long—of the U.S. delegation; it is entitled "An Evaluation of Recent Changes in Soviet Psychiatry." This delegation visited our country during the summer of last year. About 40 American psychiatrists, lawyers, and political scientists, headed by Robert V. Farrand, a representative of the U.S. State Department, had the opportunity of visiting several psychiatric hospitals of general and specialized types. They were also able to conduct an expert evaluation of the condition of patients compelled to be placed in juridical psychiatric institutions. Our guests had the opportunity to study the conditions under which patients are maintained, the tactics used to treat and rehabilitate them, as well as matters or problems of social and legal protection. This was not the only trip to our country by foreign specialists organized prior to the regularly scheduled Congress of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA), which was held in Athens at the end of this past year. But where are the materials which resulted from these trips? Have any practicing psychiatrists become acquainted with them?

Judging from my own many years of experience of working in the field of health care, journalists cannot yet count on such a level of glasnost concerning what goes on behind the walls of psychiatric hospitals.

By the way, a Soviet journalist was allowed to enter a specialized hospital in Leningrad only within a group of foreign guests. And then a favorable account appeared in the city newspaper as to how good things had become after this hospital had been transferred from the administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to that of the Ministry of Health. The conclusion drawn by the American delegation, however, was quite different. Despite

tolerable conditions in this hospital, "...these institutions...remind us of psychiatric prisons. The patients lack elementary rights, they are obviously subjected to the influence of certain medications in order to punish them and to make them fear retaliatory, punitive measures if they complain. The process of making the transition to a more humane system is still in its very early stages."

The Athens Congress witnessed the restoration of Soviet psychiatrists to membership in the WPA. In this forum's concluding documents our specialists acknowledged that abuses of psychiatry for non-medical purposes, in particular, for political purposes, could have taken place. Nor have the fears of our foreign colleagues been completely removed; this is confirmed by the as-yet conditional or provisional acceptance of the All-Union Psychiatrists' Society into the WPA. Another sign of the new times was the acceptance, as a fully entitled new member of the WPA, of the Soviet Independent Psychiatric Association. The latter was proclaimed to be founded in March 1989 by a group of Moscow psychiatrists and psychologists, who elected Yu. Savenko as president of this association. At the same time an analogous structure emerged in Leningrad under the leadership of Yu. Popov. These "sprouts" of the new times did not evoke enthusiasm among those persons who exercise the leadership of our psychiatry.

But What Kind of Theory?

The very dispute over the topic as to whether there were abuses of psychiatry already seems to be merely academic. There were such abuses, nor could it be otherwise in a totalitarian society. Since it was imposed by force, totalitarianism permitted any form of dissident thinking to be relegated to the sphere of psychiatric competency.

The history of the illness of a former patient, General P.G. Grigorenko, has been quietly lying in the archives of the Scientific Research Institute of General and Juridical Psychiatry imeni V.P. Serbskiy. Grigorenko was a talented military leader, who demanded immediately after the 20th Party Congress that those persons guilty of mass repressions and the unjustified losses at the beginning of the war be brought to justice. But who was he to demand this? It "suddenly" turned out that he was mentally ill.... But physicians in Tashkent, and then in Moscow (the late Professor D. Fedotov), as well as their colleagues in Leningrad, refused to declare the general mentally ill. Nevertheless, the doctors from the Institute imeni Serbskiy took the matter higher up. The signature of A. Snezhnevskiy, academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences was affixed to their diagnosis. There followed years of enforced treatment; in fact, the general was kept in a special section of the institute....

Force engenders counter-force. Based on a copy of the history of the general's disease, a young Kievan psychiatrist issued an opposing expert opinion which refuted the previous diagnosis. His materials became known to world public opinion. Specialists remarked on the high degree of competence possessed by this expert. Recently,

G. Morozov, director of the Institute imeni Serbskiy, canceled a showing of an American film dealing with the Grigorenko "case"—why stir up such an old matter? And then, in 1972, Semyon Gruzman, the author of the expert opinion, received a sentence of 10 years in a camp and exile after being charged with anti-Soviet agitation.

There were also other analogous "histories of diseases." But it turns out that the victims did not suffer in vain. Last year nothing happened during the court trial of the Sverdlovsk citizen Sergey Kuznetsov when S. Mamayev, the judge conducting this trial, demanded a psychiatric expert of the accused, who had "insulted staff members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs." During the trial and after the sentence was pronounced (three years of prison), S. Kuznetsov carried on a hunger strike for many days. Neither the Sverdlovsk psychiatrists nor the Institute imeni Serbskiy declared the accused to be mentally ill. This case was reviewed thanks to the intervention of public opinion, the people's deputies, and the workers of Sverdlovsk. And, thank God, this time the psychiatrists turned out to be up to their lofty calling.

And so the upper, visible part of the iceberg has basically melted. But, as everyone knows, an iceberg has a hidden part.

The society's ethics are changing, and its laws are changing. But medicine yields more slowly to changes. In psychiatry, for example, there still remain the theoretical foundations which allow it to be utilized at certain times for non-medical purposes. The main one is the concept of the so-called "creeping schizophrenia," as put forth by A. Snezhnevskiy. It is a disease without any clinical manifestations described in psychiatry. There is "no such thing." But there is a diagnosis—a diagnosis which entails a train of social, legal, and other restrictions, as well as a moral infringement. It permits a person to be hospitalized (if someone requires this); a treatment may be prescribed without the patient's consent, and it may be continued indefinitely.

There is an opinion among certain physicians that this concept did not emerge to the benefit of the social command. Possibly they are right. The creation of an extensive classification of the forms of schizophrenia in and by itself required a diagnostic art and attention to the most minute or subtle symptoms. But eroding the criteria permitted an unlimited expansion in the sphere of applying the diagnosis. And the psychiatrists could not help but understand the social consequences of this. They should have been the first to foresee such consequences and warn against them.

How does all this—the theoretical miscalculations and actual practice—affect specific persons? If we take into account the catastrophic situation with regard to the material base of psychiatric hospitals (former monasteries, barracks, age-old structures without the elementary facilities, overcrowding—in some places two patients have to share the same bed, the more-than-modest arsenal of medications being used), they

affect them badly. Such hospitals are worse than prisons; the latter are sometimes even preferable! Up to now, according to the data of foreign experts, the use of sulfazin has not yet been abandoned everywhere. Here and there this medication still continues to be employed as a means of intimidation or fear, of punishing or consciously suppressing a non-conformist type of individual. It causes a high temperature, terrible pain in the place where injected—an artificially created disease, tormenting, and demeaning to human dignity. There are known instances of sulfazin being injected into children....

In many countries psychiatric and psychotherapeutic help is rendered on the family level. Family members often have recourse to the help of their own "spiritual" doctor in solving many problems. In our country we do not yet have such a possibility; not for many years will we be able to consult a "domestic therapist." But, if there are to be also "domestic" psychiatrists in the future, they will have to overcome the fear of contacts with such physicians, a fear which, alas, has become rooted in our consciousness. A. Karpov, the chief psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health, has advised against removing certain patients from the psychiatrists' registers. He says that they have gotten accustomed to each other. This advice, in my opinion, is hypocritical—people are rather afraid of a psychiatrist, and, unfortunately, this fear is explainable or even justified. Also understandable is the hulla-balloo about television "healers," the flourishing of quackery, and the excesses of self-treatment.

"Correspondence Is Unfeasible"

Linked with certain genuine deformations in the public consciousness and with the dehumanization of society, which we are now attempting to declare war on, is yet another aspect of possible abuses by psychiatry. Far from politics but abuses nonetheless. The goodwill and high favor of the crowd towards thinkgs which are age-old in Russia have disappeared among irritated, pushed-and-pulled, disturbed persons as represented by most of our crowd. The simplest things have sometimes been written about: an energetic granddaughter needed her grandmother's apartment. The psychiatrists could advise her from their practice, and she could attempt with their help to drive not only the grandmother (wife or husband) from the "game," but also a neighbor, opponent, rival, or simply a person with a "bad expression on his face." The report mentioned above cites instances which astounded the American experts: "Persons who had never previously been hospitalized or investigated were placed on the register by psychiatrists without their knowledge upon the insistence of the administrations of the institutions where they worked."

For several years we have been corresponding with a certain rural physician. Let me call him P so as not to complicate his life. He used to work as a surgeon in a military garrison. Without waiting for the times of glasnost, he came out against certain antiquated methods and hung out some dirty linen, so to speak. He wrote to

Moscow. The guilty persons were brought to justice, whereas the doctor was subjected to an expert psychiatric examination. The diagnosis was not too severe, but he was discharged from the army. The legend of a "mania for idle snooping" also followed this doctor to the rural hospital in the Non-Chernozem region to which he moved. It operated without fail. It will operate that way (of course, "upon demand" or "when required") not only by the diagnosis but sometimes merely by the fact of being hospitalized once in a psychiatric hospital. Is he critical? Does he complain? And correspondence with him would be "unfeasible." How much information of this kind has been distributed and still is being distributed by the health-care organs with regard to persons with psychiatric anamnesis, which makes them at times persons without any juridical rights. This is done, moreover, in violation of the oath of physician's confidentiality. Another blow to the condition or status of our public morality.

In January 1988 a Directive of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, as is known, provided for the adoption of a Statute on the conditions and procedure for rendering psychiatric help. There immediately followed a series of interviews and discussions, wherein the leading officials of psychiatry called upon society to have a more humane attitude toward the mentally ill. Expansion of their rights is the fundamental concept of this statute. But within a year the competent lawyers B. Protchenko and A. Rudyakov sounded an alarm in the main party journal *KOMMUNIST*. In an extremely sharp article with the eloquent title "A Painful Topic" they stated that the statute was still not working in fact. Many of its paragraphs are declarative in their nature and are unsupported by any organizational, legal, or social measures. The article provides an analysis of the causes and outlines the ways to alter the vicious practice of violating the rights of mentally ill persons. It is characteristic that the alarm was sounded by lawyers rather than physicians. One of the lawyer-authors is Aleksandr Iosifovich Rudyakov, who has created his own unique kind of OTK [Division of Technical Control] in conjunction with the chief psychiatrist of Moscow Oblast. For more than 40 years Rudyakov has headed up this unique institution—the country's only branch of a legal consultation office in conjunction with the chief psychiatrist of Moscow Oblast. Persons from all ends of the country come here. This creates an almost unbearable load for the chief (he is already 80 years old and still has no receptionist). Patients, relatives, medical personnel, lawyers, staff members of Soviets, and even policemen come here. The train of the sometimes so lightly given diagnosis is often too long and tragic. And the defects in the work of psychiatrists and juridical instances, as well as the deficit in humaneness, from which patients and healthy people suffer, are represented here in the form of crippled human fates. There are many of them, even if we judge by Rudyakov's card file alone....

Rostislav Ivanovich Shakin, the miner from Donetsk about whom we wrote at the very beginning of this

article, is one of those persons who wanted to remove a false diagnosis from the register. This is now permitted by the 1988 statute. The story of this stubborn man could become the topic of a separate article. Two decades ago he began to struggle for truth and justice, and he spoke openly about poor procedures at the mine. He immediately was diagnosed and fired. Shakin sought truth and justice in Moscow. But...he wound up in that sepecial section of the police department where they put truth-lovers and persons who have been diagnosed. In April of last year Shakin turned for help to the Independent Psychiatric Association, the one which has been admitted into the WPA (this clarification is necessary because other such organizations have also appeared). Three of the association's experts, including its president, Yu. Savenko, issued the following conclusion: R.I. Shakin is mentally healthy. New peregrinations began—from one "high" office to another. The matter dragged on for an entire year. Persons joining in this effort included the secretary of the AUCCTU, an important staff member of the MID [International Documentation Institute] [?], not to mention people of various ranks from the field of medicine. It was only thus, through the efforts of intermediaries that a precedent evolved for establishing workers' relations by official and independent psychiatry. And finally it did evolve: in early March of this year Rostislav Ivanovich underwent yet another expert examination—a joint one with the participation of physicians named by himself. It also pronounced him to be healthy. Now it is already official. And this man bears on his shoulders several years of staying in psychiatric hospitals, of "treatments" by haldol [seranace], sulfazin, and neuroleptics in enormous doses.

The 1988 statute was adopted in too much of a hurry, on the threshold of the Athens Congress. And the fact that nowadays it is not working for people's benefit or well-being is likewise on the conscience of the leading officials in psychiatry. As a result, work is now being done again on creating a law regarding psychiatric help, a law which would replace the departmental instructions, eliminate amateur-type self-treatment, furnish legal guarantees to protect the mentally ill, and not just them. It has been proposed that such a law be submitted for nationwide discussion, and this is perfectly reasonable. But meanwhile there are still persons living among us with incorrect diagnoses on their records; and such people do not always know their own rights.

Officials Concerned Over Public Health Issues in Turkmen SSR

90US0867A Ashkhabad *TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA* in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with USSR Health Ministry Specialists G.G. Olshanskiy, G.M. Osadchiy and K.A. Martynov by L. Aleksandrova: "The Concern Remains"]

[Text] Our newspaper has already introduced the special visiting physicians of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin and Chief Specialists of the USSR Ministry of

Health G.G. Olshanskiy, G.M. Osadchiy and K.A. Martynov. They have been working for a second year in Turkmenia. Their basic mission is to help local public health in reducing the level of maternal and infant mortality. Our correspondent L. Aleksandrova has asked the chief specialists what they succeeded in doing in 1989. We are quoting the text of this conversation.

[Aleksandrova] Judging from how you have designated our conversation, there is concern and dissatisfaction. What has caused this?

[Specialists] We will say directly that the results for now are completely to our disliking. Note the indicators of infant mortality in 1989 (in comparison with 1988) in the Central Asian Republics. In Uzbekistan last year this declined by 11.7 percent, in Tajikistan by 11.2 percent and in Kirghizia by 11.2 percent. The indicator of infant mortality for the nation is the lowest over the entire history of the Soviet state with 22 per thousand. Alas, Turkmenia is for now an exception, and a lamentable one, in this list, as here infant mortality is 1.8 percent higher (again, in comparison with 1988). This rose basically due to the increased number of cases in the areas of the Ashkhabad zone and the city of Ashkhabad as well as maternal mortality.

[Aleksandrova] Possibly, although I have heard on this score the opinion that the level of mortality has risen—in statistical terms—due to the better organizing of accounting. Certainly it is no secret now that in previous years there were numerous instances of concealing mortality....

[Specialists] Yes, the accounting has become more reliable. But this fact is not grounds for not being concerned.

[Aleksandrova] Concern is simply the area of emotions as you well understand. There are also factors as a consequence of which the republic for now is moving ahead less slowly in solving the given problem than we would want and as is needed.

[Specialists] In performing our duties we in no manner are obviating the objective factors. They are rather well known, including the residual principle of investments into public health development. And not only for the republic but also for the nation. For this reason, here in Turkmenistan we have been basically concerned with the medical aspect of the problem. And we have discovered reserves which cannot be considered concealed as they lie on the surface. But simply not to notice them has become, unfortunately, something of a rule of good tone. We are not inclined to take a serious attitude toward such appeals as give us pure drinking water, a sufficient amount of linen or the diet and the acuteness of the problems of infantile mortality will be eliminated. The situation cannot be changed for the better using such slogans. It is essential to raise the level of the infant and maternity service. During the period of our work as visiting physicians we have repeatedly encountered both misunderstanding, indifference and a lack of good conscience. To this we must add the low qualification of the

medical personnel, particularly the primary level in rural public health and the disinterest in the results of their labor. Yes, we have been accused of hurry and sharpness in our judgments and views. That is possible. But we feel that scientists have the right to expect more distant results while practical medicine should have results every day. A delay does not lead to anything good.

[Aleksandrova] All the same, on the black field there possibly are some bright spots?

[Specialists] The republic government and the Turkmen CP Central Committee has made a great effort in solving the social problem being discussed by us. We realize that the situation has been so neglected that it is going to take more than a year to eliminate the trouble spots. But it would be difficult to expect positive results if there was not help and active help from the soviets, the party committees and the public health bodies on the spot. And it is this support which we often have not felt. But little by little the positive is making headway.

Last year, we were supported by the republic Council of Ministers in carrying out a campaign for the early detection and treatment of children with acute intestinal illnesses during the 3 hottest months of the summer and which are most dangerous in epidemic terms. And the result has been that in Chardzhou Oblast over this period 115 fewer children died from intestinal infections than in 1988. There are positive shifts in certain other rayons, basically where the medical aktiv has worked conscientiously and where the soviets and party bodies have shown involvement.

During the summer of this year, we intend to repeat the campaign, considering the mistakes of last year.

[Aleksandrova] Our newspaper has already announced the economic experiment in Murgabskiy Rayon. If it is possible, could you give us more details on its essence and results.

[Specialists] The experiment is linked to differentiated wages for the workers of the childhood and maternity service in terms of the end result. The decision to carry it out was incorporated in the all-republic plan approved by the Turkmen CP Central Committee and the Republic Council of Ministers for 1989-1991. Your newspaper has written that in Murgabskiy Rayon a particularly bad situation has arisen with infantile and maternal mortality. We have decided to commence the experiment precisely in this rayon.

Its essence is that for good work, that is, for carrying out specially elaborated criteria, the workers of the childhood and maternity service—from the district nurse to the chief physician of a central rayon hospital, each month can receive an additional payment equal to approximately the salary. What sort of criteria are these: the absence of instances of infant mortality at home (for the district network), a reduction in infant mortality in

the inpatient facilities and so forth. The republic government has allocated 150,000 rubles for 1990 for additional payments for salaries. It cannot be said that the matter has moved forward without problems and hitches. This is the first time such an experiment has been carried out either in the republic or in the nation. But the increased interest of the medical workers in the end result is obvious. The attitude toward the question is one-half the success.

[Aleksandrova] In the event of success in the experiment, is it possible for the acquired experience to hope for extensive introduction?

[Specialists] Why else was it started? But both you and we realize that all of this involves additional support from the republic budget. At what amount can one assess the health of people? I assume that in time these investments will be repaid in the health and life of our children.

[Aleksandrova] Public health is for man, and what in your opinion is essential now in republic public health?

[Specialists] First of all, it is essential to be seriously concerned with the training of medical personnel. That is, it should be better and of higher quality. At present, the main problem is the skill level. Everyone must study: from the specialists, the leaders of the republic level, down to the district nurses. The system needs a permanently operating system for the advanced training of medical personnel. We have turned to the Turkmen Ministry of Health and the republic government with specific proposals on this question. There are possibilities in the form of the corresponding chairs of the Turkmen State Medical Institute and the Scientific Research Institute for the Protection of Maternal and Child Health.

A very great deal can be done by the republic Supreme Soviet and by the local soviets. In particular the forms for financing medical development must be revised as they should be focused not on the number of beds and visits but on real indicators such as per inhabitant, per child, per birth and so forth. It is essential to turn over routine public health matters to the oblast and rayon soviets, while the republic Ministry of Health should be left in charge of carrying out the main republic programs such as education, the development of science, the activities of the republic procedural and organizational centers, and supervision and control over the work of the health bodies. In our view, considering the financial and foreign exchange difficulties of the republic, it is possible to wait a bit in the acquiring of consumer goods. The basic amount of foreign exchange income should go to health needs.

We feel that there should be complete independence for the sanitation-epidemiological service and it should be subordinate solely to the republic Supreme Soviet. And most importantly, all these questions can be settled independently without asking permission from the central bodies.

Writers Group 'Aprel' Reviews Year's Work

90UNI619A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 18 Apr 90 p 7

[Article by T. Rasskazova: "Political Questions Once Again"]

[Text] Yes, it was politics that turned out to be the primary focus of attention at the report-election meeting of the Aprel (April) Movement. Whether that it is good or bad is not the question. Today, it is clearly impossible to debate only creative and publishing subjects when the country is in the middle of a struggle for radical democratic changes. Everyone has become politicized: a recent example of this was the report-election meeting of the Leningrad writers (see the last issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA). The 6th plenum of the RSFSR Union of Writers also focussed on politics. The difference is in the orientation and emphasis.

What is it that is worrying writers? The probability of a new attempt by conservative forces to steer domestic politics to the right; the problem of self-determination for Lithuania; the appalling situation of refugees and the struggle of the party apparatus for the power which is slipping out of its hands both at the center and in outlying areas. These were the subjects of many speeches.

The agenda for the meeting included a report on work completed, a conversation about the future of the movement, the election of the new Aprel Council and of delegates to the First All-Union Constituent Congress of the Association.

Despite the fact that one of the four issues on the agenda immediately "fell away" (there were no elections to the All-Union Constituent Congress of the Aprel Association: all Moscow members of Aprel—with no exceptions—will become delegates), the meeting lasted approximately eight hours! And although the first secretary of the Moscow Writers Organization, Al. Mikhaylov, refused to sign the estimate for the forthcoming congress because he thinks the Association is political and not literary in nature, the congress, nonetheless, will be held on 28-29 April.

Aprel is a year old. The co-chairmen, A. Pristavkin and A. Zlobin, talked about which of the things planned a year ago had been achieved. However, the Aprel members were far from euphoria. I. Gerasimov: "The Aprel Council did not deal with the things it should have. People have come to us for protection against the arbitrary rule of the Union of Writers and publishing houses. And whom have we helped?" A. Revich: "The organization did not function as a mass one."

The problem of publications disturbs everyone acutely. At present it is being resolved this way. The "Pik" Publishing House was established under the aegis of the USSR Union of United Cooperatives. Academician Tikhonov, who heads the Union, is convinced that it should publish no fewer than 100 books a year. In

addition, "Aprel" wants to create a joint-stock publishing house, as well as children's, satirical and illustrated magazines. The participants at the meeting received a number of proposals from A. Glezer, publisher of the literary magazine STRELETS and the weekly RUSSKIY KURYER.

I would like to say a few words about the dramatic situation which developed at the time of the elections for the new Aprel Council. During the nomination process a well-known poet refused to let his name be put forward. The reason was his unwillingness to work "in tandem" with a prose writer who in the past had participated in a campaign to exclude his comrades from the Union of Writers for political reasons. (I do not name names on purpose: our society has a lot of work to do in resolving the very complex moral problems of people's willingness and ability to repent and to forgive sins). The prose writer, who also refused to let his name stand, recognized the correctness of the accusations against him. The meeting judged the sincerity of his statement and voted for leaving his name on the ballot (and as a result he was elected). The poet has not changed his decision...

At the end of the meeting the speech by A. Bestavashvili on the absolutely disastrous situation of the refugees in Moscow, who are practically without legal rights, sounded a tragic note. The meeting's resolution included a demand that Aprel members who are deputies be commissioned to do everything possible to force the Supreme Soviet to adopt an emergency law on refugees.

The resolution also stated that the most important task of the movement was to defend the creative rights of the writer. It proposes that the struggle against publishing monopolies be conducted through the creation of non-state publishing houses, that Aprel's recommendation be made decisive for the acceptance committee of the Moscow Writers Organization, and that the question of the unhappy state of MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR's editorial office be examined (according to Vad. Sokolov, six members of the editorial board have left recently for reasons of principle). It also proposes that public apologies be made to L.K. Chukovskaya, whose membership in the Union of Writers was recently restored.

At the meeting (another political issue!) the text of an appeal to M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was adopted. The Aprel members think that the "Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the Country's Communists" will not contribute to party unity and democratization.

'Aprel' Addresses Deputies on Refugee Issue

90UN1619B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 18 Apr 90 p 7

[Letter from the Organizing Committee of the Public-Literary Movement Aprel (Writers in Support of Perestroika): "Put the Principles of Humanity and

Humanism into Action! An Open Letter from Aprel Writers to the Deputies of the Moscow Soviet and the Moscow Oblast Soviet"]

[Text] Respected Comrade Deputies!

In the avalanche of matters which have descended on you, one of the most urgent and difficult will be to resolve the problem of refugees. As officials stated at a press conference in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, today there are about 47,000 forced migrants in Moscow and its environs. "Moscow has become a refugee camp!"

The 7 April resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers makes it mandatory for the ministries and agencies to urgently find for all refugees jobs with "permanent or temporary housing (but not in the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast) in order to ensure that sanatoria and other health and recreational facilities temporarily occupied by these citizens are vacated by 15 May 1990..." Just imagine, if the USSR and RSFSR state labor committees have been able to find jobs with housing for a total of only 2,000 refugees since January (that is, over a period of three months), is it feasible that within the remaining three weeks the fate of all the rest can be resolved? That means that "aid" amounts simply to exiling them from Moscow. To nowhere.

We understand that in the summer these rest and recreation facilities are needed for Muscovites themselves. But after all, there are only 5,000 refugees living in them; another 2,000 are in hotels, and the rest have found accommodation wherever they could. However, it is clear that zealous officials will hurry "to evict" all of them together. And we fear that instead of intelligent decisions on their futures (each one needs to be resolved individually!) there will be another forced resettlement of these already-destitute people of various nationalities.

Only a law on the status of refugees can protect their rights. At a meeting of Aprel we commissioned our writers who are USSR people's deputies to present to the Supreme Soviet a petition concerning the immediate adoption of such a law (the country already has 600,000 refugees!). We appeal to you to show concern not for the future but rather for the present of these unhappy fellow citizens of ours. They are waiting for one thing in Moscow—justice, and so far it is not in sight.

We are particularly concerned about the fate of veterans, invalids, single mothers and minor children; the government resolution contains not a single word about them. And we are already receiving alarming reports about mothers and newborns as well as seriously ill patients who are being discharged from hospital too early. They are literally on the street! Aside from socially-active volunteers, no one knows how many such people there are in the capital's hospitals and where they go after discharge. Aprel's organizing committee has decided to establish a representative writers' committee to work out urgent recommendations to save those most in need. But without support from the authorities any charity is useless.

We hope that the new Moscow City Soviet, which won in the elections under the slogan of humane politics, will find extraordinary measures for this tragic situation, measures to ensure that the sick are hospitalized, that invalids are given shelter and suitable work, that the rights of mothers with infants are guaranteed, and that the already-existing laws are enforced. However, the previous city fathers were not looking for methods permitted by law to help the refugees; they took the path of bans, pandering to the aggressively-inclined segment of the city's residents.

We expect the Moscow City Soviet deputies to understand that the despair and embitterment of the refugees, that the illnesses and possible deaths of these people who are guilty of nothing will not raise the level of life or consciousness in our city; on the contrary, they will contribute to the social and moral degradation of the population. We think that an intelligent moral policy with regard to the refugees will ensure the new deputies the support of some of the progressive forces of the community.

No, Moscow must not be turned into a refugee camp. And today the question is not how the refugees will become Muscovites but whether the Muscovites themselves will remain people, whether Moscow will be turned into a cemetery of hopes and a place in which destinies are crushed. But if refugees are persecuted in the capital, this will not bring to Moscow either honor or wealth.

Anti-Semitism of Russian Writer From Uzbekistan Deplored

90UNI604A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
29 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by V. Shapovalov: "A Southerner With a Vile Accent"; from the Plenum of the USSR Writers Union]

[Text] Once again it was not possible to get by without a scene at the regular plenum of the board of the Russian Writers Union. We could have ignored it here in Tashkent, which is so far from the Central House of Writers, if it had not been for one circumstance. This circumstance was described in PRAVDA of 25 March as follows: "When a certain poet from southern regions began to curse the 'Aprel' association and immediately became not merely sadly, but shamefully well known to the army of many millions readers of papers reporting on this plenum, I understood that although the talent of this poet would never have warranted even a hundred thousandth of such a huge printing, yet he managed to achieve fame, dubious as it may have been."

Now it should be said that the "southern region" from which the poet catapulted to his infamous fame at the Russian literary plenum is our homeland. And the fly-by-night orator was the "chairman of the section of Russian poetry of Uzbekistan," V. Leshchenko.

How did he spoil the applause?

We quote the poet-chairman as reported in IZVESTIYA of 23 March. "How long will we permit THEM to walk on our land, how long will the Zionism of the Jew poison and destroy our people? How long can we endure this? At home in Tashkent WE HAVE CRUSHED YOUR PEOPLE. Now THEY don't feel so free and easy around there. Since we have had it up to here with YOUR Zionist associations, long live Russia.."

I hope it is not too difficult to guess to whom the words we have capitalized "them," "they," "your people" refer, and who "crushed" whom in the context of "Death to Zionism!" and "spirit of Sergey Radonezhskiy hovering in the hall."

Sergey Mikhaylov, evaluating the shouts of V. Leshchenko as the curtain fell on the plenary meeting, called them a "concert" and closed the plenum with "a feeling of satisfaction that it had passed off better than the last one."

Well, the generals of the creative union are at liberty to evaluate the success of their own mass measures and the moral criteria of the tribunal of pluralism however they wish.

We, on the other hand, will speak only of the scene made by V. Leshchenko in the noble family of Russian writers. This of course can be referred to as a "concert." Only then wouldn't it have been a good idea to name its producers right away? After all they were right there in the House of Writers. But all this can also be termed a provocation. Actually the two are one and the same thing. It was a "concert of provocation..."

We can only agree with PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA's evaluation of V. Leshchenko's speech. Here they are, respectively. "Isn't this freedom to gain fame in a single instant the secret of why people have participated in recent provocations?" and, "The appearance on the rostrum of the plenum of a self-styled orator from regions far from Russia may be explained however you like, including by calling it a typical act of provocation."

Well, does anything need to be added to this?

There does.

The fact is that V. Leshchenko's speech at the plenum of Russian writers was a kind of "report" rendered to certain forces concerning the "job" they assigned V. Leshchenko to perform in our republic. Let us put it plainly, it was a "job" smacking of anti-Semitism, which the Russian intelligentsia has refused to disseminate in Russia. Failing in his provocation on a local scale, the poet blatantly exaggerated in his statement at the plenum ("We crushed your people"), obviously so as to be taken into the embraces of those who not so long ago created a "sabbath" at that same House of Writers during the meeting of the "Aprel" association.

What route did he take to this rostrum?

As early as May 1987, V. Leshchenko sent his enlightened opinion concerning Russian poetry and literary criticism in Uzbekistan to one of the central papers. He was not pleased that discussion of Russian poetry in the republic's press and at literary meetings began with names such as A. Feinberg and others. And he was upset that all these people, such as the famous critic A. Tartakovskiy, were Jews. V. Leshchenko and his gang were likewise not happy with such names as Yu. Morits and N. Demasi. These are surnames to which V. Leshchenko does not attribute to a particular ethnic group, yet which seemed "strange" to eyes blinded with hatred for "aliens." And once he had "spotted" this, V. Leshchenko informed the central paper that the internationalism of doctor of philology, P. Tartakovskiy, "can be renamed unambiguously in Soviet terms as Zionism." PRAVDA VOSTOKA got the same treatment, since it publishes poems and poetry reviews "under pressure of the cohesive unity of ends and lack of scruples in means of the literary section of Zionists." However, if this is not true and the editors of PRAVDA VOSTOKA can prove it to V. Leshchenko then, he writes, "I will be compelled to agree that this whole 'shooting match' was not created intentionally by anyone and it simply is pure coincidence that all the really talented writers of Uzbekistan writing in Russian turn out to be Jewish."

The paper to which V. Leshchenko addressed his investigation of the literary Jewish approach must be given its due—his opus with the vile anti-Semitic accent was readressed to PRAVDA VOSTOKA.

At a meeting of the editorial committee, the literary labor pains of V. Leshchenko were judged to be racist and we so informed the central paper and V. Leshchenko through its correspondent in Tashkent.

They say that two random events make a trend.

But what if everything repeats itself many times?

Let us move forward a bit more to the year 1988. On 16 November there was a meeting of the council on Russian literature of the Writers' Union of Uzbekistan. A discussion that was relatively calm and evidently significant to the writers ensued. But then this same V. Leshchenko took the floor and began to go on about the same old subject. "The book 'Zionism: The Truth and The Lies,' cites the statistic that 20 percent of those working in our literature and mass media are Jews, although Jews make up no more than 0.8 percent of the population of the country."

Of course, the hall exploded and the unambiguous speech was given the evaluation it deserved. But V. Leshchenko did not give up. He analyzed the "percentage composition" of the Russian papers of Uzbekistan, brazenly citing the names of journalists and making his own comments: "the so-called Russian P," "representative of the chosen people" so and so, someone else with the "strange surname L."

One can guess the outcome of the latest provocation of V. Leshchenko—he was called unflattering but accurate names and a large group of writers walked out of the room. How did it all end? With the timid remark of the session chairman to the effect that "I must warn V. Leshchenko that in the future he must be more careful in his statements on the ethnic issue."

And since even then there was no evaluation of his "statements on the ethnic issue," which were, in essence, the latest in a series of anti-Semitic provocations made by this Tashkent servant of Great Russian chauvinism, these remarks slid off of him like water from a goose's back. And he even more assiduously began to earn "points" with those who had ultimately brought him to the rostrum of the 7th plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union with his "report" detailing how "we have crushed them all at home."

Of course, this is a provocation and a slander of the writers of Uzbekistan. And V. Leshchenko had prepared himself assiduously to perform it. Even in the genre of poetry, to the extent his own modest creative capacity would permit. In one of the departmental newspapers he even proclaimed his poetic credo: "Let the Russian word live for as long as our world survives—let it shine through the dull cheap cloth, through the MURK OF ALIEN WORDS."

It would be difficult to think up a greater insult to any human community. After all he calls language—the major achievement of an ethnic group and the object of almost morbid pride—the "murk of alien words." And then, the representatives of the ethnic group so pathologically disliked by V. Leshchenko receive another slap in the face. "Through the murk, through the dirty little Jewish town," the "living Russian word" fights its way through to him.

If only that were the case. For the present, judging by the weak, sparse list of poetry he has published, it doesn't always manage to get through to him, and even in his piece about the Russian word he is irremediably inarticulate. Here what we have is a real deficit in talent, compensated for by vituperation on the rostrum of the House of Writers.

Evidently hoping to publish and thus to earn new "points" in his fight against "Zionism," V. Leshchenko sent us a parody. Of course, it is directed against a poet with "a certain surname" and with unbridled hatred for a talent, about which LITERATURNOYE OBOZRENIYE, alongside V. Leshchenko's parody wrote, "born in Uzbekistan, a poet with a good poetic style and mature outlook."

But, to each his own. What of the further activism of V. Leshchenko, who if he lived to be 100 would never deserve such an assessment? Well he would be capable of anything. Even lawsuits, if he could only make himself appear to be a "warrior" of that certain persuasion. He has claimed that a "representative of the Jewish nationality" working at PRAVDA VOSTOKA politically

insulted him and that is, of course, a "blatant Zionist demonstration." Also present at this event was a group of Moscow writers who had been invited for a "round table."

Here are the statements of the Moscow writers, who, by the way, are very well known. One writes, "V. Leshchenko's complaint made a strange impression on me. He was far from sober and tried to push his way into the elevator noisily and rudely, although he had not been invited to participate in the discussion. They closed the elevator door in his face, but there were no accusations made at all. What accusations he himself makes and against whom is a matter of his own self-respect. All I can say is that this accusation, in my opinion, is a far from honorable and respectable."

And here is a letter from another Moscow writer. "Throughout the time we were working, V. Leshchenko, was aching for a fight, as they say—he was very eager to provoke a scene. He, for example, interjected, 'have you heard that Politburo member Yakovlev is being brought to court for insulting the Pamyat society?' During the meeting in the press building he very nearly disrupted the discussion with his inappropriate 'denunciations.' For this reason, when those who had been invited to the 'round table' at the editorial office were together in the elevator, and suddenly V. Leshchenko appeared, I blocked his way. Since there wasn't any scene, Leshchenko - a person without shame or conscience - invented one. The court under no circumstances should accede to the provocation of V. Leshchenko."

Subsequently, one court rejected V. Leshchenko's suit, and he himself rescinded his complaint from another court, evidently, understanding its absurdity.

But this really isn't the point. He finally got some attention; the "Pamyat" society was named for the first time. V. Leshchenko himself named it with proud ecstasy in a conversation with the Moscow writers. This movement is contradictory, constantly undergoes deformations, and even appears to be changing its name. But it produced those who are the "leading spirits"—Sergey Radonezhskiy and those who organized the "sabbath" in the House of Writers during the meeting of "April," which was widely and unambiguously commented upon by the Soviet press.

And in this situation, honestly, it becomes clearer and clearer who is reaping the benefit from all this, either the kept woman, or the do-gooder in the ranks of the "teachers of the Russian poets" in the Writers Union of Uzbekistan, and how he had the honor of turning himself inside out on the rostrum of the plenum of Russian Writers.

It is understandable, but shameful. It is shameful to me, who was born a Russian and who is an internationalist by conviction.

It is shameful to the person who wrote to our editors, "Please comment in your paper on the speech by the

Tashkent obscurantist at the plenum of writers of the RSFSR. Leshchenko shamed us in front of the whole Union. Who put him up to it? There have been so many orders and decrees concerning liability for inciting discord among ethnic groups. But yet our homegrown 'section chairman' does whatever he wants. Isn't this somewhat strange?"

One would think that this is a question not for us, but for the procurator.

And here is a letter from a group of Russian writers of Uzbekistan. "A deliberate and malicious campaign is underway to persecute a group of Jewish writers from a position of blatant anti-Semitism. The leader and moving spirit of this campaign is V. Leshchenko, who was only recently himself accepted into the Writers Union. His 'activity' is directed blatantly at inciting discord among ethnic groups."

One gets the impression that there is nothing accidental or inadvertent about V. Leshchenko's campaign. It is deliberate and well-equipped. An example of this is yet another letter from the same Writers Union of Uzbekistan. "Union member V. Leshchenko asked me to reproduce an article. How could I propagate this article when in it he described the Jews as a nationality calling for the annihilation of all other nationalities. A vile article! Receiving my refusal, V. Leshchenko immediately pronounced me a defender of Zionism. How can such behavior be compatible with membership in the USSR Writers Union?"

A true member of the intelligentsia cannot be a chauvinist or a nationalist and this is a 100 times more the case of a true writer. In the past a member of the Russian intelligentsia not only would have refused to shake hands with anyone like him, but would have slapped him in the face with a glove (i.e., challenged him to a duel). For this reason being part of the intelligentsia is not a matter of higher education or membership in a creative union. It lies in a way of life, to which V. Leshchenko is pathologically averse. He is an exponent of the opposite mode of existence, in which it is permissible to call revolutionaries and internationalists and even those who prefer the violin to the balalaika "Jews and Masons." "There is a mirage produced by the appearance of such heralds in center stage. They themselves do not understand what they are proclaiming, but there is no doubt that their words will have consequences and will introduce confusion into our life—a confusion which will be difficult to dissipate, if only because, like every confusion it is formless and cannot be criticized as a whole. While criticism sweeps out this garbage bit by bit, its heralds fill the fatherland with their proclamations, and the right they have been granted to speak aloud gives them the opportunity to attempt to pass these howls and cries off as the true opinions and desires of the fatherland. One of the favorite themes of these outcries is, among others, the Jewish question."

Perestroyka has given us the right to speak aloud. How are we using this right? That is the question. And was not S. Yuzhanov, whom I have just quoted, perspicacious, writing as he was in the May issue of OTECHESTVEN-NYYE ZAPISKI of 1882, more than a century before the appearance of today's heralds under the banners of anti-Semitism?

But I am not talking about various "banners," but only their shadows here, in the revered Writers Union of Uzbekistan.

Letter From the Secretariat of the Board of the Uzbek Writers Union

When this material was being prepared for press, the leadership of the republic Writers Union sent the following letter to the editors.

"The writers of Uzbekistan categorically condemn the anti-Semitic spirit and demagogic contents of the speech by V. Leshchenko at the 7th plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union. We consider this speech an attempt to disorient the public, incite discord among ethnic groups, and introduce a schism into the ranks of the republic's writers; organization.

"With all responsibility, we declare that the writers of Uzbekistan, regardless of their ethnic group, have equal writes in accordance with the Constitution of the Uzbek SSR and the charter of the USSR Writers Union. This applies equally to Jewish writers.

"Within the Uzbek Writers Union a council on Bukhara Jewish literature has been established and is working productively. The measures taken by this council and also councils on Tadzhik, Kazakh, Crimean Tartar, Ugric, and Korean literature are aiding in the cultural renewal of these peoples, and strengthening friendship and mutual understanding among representatives of ethnic groups living on the territory of our republic.

"V. Leshchenko's speech at the plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union in no way reflects the actual state of affairs in the writers' organization of Uzbekistan and evokes profound indignation in the writers of the republic."

From the Editors

PRAVDA VOSTOKA expresses solidarity with the statement that Leshchenko's speech "evoked profound indignation." However, we think that one cannot stop at mere "indignation" here. The question must be posed as follows: with such views can Leshchenko remain a member of the USSR Writers Union?

For us the answer is unambiguous.

Russian Writers' 'Letter of 74,' Antisemitism Deplored

90UN1622A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, Apr 25 90 p 7

[Article by Vyacheslav Vs. Ivanov: "Before It's Too Late"]

[Text] In every issue of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA they print material in support of the "Letter From the Writers of Russia," published in that same paper on 2 March. Our editors have also received responses to that letter, but these attest to the fact that far from all the writers in the RSFSR Writers' Union agree with the "Letter of the 74." On the contrary, the writers who correspond with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA categorically repudiate the spirit and major points in this letter and see it, as a group of writers from Murmansk notes, as an attempt to extend the factional discord and conflicts going on in the corridors and halls of the institutions of the RSFSR Writers' Union mainly in Moscow and Leningrad to all the regional writers' organizations, and make it all-Russian in scope.

A large group of Leningrad writers has taken a categorical stand against the substitution of factional political prejudices and ambitions for universal professional literary interests and values, which was also manifested, in their opinion, during the last plenums of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union. This group proposes a radical revision of the structure of the Writers' Union and the creation, in place of the current "hierarchy of literary bosses," of a federation of literary organizations of the autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and larger cities, etc. in which all would have equal rights.

The "Letter From the Writers of Russia" has been discussed more than once on the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, starting with a protest by the co-chairmen of "Aprel," Ye. Yevtushenko, A. Pristavkin, V. Sokolov, Yu. Chernyshenko, and M. Shatrov (No 10, 1990) and concluding with an article by A. Latynina in the preceding issue of the paper.

Today, as we give the floor to USSR people's deputy, V.V. Ivanov, we consider it necessary to emphasize that LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, which published the "Letter of 74," should make available to its readers not only the responses that "support it," but also those expressing opinions (sharply negative) such as are put forth by the Murmansk and Leningrad writers. A newspaper has the obligation to be objective.

In recent years and months, along with the breath—which we hope is not an illusion—of freedom and the ever more palpable difficulties of everyday life, we have begun to experience the sharp pain of discord, the reason for which is sought in differences in economic status, ethnic origin, language, and faith. Those who value the future of Russia cannot help but be disturbed by the growth in emigration abroad by our fellow citizens whose passports designate them as Jews (I myself am not

an adherent of "point five," and do not divide people up into racial categories; I believe that our passport and personal data system, which diverges from that accepted in the civilized world, is harmful and should be abolished). If the government and society does not undertake decisive steps, then hundreds of thousands of people—even millions—will emigrate in the near future, which will affect the whole economical and cultural life of the nation.

On the basis of recently discovered written texts, beginning with the tenth century a.d., historians have established that for more than a thousand years, the Russians and their remote ancestors lived side by side with Eastern European Jews, whose contribution to the development of our culture, which was created through the efforts of many ethnic groups, was and remains substantial. The centuries of peaceful and mutually beneficial collaboration were replaced and overshadowed by confrontations, persecution and pogroms. But we did not experience a crisis comparable in scope to the one we now confront until Hitler's invasion led to the death of millions of Jews in Eastern Europe. This was our common wartime tragedy! Why were we unable to survive it together and recover after our common victory? Why do we prolong and multiply the pain of insults and separation?

Everyone is free to decide his own fate. No one should be forbidden to leave. One can attempt to dissuade. But to accomplish this, at the end of a century tainted by the extermination and debasement of so many people, good intentions are not enough. Those whom we wish to persuade not to leave must be provided not merely with a guarantee of personal safety, but must also be assured of the enforcement of the equal rights for all citizens provided by our laws. These laws have been and continue to be violated.

I remember how at the very end of the 50s I happened to become the head of the machine translation group in the Academy's Institute of Fine Mechanics and Computer Technology and I decided to hire a certain talented young man. The head of the personnel department told me that this was not possible: the group had already exceeded the standard stipulated in the academy for percentage of Jews. I became upset and insisted on continuing the conversation in the presence of the deputy director. The latter, sitting in his office under the portrait of Lenin, asked me, "Well, Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich, who, as the Germans would say, is this useful Jew?"

I am not quoting something that was simply a random joke in poor taste. It is no secret that for many years not a single mathematically talented young man suspected of having any Jewish blood was able to gain entry to the Department of Mathematical Mechanics of Moscow University. And to this day no one has been punished for this! I was also depressed by the fact that these personnel bans with which I and many of my friends - Russian scholars - had to (sometimes successfully, although at

great cost of time and energy) contend were the direct continuation of the official anti-Semitism of the last years of Stalin's rule, the time of the murder of Mikhoels and the shooting of other writers whom I knew and who were friends of my father, the writer Vsevolod Ivanov, a cultural figure, and member of the European Anti-Fascist committee.

My father, who was born in Western Siberia, remembered that in his youth, during the many years he traveled through the villages and towns of the Asian portion of Russia, he never encountered anti-Semitism. When as an adult after the civil war, he found himself first in Petrograd and then in Moscow, he decided that this was some kind of strange urban perversion. Indeed, the declassé urban lower class, the dregs of the industrial society served as a nutrient medium for Hitler, whose written testament ends with the request that his life's work—the annihilation of world Judaism—be completed. In old Russia, for the intelligentsia, as well as for the simple folk, anti-Semitism was unthinkable. Recall how unanimously the writer Rozanov, who was esteemed by many, was expelled from the Religious-Philosophical Society, during the time of the Baylis affair after he had published the Black Hundred book. And he condemned himself in "Apocalypse of Our Time."

Now we recall this as a spiritual and social virtue that we have lost. I would not want to steep the reader in that fetid and stinking atmosphere that has cloaked the publication in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA of the letter from 74 writers, signed with various names known and unknown. And the ones who are known are known for different things. I am publicly addressing two of those who signed this letter.

Igor Rostislavovich Shafareyevich, we met at the home of B.L. Pasternak. (Haven't you tainted yourself by your contact with this individual? According to your own classification, doesn't he belong to that "small people" to whose designs" you attribute the reason for all the Russians' troubles?) Together we became friends with A.I. Solzhenitsyn and together we wrote a letter concerning the publication of his works. At that point, only a year and a half ago, you did not want, as far as I remember, to acknowledge to me—and to yourself?—that you had written your "Russophobia." I would have preferred that your doubts persisted. It is not for me to judge your mathematical work, but what is your justification for calling yourself a Russian writer?

If socialism is so bad and dangerous, as you write in your book you gave me with a grateful inscription, then why in your collective letter do you defend the idea of creating a Russian Communist Party?

We are not an Indian tribe in danger of extinction who need to be saved from foreigners. Do not insult Russia by encroaching on its defense from foreigners. We intend to continue Russian culture not through querulous complaints about newcomers who are supposed to be

destroying it, but through accomplishments that are worthy of its remarkable and lofty beginnings.

Leonid Maksimovich Leonov, there was a time, when I visited your house almost every day, I became friends with your children, then we met at Academy meetings. I would like to believe that lack of time or your health prevented you from reading all the way through the long Black Hundred text that you signed.

The letter in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA is permeated from beginning to end with the desire to return to the time of Stalin, when even contact with "foreign firms" was considered a crime. It also follows yet another evil tradition—that of political hooliganism, manifesting itself, in particular, in insulting USSR people's delegate A.N. Yakovlev, whose honor, as well as the worth of deputies' paper, which the "Letter of the 74" repeatedly dishonors, must be defended by the law. Although the authors of the letter spend a long time discussing the lack of reality of pogroms and even rumors about them (to hear them speak, the invasion of the Central House of Writers' by Fascist youth never took place), they themselves are preparing the soil for a pogrom. Of course, division of labor is possible: the ideologues of the pogrom, through cowardice or for some other reason, may not participate in it, but this does not diminish their responsibility for paving the way for it.

It is curious that the authors of the "Letter of the 74" are very angry about the possibility of there being a law passed against anti-Semitism. For the reasons I cited earlier, I think such a law is essential. Anti-Semites love to compute percentages: in their letter to LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA they are concerned with the percentage norms of their own publications. I propose that we do not introduce the Pale of Settlement into our literature. Publication of anti-Semitic ravings must be forbidden and decisively; paper and resources must not be wasted on harmful phrase mongering. It is time for all of us to get to work: writers in literature, mathematicians in science. And the government of the country by taking effective measures against the sowing of ethnic discord.

Manifesto on Latvian Culture Published

90UN1455A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
22 Mar 90 p 4

[Article: "Manifesto on Latvian Culture"]

[Text] We 1,194 delegates attending the Latvian cultural forum, who gathered in Riga and other Latvian cities and regions on March 9-11, evaluated the cultural situation in all of the land and of the people, as well as the cultural policy implemented until now in Latvia, and the prospects for the future, believe that the spiritual culture of our people - the main vehicle for preserving the Latvians' identity for centuries - had to perform the functions of the nation's self-preservation both after the Latvian republic had lost its independence and in the course of its 50-year long natural evolution. The Latvian language was threatened with extinction; the rights of

other peoples, with the exception of the Russians, to study their own language and use it as a medium of instruction, were altogether ignored in Latvia. The center-dictated imperial trend, humiliating for the Russian people too, reigned supreme. Professional art, humanitarian and social sciences were excessively politicized; the folk art was often used as a decoration for state facade and to create an impression of grass-root involvement. Both the Christian religion and the Latvian mentality in the relevant material and spiritual shapes were expunged for decades from the processes of spiritual life. This deprived the Latvian people and each individual of an opportunity to make a free spiritual choice, and prevented the Latvian nation from identifying itself as a unique integral part of European civilization and culture.

We have been isolated from the Latvian culture that was being established beyond the Latvian borders.

Certain old problems still prevail and entirely new problems have now emerged in the field of culture at a time when Latvia's political life faces a breakthrough and when the avenues of reviving Latvian culture are opening up. Since man is both the subject and the object of culture, attention should be centered on developing the creative potential of each individual and on bringing him up spiritually. Aware of the prevailing situation, we believe that public institutions, organizations and all people of goodwill should pull their initiative and effort together to practically work towards establishing a new culture of Latvia.

We delegates to the Latvian cultural forum, attended also by foreign guests, address the Supreme Soviet of the Republic and the new government cabinet, to be newly elected, the bodies of local self-government, rural collective farms, associations, enterprises, cooperatives, churches and communities, each citizen of Latvia and all of us together, to each Latvian patriot irrespective of his nationality, faith, citizenship, and domicile in all of the world, and propose:

1

- To pass a law on culture, a law on the preservation of cultural monuments and a law on copyright and performance within one year. To sign the international Rome copyright and performance right convention.

- To revise the existing policy of allocating state budget resources to territories and branches of national economy, considerably increase budget allocations for the development of culture and art. Increase significantly budget allocations from the turnover tax and the revenues received by union-administered enterprises, alternating the policy of state budget allocations during the transitional period, until Latvia obtains its state independence.

- To legislate the percentage of deductions for cultural development from the income (revenue) of all enterprises, associations, organizations, rural collective farms

and cooperatives located in the republic's territory, contributing these amounts to the cultural fund which is to be administered by the bodies of local self-government.

To establish a system of taxation that would encourage charitable contributions for culture and enlightenment. Passing the law on levying taxes on the profits (revenues) of enterprises, associations, rural collective farms, state organizations and cooperatives, make the profits (revenues) contributed for cultural purposes exempt from state budget taxes.

- To levy excise duty on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages. Use the proceeds for the needs of culture and education.

- To allow creative studios under the Ministry of Culture, the "Latvijas" cinema association, the economic organizations of creative unions and the associations of national cultural societies to waive their budget payments for the funds, manpower resources and from their profits.

- To lift customs duties on overseas parcels sent to the cultural, art and educational institutions, the same way as the Latvian cultural fund is relieved of paying such duties.

- To legislate differentiated payments to the overall republican fund for cultural and educational development from foreign currency revenues earned by enterprises, associations, institutions, organizations, rural collective farms, state organizations and cooperatives.

- To enact the policy of economically stimulating entrepreneurship designed to secure the manufacture of the materiel for cultural needs. Encourage joint-stock ventures, stock enterprises and private businesses along those lines.

- Include a special section on the restoration of cultural monuments in the 1991 state plan of the republic's economic, social, and cultural development, indicating the required financial resources, construction materials and organizational facilities. Establish a unified system of monument conservation and restoration in the Republic, including a republican research center.

- To start the overhaul of workers' earnings and finish it by 1991. Urge the government and local self-government bodies to provide financial support for cultural workers in 1990 by drawing on the surplus local and republican budget revenues. Urge all economic managers to provide financial help to cultural workers by paying them extra salary benefits.

2

- To end discrimination against Latgal culture in the eastern parts of Latvia, establishing an order under which both the Latvian culture and the culture of other ethnic minorities in these areas could be promoted. Establish an extraordinary governmental commission to study Latgalia's economic, demographic and cultural

situation, and set up a special cultural zone in eastern Latvia. Leave the decision of establishing the Latgal cultural center, suggested by the "minor" Rezekne forum, at the discretion of the Latgal region itself. Start a publishing house in Daugavpils by allocating a certain amount from state budget.

- To approach the executive committee of the Riga city Soviet of people's deputies with a request to set aside necessary premises for the center of overseas culture and national cultural societies. Support the desire of the republican national minorities to establish cultural centers of their own.

- To build a technically equipped repository (archives) for Latvian folklore in order to encourage the studies of ethnic culture.

- To execute all the preparations to open the Latvian Institute of Culture in 1991. Decentralize culture, providing facilities for receiving higher and specialized secondary education in Latgalia, Vidzem, Zemgal, and Kurzem. Elaborate a unified concept of cultural enlightenment and education in Latvia.

Train teachers of the history of culture without delay, introduce classes on ethnic culture (folklore) at schools, re-establish the centers of craftsmanship and home economy.

- To tailor the work of the Latvian book publishing, printing and paper industries to the interests of preserving and further developing national culture.

3

- Considering the urban environment and the Latvian village active carriers of culture, work to assign priority to the restoration and use of historical structures in financing and in the allocation of materiel. Increase state allocations for putting the cultural environment and the unique cultural objects in good repair: restore the Riga castle; restore the National opera; build a national library; restore the building of the Riga Latvian society (after it has been vacated); - To prevent army units and offices of the Ministry of Defense from occupying the cultural-historical milieu and cultural monuments (the Krustpils castle, the Daugavpils fortress, in the historical centers of Riga, Liepaia, Ventspils, and other facilities).

- To establish a special cultural zone in the territory of the Daugava's old river bed.

- To assign a special status for the protection of the Kurzem sea shore, solving the problems of Livs national culture by providing state budget financing at the same time.

- To request the Latvian government to keep in force the demand made by the Moscow Latvian society to have a house of their own to conduct cultural work in Moscow.

- To request the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia to turn over the building of the Institute

of the History of the Communist Party, now under construction, to the Misin library of the Latvian Academy of Sciences.

- To request the Supreme Soviet to establish a commission which would familiarize itself with the work done by the museum of history of the Baltic military district (2 Pils Square), evaluate its work in a principled manner and make a decision about its expediency.

Let the present manifesto mobilize our spiritual energy and activity for the benefit of the Latvian nation, of all of Latvia's land and all its people!

March 11, 1990 Riga

Creative Intelligentsia in Kazakhstan Snubbed

90US0753A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by V. Maricheva: "We Can Get Along Without Culture!"]

[Text] Alma-Ata. [We can get along without culture] the organizers of the republic meeting of primary party organization secretaries decided.

At the plenary sessions and debates on the report by N.A. Nazarbayev, Kazakh CP Central Committee first secretary and chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, which raised critical and urgent questions on the role of the party in contemporary conditions, not a single secretary of a primary party organization representing the creative intelligentsia spoke. No, it's not that the artist and writers avoided taking part in the main topics of conversation and remained silent. They were simply not in the hall—they were not invited...

"I found out about the work of the conference only from the newspapers," says V. Yakovenko, People's Artist of the Kazakh SSR, party bureau secretary of the Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet imeni Abaya. "If I had known about it a little earlier, I would have rushed to the raykom and asked for an invitation. No doubt they would not have refused me."

However, at the capital's Frunzenskiy Party Raykom, U. Dzhalilov, party secretary of the Kazakh SSR State Committee on Culture, was refused an invitation: The hall at the political education building, they said, is not made of rubber, and only selected persons are invited.

The right of selection was offered to rayon and oblast party committees. And they, as if they had all collaborated, found no places for the secretaries of primary party organizations from the sphere of culture and the arts. Not even from Alma Ata Oblast, where all the creative societies and republic multilingual theaters are concentrated; only the secretaries of primary organizations of the theatrical-artistic institute and the conservatory found their names on the list.

Thus, the dialogue on discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, and on the state of affairs in the republic and in the country, took place without the participation of cultural figures. The meeting, apart from everything else, vividly demonstrated the level of political culture and civic maturity of the secretaries of the primary party organizations. The level was quite often, alas, not high, although all oblasts sent their best to the forum in Alma Ata.

The secretaries who did not go to the conference ask, why was only Nazarbayev's speech published in its entirety in the republic newspapers, whereas only quotations were taken from the rest of the speeches. I can state my own understanding of the situation. Certain speeches could not have been printed or quoted, not because they contained seditious statements, but because of the emptiness of their content. The orators ascended the rostrum not in order to express their profound thoughts or passions, but just to talk about something or other. Other secretaries, not schooled in participation in such high forums, became flustered in front of the audience.

"We thought that at a republic-level conference, cultural officials would have received both complaints, and practical suggestions, and demands. Our secretaries also had something to say. Unfortunately, the first opportunity that arose for businesslike conversation among primary party organization secretaries from various spheres of production and culture was lost," said U. Dzhalilov.

A republic Council of Primary Party Organization Secretaries was chosen at the meeting. Its purpose is to provide direct contacts between the primary organizations and the central committee, and support more efficient solution of problems associated with perestroika in the party. But not a single primary party organization secretary representing the creative intelligentsia was elected to the council.

Moldavian Culture Minister Describes Background, Plans

90UN1502A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 15, Apr 90 p 12

[Interview with Ion Spiridonovich Unguryanu, Moldavian minister of culture, by UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA staff correspondent L. Dobrovolskaya; interview in the Minister's office in Kishinev; time and date not given: "I. Unguryanu" (facsimile of signature)]

[Text] Ion Unguryanu—the Moldavian Minister of Culture.

A sea of problems, current and long-range, has swirled about him, not letting him surface and catch his breath. A huge tower clock is visible through his office window, and, although the Minister had not limited the interview time, I understood that lengthy conversations were inappropriate at the moment. Nevertheless, I began with the past.

[Dobrovolskaya] Ion Spiridonovich, you left Moldavia....

[Unguryanu] I was compelled to leave. They took away my theatrical director's rights and "asked me to." Do you know how they used to ask? It was, in fact, a demand, not subject to discussion. At that time, they did not trouble themselves with debate, and, officially, the order was essentially a disfranchisement: They had fired me "for gross political mistakes in repertoire policy." At that time, by the way, they failed to trouble themselves, not only with debate, but also with logic. The new director, who succeeded me, received an award—for best repertoire—after 1 month. As is common knowledge, one does not build a repertoire in a month. Well, so be it. These are events of days long past. With tremendous effort—they were not letting me leave the republic—I went to Moscow, and the voluntary exile lasted a full 18 years. However, I was not distracted from Moldavian themes. I put Ion Drutse, then also in disfavor, on Moscow and other stages. I was the director and an actor. In a word, I lived. But, for my native Moldavia, it was as if I had died. There was neither word nor a single press line.

[Dobrovolskaya] And now you have returned after such a long absence. Everything has changed!...

[Unguryanu] The changes are great. However, if one speaks of the theater, and I am biased and consider it the main indicator of cultural level—there is a crisis in the theater. It still has not recovered from the blow that was inflicted in the past. Our best dramaturge, Drutse, has been produced everywhere except here. Progressive Moscow has approved, but the reactionary republic administration has squelched every fresh outcropping. It has turned out to be like a grapevine: In their administrative zeal, they chopped it down in a year or two, and now decades will be required to restore it. We are at the very beginning of the restoration path. A new building is being constructed in Beltsy, and we await the return of young actors for the national theater. But this is not a simple matter. Right now, for example, we are seeking a teacher for the correct diction on a Moldavian stage.

It is gladdening that the intelligentsia has awakened from hibernation. The writers have become particularly active. Previously they had constituted an inert mass without its own position. A genuine citizen's current-affairs literature is now appearing. And this cannot but be encouraging.

[Dobrovolskaya] If I am not mistaken, you are the third person in the Soviet Union, after Raymond Pauls and Nikolay Gubenko, who came straight out of creative work into the administrative system. And the administrative system, you know, usually either makes you fit itself, or breaks your back.

[Unguryanu] You see, no system can be either good or bad in and of itself. Every system contains both goodness and badness. Even when sincerely trying to make

improvements, one can do much harm. It is very important to understand where to apply pressure, and where to slack off. The main thing is to make no mistakes. I will not hide it, changing places from the director's chair to the Minister's is psychologically very difficult. I, who love to delve into Shakespeare, for example, investigate the features of human interrelations, and find stage embodiment for these, now must act in an entirely different manner. Here, there is not a stage, but reality. And your every word or action is interpreted in one way or another, setting in motion mechanisms of which I had not even conceived in the theater. I often have to restrain myself, which is not my habit. Even on the stage, I created a free and independent person, capable of withstanding any pressure, and pursued the eternal ideals. Fate took over, and commanded: Enough on the stage; try it in life. The directorship of life—this, of course, is much more complicated. And the cost of mistakes here is immeasurably higher. In essence, an experiment is in progress. An artist is trying to influence realities without intermediaries.

[Dobrovolskaya] So, is it an experiment, or is it fairness, that people are entering the cultural administrative system from art?

[Unguryanu] Let me say it like this: The time has come to replace the experiment in command with an experiment in spiritual search. Why did the people in art find themselves alarmed? The administration had discredited itself, and led culture into a blind alley. And how do we get out of it? I came in with good ideas, as it seemed to me, and with a program of about 20 points. In going through the materials of staffs that previous ministers had headed, I saw with dismay that hardly any of my plans were new—showing up from year to year, they had been discussed in one form or another. And I became terrified that even I would become a party to bureaucratic games. Therefore, I made several unwritten rules for myself, chief among which is: Action, and action alone must characterize the ministry's work, in fact, and every day, and there must be no empty words and promises. I remember how sensibly my farmer father approached life: That which could not be postponed was settled immediately. The land could not wait. Culture, likewise, cannot wait. However, we seemingly will not understand that catch-as-catch-can financing of spiritual health is detrimental, not only morally, but economically as well. Spending money on culture and education is very advantageous economically. When we understand this, everything will come together.

A second, very important corollary is: See the person and his or her problems. The whole ministry is engaged in this when reception of visitors is in process. A person should either go away with a clear-cut solution, or receive an absolutely clear explanation as to why his or her problem cannot be solved today. The point is that something most important—ethical law—has been lost in administrative zeal. And precisely that law should be the point of departure. Here is a simple example: There

is a mother of four little children, a cultural enlightenment worker by degree. Her husband has died. She is raising the children alone. At the same time, let me say: Her professional level does not correspond to her degree. But, for her little children, there is no concern for our laws and rules, and, for them, their mother is the only person upon whom life and fate depend. And, for us, the children also should be the most important consideration in settling the question concerning her. Culture and conscience take nourishment from the same source....

[Dobrovolskaya] Since talk has begun about children, I want to ask you about something. Logically, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Public Education are closely connected, but in practice they often contradict each other.

[Unguryanu] I think this is utterly abnormal. One of my program's main points is to unite the efforts, not only of these two ministries, but also of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade [Goskomizdat], the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and, without fail, the church, in returning to and forming spiritual values.

And another idea concerns me: decentralizing cultural centers. The totalitarian regime also made its mark here. Everything we have is concentrated in the capitals. It is necessary to create major cultural centers throughout the republic, and then a spiritual background, which will enable us to break out of the bondage of culturelessness, will appear. Sometimes life itself impels us to this conclusion. Take my native Kaushanskiy Rayon. There, in one village, is the oldest church building in the republic, and it should have been preserved long ago. And the famous poet Aleksey Mateyevich was born in a neighboring village. He, by the way, was a priest. In a third village, too, there is its interesting history, but there is not even a poor little House of Culture. What if a consolidated spiritual and cultural center, named in honor of A. Mateyevich, were created? We have already

called in specialists from Moscow for restoration of the church. We shall do all the rest with our own resources.

Or, another example: I have picked out two vacant buildings near Kishinev. We want to attract scholars from the republic's Academy of Sciences and writers—by the way, they do not know about this yet, and I am informing your newspaper first—and open an ethnographic folklore- methodology center for all Moldavia.

These are facts and present-day matters. However, I cannot resist telling you about one more idea that seems important to me. A need has arisen to broaden relations with neighboring Romania. I am speaking, if you will, about the cultural confederation's originality. Why invent anew that which our neighbors and brothers already have? Is it not better to exchange our accumulated treasures with each other? An intensive mutual exchange would be very useful to our republic in reviving our language and culture. In short, my plans are big. God grant me the powers to carry them out.

Ukraine Cinematographers Meet With Ivashko

90UN1697B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
15 Apr 90 p 1

[RATAU report: "Meeting With Cinematographers"]

[Text] The Sixth Congress of Ukrainian Cinematographers will begin its work on Tuesday in the republic's capital. On the eve of this event, on 14 April, a meeting took place between board secretaries of the Union of Ukrainian Cinematographers and V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Brought up in the frank and lively discussion were matters regarding the development of Ukrainian national cinema, augmenting its role in the spiritual renewal of society, and pressing issues of cultural policy under today's conditions. V.A. Ivashko answered cinematographers' questions regarding preparation for the upcoming party congresses, affirmation of political and economic sovereignty of the Ukraine, and the situation in a variety of spheres of life of the republic.